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Erschienen in:
Tightly-Secure Encryption in the Multi-user, Multi-challenge Setting with Improved Efficiency Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Practical Strongly Invisible and Strongly Accountable Sanitizable Signatures

verfasst von : Michael Till Beck, Jan Camenisch, David Derler, Stephan Krenn, Henrich C. Pöhls, Kai Samelin, Daniel Slamanig

Erschienen in: Information Security and Privacy

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Sanitizable signatures are a variant of digital signatures where a designated party (the sanitizer) can update admissible parts of a signed message. At PKC ’17, Camenisch et al. introduced the notion of invisible sanitizable signatures that hides from an outsider which parts of a message are admissible. Their security definition of invisibility, however, does not consider dishonest signers. Along the same lines, their signer-accountability definition does not prevent the signer from falsely accusing the sanitizer of having issued a signature on a sanitized message by exploiting the malleability of the signature itself. Both issues may limit the usefulness of their scheme in certain applications.
We revise their definitional framework, and present a new construction eliminating these shortcomings. In contrast to Camenisch et al.’s construction, ours requires only standard building blocks instead of chameleon hashes with ephemeral trapdoors. This makes this, now even stronger, primitive more attractive for practical use. We underpin the practical efficiency of our scheme by concrete benchmarks of a prototype implementation.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Conditional Differential Cryptanalysis for Kreyvium
Nächstes Kapitel Tightly-Secure Signatures from the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption
Fußnoten
1
Their idea dates back to the original paper by Ateniese et al. [2], which name this property “strong transparency” (cf. Pöhls et al. for a discussion [41]). However, they neither provide a formal definition nor a provably secure construction.
 
2
The randomness r is also sometimes called “check value” [3].
 
3
Which, in turn, is based on prior work [8, 30, 36].
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Practical Strongly Invisible and Strongly Accountable Sanitizable Signatures
verfasst von
Michael Till Beck
Jan Camenisch
David Derler
Stephan Krenn
Henrich C. Pöhls
Kai Samelin
Daniel Slamanig
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Buch
Information Security and Privacy

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-60054-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-60055-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60055-0_23

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