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Social Choice and Welfare
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare 4/2013

01.10.2013 | Original Paper

Process manipulation in unique implementation

verfasst von: Hitoshi Matsushima

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 4/2013

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Abstract

We incorporate social influence into implementation theory, and highlight the manner in which an informed agent feels guilty with regard to disobeying an uninformed principal’s wishes. The degree of this feeling depends on the agent’s expectation of others’ behavioral modes. We demonstrate a method of process manipulation, through which the principal employs psychological tactics for incentivizing agents to announce information in keeping with his/her wishes. We indicate that with a version of incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative that he/she wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium without employing any contractual device. Each agent’s psychological cost would be negligible.
Vorheriger Artikel Dynamic contests with resource constraints
Nächster Artikel Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules

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Fußnoten
1
For surveys on implementation theory, see Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), (Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Chap. 10), and Maskin and Sjöström (2002).
 
2
Attempts to incorporate social psychology into economics are not new but are now acquiring growing popularity. For example, see Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Geanakoplos et al. (1989), Bernheim (1994), Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Bébabou (2007).
 
3
For studies in the field of implementation theory that are relevant to psychological aspects, see Eliaz (2002), Dutta and Sen (2011), Kartik and Tercieux (2012) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2012), for instance.
 
4
See Foucault (1995).
 
5
They alternately announce messages but cannot observe the others’ messages.
 
6
\( \text{ Note} \text{ that} s_i (t_i (s_i ))\ne m_i^*=s_{i,t_i (s_i )} (t_i (s_i ))\).
 
Literatur
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Foucault M (1995) Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. Vintage, New York
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Maskin E (1999) Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev Econ Stud 66:23–38CrossRef
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Matsushima H (2008b) Behavioral aspects of implementation theory. Econ Lett 100:161–164CrossRef
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Zimbardo P, Haney C, Banks W, Jaffe D (1977) The psychology of imprisonment: privation, power, and pathology. In: Brigham J, Wrightman L (eds) Contemporary issues in psychology social. Cole Publishing Co., Belmont
Metadaten
Titel
Process manipulation in unique implementation
verfasst von
Hitoshi Matsushima
Publikationsdatum
01.10.2013
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 4/2013
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0712-0

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