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2022 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Setting the Stage: Board Busyness as a Matter of Modern Banking Context

verfasst von : Vu Quang Trinh

Erschienen in: Fundamentals of Board Busyness and Corporate Governance

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter provides readers some fundamental knowledge about the multiple directorships of boards and directors related theories which include the reputation and busyness hypotheses. Multiple directorships are not only observed as a positive indicator for the benefits of directors but also as a negative sign for the risks of directors being stretched thin. The reputation and busyness hypotheses explain such positive and negative signs of board busyness, respectively. In addition, researchers and students can understand why board busyness could be a matter of modern banking context and update some empirical evidence on the effects of multiple board appointments of directors in the banking sector.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Corporate Governance in Banking

Nächstes Kapitel Dual Banking System: Conventional and Islamic Banks

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Titel: Setting the Stage: Board Busyness as a Matter of Modern Banking Context
verfasst von: Vu Quang Trinh
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Fundamentals of Board Busyness and Corporate Governance
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-89227-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-89228-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89228-9_3

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