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Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

31.03.2016 | Original Paper

Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity

verfasst von: Grisel Ayllón, Diego M. Caramuta

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 2/2016

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Abstract

We study the problem of the location of a public facility that generates negative externalities. We consider that agents have single-dipped preferences with satiation: each agent considers a location as the worst, the “dip”, and the farther the location is from the dip, the better for the agent. In addition, an agent might be indifferent between all the locations sufficiently far from his dip, reaching his highest level of satisfaction. We characterize the family of strongly group strategy-proof and unanimous rules. Opposite to previous results without satiation, the locations selected are not necessarily at the extremes of the alternatives’ space.

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Another interpretation is as follows: apply the consensus rule, \( C^{d}(R)\), proposed by Manjunath (2014). This will select \(b\in \{0,T\}\). If there exist an alternative a that Pareto-dominates b, then choose a.

In our case, the default d corresponds to the bias b.

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Titel: Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
verfasst von: Grisel Ayllón
Diego M. Caramuta
Publikationsdatum: 31.03.2016
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 2/2016
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0957-0

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