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2016 | Buch

Introduction Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

verfasst von: Suren Basov

Verlag: Springer Singapore

Buchreihe : Studies in Economic Theory

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.
Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.
This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
Growing body of research calls into question the utility maximization paradigm. This chapter discusses various responses to this research and provides a brief overview of the rest of the book.
Suren Basov
Chapter 2. Ambiguity, Robustness, and Contract Design
Abstract
In this chapter we consider the choice economic agents make under ambiguity, i.e. in a situation when they do not have well-defined probabilistic beliefs. The agents still have a well-defined objective they maximize, but even this minimal deviation from the standard model allows to explain some, otherwise puzzling, features of real life contracts.  
Suren Basov
Chapter 3. Evolution of Preferences, Social Norms, and Decision Rules
Abstract
In this chapter I suggest some general thoughts on a way one can approach the problem of modelling coevolution of decision rules, preferences and social norms.
Suren Basov
Chapter 4. Complexity Constraints and Optimal Contracts
Abstract
In this chapter I discuss the definitions of complexity that emerged in different areas of science and their relevance to the economic theory of optimal contracts.
Suren Basov
Chapter 5. Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts
Abstract
In this chapter I study optimal contracts in the context of probabilistic choice models. Probabilistic choice models represent a more drastic deviation from the standard paradigm since agents in these type of models no longer follow maximizing behavior.
Suren Basov
Chapter 6. Bounded Rationality, Learning, and Optimal Contracts
Abstract
In this chapter we explicitly model the process of the decision making by economic agents. This gives rise to dynamic models of  bounded rationality, where agents adjust their choices with time in a way they consider beneficial.
Suren Basov
Chapter 7. Social Norms and Optimal Contracts
Abstract
In this chapter I will consider interaction of social norms and economic incentives. Adherence to social norms can itself be considered as a form of bounded rationality, since they provide an agent with a simple instruction how to behave.  
Suren Basov
Chapter 8. Miscellaneous Models
Abstract
In this chapter I will deal with models, which are difficult to fit within any of the categories discussed above.
Suren Basov
Chapter 9. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
Abstract
Evidence collected during the past three decades establishes beyond reasonable doubt that one has to go beyond standard subjective expected utility maximization paradigm to explain many commonly observed economic phenomena. This realization gave rise to the development of plethora of different models that deviate to greater or lesser extent from the standard model. In this final chapter I summarize these developments and suggest directions for future research.
Suren Basov
Metadaten
Titel
Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts
verfasst von
Suren Basov
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Verlag
Springer Singapore
Electronic ISBN
978-981-10-1041-5
Print ISBN
978-981-10-1039-2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5

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