Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
MTZ-Fachkongress

Antriebe und Energiesysteme von morgen


Austausch von Automobil- und Energiewirtschaft

Am 14./15. Mai geht es in Chemnitz um die Mobilitätswende durch Elektro- und Wasserstofffahrzeuge.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Erschienen in:
Buchtitelbild

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Introduction

verfasst von : Suren Basov

Erschienen in: Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

Verlag: Springer Singapore

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Growing body of research calls into question the utility maximization paradigm. This chapter discusses various responses to this research and provides a brief overview of the rest of the book.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Nächstes Kapitel Ambiguity, Robustness, and Contract Design
Fußnoten
1
See Allais (1953), Edwards (1954).
 
2
See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
 
3
See for example Basov and Bhatti (2013) and Chap. 7 of this book.
 
4
See, for example, Goeree (2008), Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990), Howard and Sheth (1969), Nedungadi (1990), Punj and Brookes (2001), Roberts and Lattin (1991), Roberts and Nedungadi (1995), Wright and Barbour (1977).
 
5
Refer to Basov, Blanckenberg and Gangadharan (2007) and Chap. 3 of this book for a detailed discussion of this perspective.
 
6
Indeed, if mistakes have sufficiently small support, only high type will sometimes behave as a low type, since only one incentive compatibility constraint is binding.
 
7
Contract is viewed as incomplete if it does not condition payments on all available information that would have been useful under the assumptions of standard preferences and full rationality. It differs from another definition of incompleteness found in the literature as not specifying actions in some states of the world. See Anderlini and Felli (1994), Hart and Moore (1999) for a defence of such a use of the term.
 
8
For a discussion of empirical evidence, see Basov et al. (2001).
 
Literatur
Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école Américaine”. Econometrica, 21, 503–546.CrossRef
Anderlini, L., & Felli, L. (1994). Incomplete written contracts: Undescribable States of nature. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1085–1124.CrossRef
Anderlini, L., & Felli, L. (1998). Describability and agency problems. European Economic Review, 42, 35–59.CrossRef
Anderlini, L., & Felli, L. (2004). Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts. Research in Economics, 58, 3–30.CrossRef
Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (1998). Rent seeking with bounded rationality: An analysis of ALL-PAY AUCTION. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 828–853.CrossRef
Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (2004). Noisy directional learning and the logit equilibrium. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106, 581–602.CrossRef
Basov, S. (2003). Incentives for boundedly rational agents, 2003. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics (Topics), 3, 1–14.
Basov, S. (2005). Bounded rationality: Static versus dynamic approach. Economic Theory, 25, 871–885.CrossRef
Basov, S. (2009). Monopolistic screening with boundedly rational consumers. The Economic Record, 85, S29–S33.CrossRef
Basov, S. (2013). Emotional temperature, probabilistic choice, and the optimal power of incentives. The Economic Record, 89(s), 84–94.
Basov, S., & Bhatti, M. I. (2013). Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics (Contributions), 13, 1–14.CrossRef
Basov, S., & Bhatti, M. I. (2016). Islamic finance in light of modern economic theory. Palgrave-Macmillan: Basingstoke, UK.
Basov, S., & Danilkina, S. (2007a). Auctions with opportunistic experts. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics (Topics), 7, 1–11.
Basov, S., & Danilkina, S. (2015). Bertrand oligopoly with boundedly rational consumers. The BE Journal for Theoretical Economics (Topics), 15, 107–123.
Basov, S., Jacobson, M., & Miron, J. (2001). Prohibition and the market for illegal drugs. World Economics, 2, 133–158.
Basov, S., Blanckenberg, L., & Gangadharan, L. (2007). Behavioral anomalies, bounded rationality and simple heuristics. Department of Economics, Working Papers Series 1012, The University of Melbourne.
Battigalli, P., & Maggi, G. (2002). Rigidity, discretion, and the costs of writing contracts. American Economic Review, 92, 798–817.CrossRef
Becker, G., & Murphy, K. (1988). A theory of rational addiction. Journal of Political Economy, 96, 675–700.CrossRef
Dye, R. A. (1985). Costly contract contingencies. International Economic Review, 26, 233–250.CrossRef
Edwards, W. (1954). The theory of decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 51, 380–417.CrossRef
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, incentives, and contractual choices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.CrossRef
Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (2001). Bounded rationality: adaptive toolbox. Cambridge, MA, USA: The MIT Press.
Goeree, M. S. (2008). Limited information and advertising in the U.S. Personal Computer Industry, Econometrica, 76, 1017–1074.
Grant, S., Kline, J., & Quiggin, J. (2006). Lost in translation. Business Papers, Bond University.
Green, J. R., & Laffont, J. J. (1986). Incentive theory with data compression, in Essays in honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, v. 3: Uncertainty, information, and communication, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
Green, J. R., & Laffont, J. J. (1987). Limited communication and incentive compatibility, in Information, incentives, and economic mechanisms: Essays in honor of Leonid Hurwicz. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1999). Foundations of incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 115–139.CrossRef
Hauser, J. R., & Wernerfelt, B. (1990). An evaluation cost model of consideration sets. The Journal of Consumer Research, 16, 393–408.CrossRef
Hochman, G., & Ayal, S. (2013). Behavioral economics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Howard, J. A., & Sheth, N. (1969). The theory of buyer behavior. New York, NY, USA: Wiley.
Knetsch, J. L. (1989). The endowment effect and evidence of nonreversible indifference curves. American Economic Review, 79, 1277–1284.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty, and profits. Boston, MA: Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin Co.
Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The theory of incentives. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Lipman, B. (1991). How to decide how to decide how to…modeling limited rationality. Econometrica, 59, 1105–1125.CrossRef
Luce, R. D. (1959). Individual choice behavior. New York, NY, USA: Wiley.
Masatlioglu, Y., Nakajima, D., & Ozbay, E. (2012). Revealed attention. The American Economic Review, 102, 2183–2205.CrossRef
Mukerji, S. (1998). Ambiguity aversion and incompleteness of contractual form. American Economic Review, 88, 1207–1231.
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 301–317.CrossRef
Nedungadi, P. (1990). Recall and consumer consideration sets: influencing choice without altering brand evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 263–276.CrossRef
Pulford, B. D. (2009). Is luck on my side: Optimism, pessimism, and ambiguity aversion. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 1079–1087.CrossRef
Punj, G., & Brookes, R. (2001). Decision constraints and consideration-set formation in consumer durables. Psychology and Marketing, 18, 843–863.CrossRef
Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility’. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3, 323–343.CrossRef
Renou, L., & Tomala, T. (2012). Mechanism design and communication networks, department of economics, University of Leicester. Theoretical Economics, 7, 489–533.CrossRef
Roberts, J. H., & Lattin, J. M. (1991). Development and testing of a model of consideration set composition. Journal of Marketing Research, 28, 429–444.CrossRef
Roberts, J. H., & Nedungadi, P. (1995). Studying consideration in the consumer decision process: progress and challenges. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 12, 3–7.CrossRef
Robson, A. (2001). Why would nature give individuals utility functions? Journal of Political Economy, 109, 900–914.CrossRef
Savage, L. J. (1954). Foundations of statistics. New York, NY, USA: Wiley.
Segal, I. (1999). Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57–82.CrossRef
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man: social and rational. New York, NY, USA: John Wiley and Sons.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion and riskless choice: a reference dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1039–1061.CrossRef
Vriend, N. J. (1996). Rational behavior and economic theory. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 29, 263–285.CrossRef
Wright, P. R., & Barbour, P. (1977). Phased decision strategies: sequels to initial screening. In M. K. Starr, & M. Zeleny, (Eds.), North Holland TIMS Studies in the Management Science: Multiple Criteria Decision Making. Amsterdam, North Holland.
Metadaten
Titel
Introduction
verfasst von
Suren Basov
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Verlag
Springer Singapore
Buch
Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

Print ISBN: 978-981-10-1039-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-10-1041-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_1

Premium Partner

    Bildnachweise