Skip to main content
Erschienen in: International Tax and Public Finance 1/2024

11.10.2023

Sovereign debt maturity structure and its costs

verfasst von: Flavia Corneli

Erschienen in: International Tax and Public Finance | Ausgabe 1/2024

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

I propose a theoretical model of a debt contract between a sovereign and its international lenders that determines the optimal debt maturity structure and related costs. It is shaped by two financial frictions: limited liability (the country cannot guarantee that it will not dilute its obligations or default on them) and market incompleteness. In equilibrium, debt dilution constrains the amount of long-term debt issuance. I use this framework to evaluate the impact of two policy interventions: the possibility of sovereign debt restructuring with private creditors and international official lending in the event of exclusion from the international capital markets. The possibility of restructuring after default stimulates long-term debt issuance; however, in equilibrium, those tools are unable to loosen the constraint on long-term debt issuance. Consistently with the empirical literature, I find that even when these policy options are available, the country tends to issue mainly short-term debt.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
I define debt dilution following Hatchondo et al. (2016): “Debt dilution refers to the reduction in the value of existing debt triggered by the issuance of new debt. Issuing new debt reduces the value of existing debt because it increases the probability of default.”
 
2
For a presentation and discussion of SDRM and Redemption Funds see Cioffi et al. (2019), and Committeri and Tommasino (2018).
 
3
Long-term debt and its cost have no time index since this type of debt can be issued only at time zero and repaid in the last period, \(t = 2\).
 
4
The two quantities the country has to repay or receives in the interim period do not need to be the same in absolute value. They are set equal but with opposite sign for simplicity and in order to reduce the number of parameters.
 
5
See Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) for a discussion on output losses in the event of default.
 
6
In case of partial default the deadweight loss is lower than in the case of full default; therefore, the overall welfare improvement for the system given by the possibility of partial default is imposed by construction and justified by the empirical evidence mentioned in the introduction.
 
7
See for details https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr1631.
 
8
If the country repays also its short-term obligations with delay, the case would become analogous to the reprofiling case of the next section.
 
9
The repayment of short-term obligations in case of full default would not change the equivalence result.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Aguiar, M., & Amador M., (2013). Take the short route: How to repay and restructure sovereign debt with multiple maturities. NBER Working paper 19717. Aguiar, M., & Amador M., (2013). Take the short route: How to repay and restructure sovereign debt with multiple maturities. NBER Working paper 19717.
Zurück zum Zitat Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2015). Sovereign Debt. In E. Helpman, K. Rogoff, & G. Gopinath (Eds.), Handbook of International Economics (pp. 647–687). North-Holland. Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2015). Sovereign Debt. In E. Helpman, K. Rogoff, & G. Gopinath (Eds.), Handbook of International Economics (pp. 647–687). North-Holland.
Zurück zum Zitat Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2020). Self-fulfilling debt dilution: Maturity and multiplicity in debt models. American Economic Review, 110(9), 2783–2818. Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2020). Self-fulfilling debt dilution: Maturity and multiplicity in debt models. American Economic Review, 110(9), 2783–2818.
Zurück zum Zitat Aguiar, M., Amador, M., Hopenhayn, H., & Werning, I. (2019). Take the short route: Equilibrium default and debt maturity. Econometrica, 87(2), 423–462.MathSciNet Aguiar, M., Amador, M., Hopenhayn, H., & Werning, I. (2019). Take the short route: Equilibrium default and debt maturity. Econometrica, 87(2), 423–462.MathSciNet
Zurück zum Zitat Aizenman, J., & Marion, N. (2004). International reserve holdings with sovereign risk and costly tax collection. Economic Journal, 114, 569–591. Aizenman, J., & Marion, N. (2004). International reserve holdings with sovereign risk and costly tax collection. Economic Journal, 114, 569–591.
Zurück zum Zitat Arellano, C. (2008). Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies. American Economic Review, 98, 690–712. Arellano, C. (2008). Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies. American Economic Review, 98, 690–712.
Zurück zum Zitat Arellano, C., & Ramanarayanan, A. (2012). Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds. Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), 187–232. Arellano, C., & Ramanarayanan, A. (2012). Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds. Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), 187–232.
Zurück zum Zitat Anand, K., & Gai, P. (2019). Pre-emptive sovereign debt restructuring and holdout litigation. Oxford Economic Papers, 71(2), 364–381. Anand, K., & Gai, P. (2019). Pre-emptive sovereign debt restructuring and holdout litigation. Oxford Economic Papers, 71(2), 364–381.
Zurück zum Zitat Asonuma, T., & Joo, H. (2020). Sovereign debt restructurings: Delays in renegotiations and risk averse creditors. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(5), 2394–2440. Asonuma, T., & Joo, H. (2020). Sovereign debt restructurings: Delays in renegotiations and risk averse creditors. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(5), 2394–2440.
Zurück zum Zitat Asonuma, T., Niepelt, D., & Ranciere, R., (2017). Sovereign bond prices, Haircuts and Maturity. NBER Working Paper, 23864. Asonuma, T., Niepelt, D., & Ranciere, R., (2017). Sovereign bond prices, Haircuts and Maturity. NBER Working Paper, 23864.
Zurück zum Zitat Asonuma, T., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Sovereign debt restructurings: Preemptive or post-default. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 175–214. Asonuma, T., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Sovereign debt restructurings: Preemptive or post-default. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 175–214.
Zurück zum Zitat Bolton, P., & Jeanne, O. (2007). Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of a bankruptcy regime. Journal of Political Economy, 115, 901–924. Bolton, P., & Jeanne, O. (2007). Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of a bankruptcy regime. Journal of Political Economy, 115, 901–924.
Zurück zum Zitat Bolton, P., & Jeanne, O. (2009). Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of seniority. The Review of Economic Studies, 76, 879–902. Bolton, P., & Jeanne, O. (2009). Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of seniority. The Review of Economic Studies, 76, 879–902.
Zurück zum Zitat Bolton, P. (2016). Presidential address: Debt and money: Financial constraints and sovereign finance. The Journal of Finance, 71(4), 1483–1510. Bolton, P. (2016). Presidential address: Debt and money: Financial constraints and sovereign finance. The Journal of Finance, 71(4), 1483–1510.
Zurück zum Zitat Boz, E. (2011). Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs. Journal of International Economics, 83(1), 70–82. Boz, E. (2011). Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs. Journal of International Economics, 83(1), 70–82.
Zurück zum Zitat Broner, F., Lorenzoni, G., & Schmukler, S. L. (2013). Why do emerging economies borrow short term? Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 67–100. Broner, F., Lorenzoni, G., & Schmukler, S. L. (2013). Why do emerging economies borrow short term? Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 67–100.
Zurück zum Zitat Caballero, R. J., & Panageas, S. (2007). A global equilibrium model of sudden stops and external liquidity management. Mimeo. Caballero, R. J., & Panageas, S. (2007). A global equilibrium model of sudden stops and external liquidity management. Mimeo.
Zurück zum Zitat Chang, R., & Velasco, A., (2000). Liquidity crises in emerging markets: Theory and policy, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, 14, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., (pp. 11–78). Chang, R., & Velasco, A., (2000). Liquidity crises in emerging markets: Theory and policy, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, 14, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., (pp. 11–78).
Zurück zum Zitat Chatterjee, S., & Eyigungor, B. (2015). A seniority arrangement for sovereign debt. American Economic Review, 105(12), 3740–3765. Chatterjee, S., & Eyigungor, B. (2015). A seniority arrangement for sovereign debt. American Economic Review, 105(12), 3740–3765.
Zurück zum Zitat Cheng, G., Diaz-Cassou, J., & Erce, A. (2019). The macroeconomic effects of official debt restructuring: Evidence from the Paris Club. Oxford Economic Papers, 71(2), 344–363. Cheng, G., Diaz-Cassou, J., & Erce, A. (2019). The macroeconomic effects of official debt restructuring: Evidence from the Paris Club. Oxford Economic Papers, 71(2), 344–363.
Zurück zum Zitat Cioffi, M., Rizza, P., Romanelli, M., & Tommasino, P. (2019). Outline of a redistribution-free debt redemption fund for the euro area. Occasional Papers: Bank of Italy. (p. 479). Cioffi, M., Rizza, P., Romanelli, M., & Tommasino, P. (2019). Outline of a redistribution-free debt redemption fund for the euro area. Occasional Papers: Bank of Italy. (p. 479).
Zurück zum Zitat Committeri, M., & Tommasino, P. (2018). Managing sovereign debt restructurings in the euro zone. Bank of Italy Occasional Papers: A note on old and current debate (p. 451). Committeri, M., & Tommasino, P. (2018). Managing sovereign debt restructurings in the euro zone. Bank of Italy Occasional Papers: A note on old and current debate (p. 451).
Zurück zum Zitat Corneli, F., & Tarantino, E. (2016). Sovereign debt and reserves with liquidity and productivity crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 65, 166–194. Corneli, F., & Tarantino, E. (2016). Sovereign debt and reserves with liquidity and productivity crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 65, 166–194.
Zurück zum Zitat Corsetti, G., (2018). Debt sustainability assessments: The state of the art. STUDY Requested by the ECON committee of the European Parliament. Corsetti, G., (2018). Debt sustainability assessments: The state of the art. STUDY Requested by the ECON committee of the European Parliament.
Zurück zum Zitat Corsetti, G., Guimaraes, B., & Roubini, N. (2006). International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF’s catalytic finance. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(3), 441–471. Corsetti, G., Guimaraes, B., & Roubini, N. (2006). International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF’s catalytic finance. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(3), 441–471.
Zurück zum Zitat Corsetti, G., Erce, A., & Uy, T., (2018). Debt sustainability and the terms of official support. ADEMU Working Paper Series 2018/116. Corsetti, G., Erce, A., & Uy, T., (2018). Debt sustainability and the terms of official support. ADEMU Working Paper Series 2018/116.
Zurück zum Zitat Cruces, J. J., & Trebesch, C. (2013). Sovereign defaults: The price of haircuts. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(3), 85–117. Cruces, J. J., & Trebesch, C. (2013). Sovereign defaults: The price of haircuts. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(3), 85–117.
Zurück zum Zitat Damiani, S. (2018). Dealing with systemic sovereign debt crises: Fiscal consolidation, Bail-Ins, or Bail-Outs? IMF Economic Review, 66(4), 665–693.MathSciNet Damiani, S. (2018). Dealing with systemic sovereign debt crises: Fiscal consolidation, Bail-Ins, or Bail-Outs? IMF Economic Review, 66(4), 665–693.MathSciNet
Zurück zum Zitat Debortoli, D., Nunes, R., & Yared, P. (2016). Optimal time-consistent government debt maturity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(1), 55–102. Debortoli, D., Nunes, R., & Yared, P. (2016). Optimal time-consistent government debt maturity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(1), 55–102.
Zurück zum Zitat Dellas, H., & Niepelt, D. (2016). Sovereign debt with heterogeneous creditors. Journal of International Economics, 99, S16–S26. Dellas, H., & Niepelt, D. (2016). Sovereign debt with heterogeneous creditors. Journal of International Economics, 99, S16–S26.
Zurück zum Zitat De Ferra, S., & Mallucci, E., (2020). Avoiding sovereign default contagion: A normative analysis. FRB International Finance Discussion Paper, 1275. De Ferra, S., & Mallucci, E., (2020). Avoiding sovereign default contagion: A normative analysis. FRB International Finance Discussion Paper, 1275.
Zurück zum Zitat Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. The Journal of Political Economy, 91, 401–419. Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. The Journal of Political Economy, 91, 401–419.
Zurück zum Zitat Di Casola, P., & Sichlimiris, S., (2017). Domestic and external Sovereign debt. Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series (p. 345). Di Casola, P., & Sichlimiris, S., (2017). Domestic and external Sovereign debt. Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series (p. 345).
Zurück zum Zitat Engel, C., & Park, J. (2022). Debauchery and original sin: The currency composition of sovereign debt. Journal of the European Economic Association, 20(3), 1095–1144. Engel, C., & Park, J. (2022). Debauchery and original sin: The currency composition of sovereign debt. Journal of the European Economic Association, 20(3), 1095–1144.
Zurück zum Zitat Farhi, E., & Tirole, J. (2017). Deadly embrace: Sovereign and financial balance sheets doom loops. The Review of Economic Studies, 85(3), 1781–1823.MathSciNet Farhi, E., & Tirole, J. (2017). Deadly embrace: Sovereign and financial balance sheets doom loops. The Review of Economic Studies, 85(3), 1781–1823.MathSciNet
Zurück zum Zitat Fernandez, R., & Martin, A., (2014). The long and the short of it: Sovereign debt crises and debt maturity. NBER Working Paper, 20786. Fernandez, R., & Martin, A., (2014). The long and the short of it: Sovereign debt crises and debt maturity. NBER Working Paper, 20786.
Zurück zum Zitat Fink, F., & Scholl, A. (2016). A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality. Journal of International Economics, 98, 176–190. Fink, F., & Scholl, A. (2016). A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality. Journal of International Economics, 98, 176–190.
Zurück zum Zitat Forni, L., & Pisani, M. (2018). Sovereign restructuring vs. fiscal adjustment in a monetary union: Macroeconomic effects from model-based simulations. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 22, 470–500. Forni, L., & Pisani, M. (2018). Sovereign restructuring vs. fiscal adjustment in a monetary union: Macroeconomic effects from model-based simulations. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 22, 470–500.
Zurück zum Zitat Gabriele, C., Erce, A., & Rojas, J., (2017). Debt stocks meet gross financing needs: A flow perspective into sustainability. ADEMU Working Paper Series 2017/067. Gabriele, C., Erce, A., & Rojas, J., (2017). Debt stocks meet gross financing needs: A flow perspective into sustainability. ADEMU Working Paper Series 2017/067.
Zurück zum Zitat Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., & Rossi, S. (2014). Sovereign default, domestic banks, and financial institutions. Journal of Finance, 69, 819–866. Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., & Rossi, S. (2014). Sovereign default, domestic banks, and financial institutions. Journal of Finance, 69, 819–866.
Zurück zum Zitat Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L., & Sosa-Pasadilla, C. (2016). Debt dilution and sovereign default risk. Journal of Political Economy, 124(5), 1383–1422. Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L., & Sosa-Pasadilla, C. (2016). Debt dilution and sovereign default risk. Journal of Political Economy, 124(5), 1383–1422.
Zurück zum Zitat Horn, S., Reinhart, C. M., & Trebesch, C. (2021). China’s overseas lending. Journal of International Economics, 133, 103539. Horn, S., Reinhart, C. M., & Trebesch, C. (2021). China’s overseas lending. Journal of International Economics, 133, 103539.
Zurück zum Zitat Jeanne, O. (2009). Debt maturity and the international financial architecture. American Economic Review, 99(5), 2135–2148. Jeanne, O. (2009). Debt maturity and the international financial architecture. American Economic Review, 99(5), 2135–2148.
Zurück zum Zitat Lizarazo, S. V. (2013). Default risk and risk averse international investors. Journal of International Economics, 89(2), 317–330. Lizarazo, S. V. (2013). Default risk and risk averse international investors. Journal of International Economics, 89(2), 317–330.
Zurück zum Zitat Mallucci, E. (2015). Domestic debt and sovereign defaults. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 54(6), 1741–1775. Mallucci, E. (2015). Domestic debt and sovereign defaults. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 54(6), 1741–1775.
Zurück zum Zitat Muller, A., Storesletten, K., & Zilibotti, F. (2019). Sovereign debt and structural reforms. American Economic Review, 109(12), 4220–59. Muller, A., Storesletten, K., & Zilibotti, F. (2019). Sovereign debt and structural reforms. American Economic Review, 109(12), 4220–59.
Zurück zum Zitat Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. C., & Taylor, A. M. (2010). Financial stability, the Trilemma, and international reserves. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 57–94. Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. C., & Taylor, A. M. (2010). Financial stability, the Trilemma, and international reserves. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 57–94.
Zurück zum Zitat Ottonello, P., & Perez, D. J. (2019). The currency composition of sovereign debt. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11(3), 174–208. Ottonello, P., & Perez, D. J. (2019). The currency composition of sovereign debt. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11(3), 174–208.
Zurück zum Zitat Pancrazi, R., Seoane, H. D., & Vukotić, M. (2020). Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 113, 103867.MathSciNet Pancrazi, R., Seoane, H. D., & Vukotić, M. (2020). Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 113, 103867.MathSciNet
Zurück zum Zitat Phan, T. (2017). A model of sovereign debt with private information. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 83, 1–17.MathSciNet Phan, T. (2017). A model of sovereign debt with private information. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 83, 1–17.MathSciNet
Zurück zum Zitat Reinhart, C. M., Reinhart, V.R., &Trebesch, C., (2017). Capital flow cycles: A long, global view. IMF Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference. Reinhart, C. M., Reinhart, V.R., &Trebesch, C., (2017). Capital flow cycles: A long, global view. IMF Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference.
Zurück zum Zitat Reinhart, C. M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Sovereign debt and its aftermath. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 215–251. Reinhart, C. M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Sovereign debt and its aftermath. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 215–251.
Zurück zum Zitat Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009). This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton University Press. Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009). This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Rey, H., (2013). Dilemma not Trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Policy Symposium. Rey, H., (2013). Dilemma not Trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Policy Symposium.
Zurück zum Zitat Rodrik, D., & Velasco, A., (2003). Short-term capital flows. NBER Working Paper 7634. Rodrik, D., & Velasco, A., (2003). Short-term capital flows. NBER Working Paper 7634.
Zurück zum Zitat Saravia, D. (2013). Vulnerability, crises and debt maturity: Do IMF interventions increase reliance on Short-Term Debt? International Finance, 16(3), 311–331. Saravia, D. (2013). Vulnerability, crises and debt maturity: Do IMF interventions increase reliance on Short-Term Debt? International Finance, 16(3), 311–331.
Zurück zum Zitat Schlegl M., Trebesch C. & Wright, M. L. J. (2019). The seniority structure of sovereign debt. CEPR discussion paper, 13692. Schlegl M., Trebesch C. & Wright, M. L. J. (2019). The seniority structure of sovereign debt. CEPR discussion paper, 13692.
Zurück zum Zitat Schumacher, J., Trebesch, C., & Enderlein, H. (2021). Sovereign defaults in court. Journal of International Economics, 131, 103388. Schumacher, J., Trebesch, C., & Enderlein, H. (2021). Sovereign defaults in court. Journal of International Economics, 131, 103388.
Zurück zum Zitat Trebesch, C., & Zabel, M. (2017). The output cost of hard and soft sovereign default. European Economic Review, 92, 416–432. Trebesch, C., & Zabel, M. (2017). The output cost of hard and soft sovereign default. European Economic Review, 92, 416–432.
Zurück zum Zitat Yue, V. (2010). Sovereign default and debt renegotiation. Journal of International Economics, 80, 176–187. Yue, V. (2010). Sovereign default and debt renegotiation. Journal of International Economics, 80, 176–187.
Metadaten
Titel
Sovereign debt maturity structure and its costs
verfasst von
Flavia Corneli
Publikationsdatum
11.10.2023
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
International Tax and Public Finance / Ausgabe 1/2024
Print ISSN: 0927-5940
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-6970
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-023-09800-1

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 1/2024

International Tax and Public Finance 1/2024 Zur Ausgabe