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Journal of Management and Governance

Erschienen in:

01.02.2012

The adoption of deferred share unit plans for outside directors: economic and social determinants

verfasst von: Paul André, Samer Khalil, Michel Magnan

Erschienen in: Journal of Management and Governance | Ausgabe 1/2012

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Abstract

This paper investigates the antecedents of adopting deferred compensation plans for corporate directors. Relying on agency and network theories, we compare the economic and social characteristics of firms that have adopted a deferred share unit plan for their directors over the 1997–2005 period (130 firms) to a control sample. Our findings show that firms where outside directors have higher agency costs, firms having a block holder that owns a significant voting power, firms whose outside directors serve on other boards having adopted deferred compensation plans, and firms that hire compensation consultants are more likely to adopt a deferred share unit plan for their directors than other firms. These findings highlight the importance of integrating economic and social perspectives when investigating the diffusion of compensation practices.

Vorheriger Artikel Interdependence and accounting information exchanges in inter-firm relationships

Nächster Artikel Impacts of institutional pressures and the strength of market supporting institutions in the host country on the ownership strategy of multinational enterprises: theoretical discussion and propositions

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Titel: The adoption of deferred share unit plans for outside directors: economic and social determinants
verfasst von: Paul André
Samer Khalil
Michel Magnan
Publikationsdatum: 01.02.2012
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Journal of Management and Governance / Ausgabe 1/2012
Print ISSN: 1385-3457
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-963X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-010-9142-5

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