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Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 3/2023

Open Access 31.01.2023 | Original Paper

The case for minimax-TD

verfasst von: Richard B. Darlington

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 3/2023

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Abstract

In spatial-model computer simulations with artificial voters and candidates, the well-known minimax single-winner voting system far outperformed 10 other systems at picking the best winners. It essentially tied with two others (Schulze and ranked pairs), both of which are far more complex than minimax. Minimax’s other advantages include Condorcet consistency, simplicity, monotonicity, and ease of voting because it allows tied and missing ranks. It also makes insincere strategic voting schemes difficult and dangerous for the schemers. The new minimax-TD system modifies minimax in three ways, all of which make it pick better winners, according to simulation studies: (a) TD includes Smith/minimax, (b) TD uses one particular definition of a candidate’s “largest loss” in two-way elections, and (c) TD includes a multi-stage tie-breaker which breaks nearly all ties. TD avoids four of the worst anomalies afflicting classic minimax. Four other minimax anomalies can be ignored, leaving TD arguably free of anomalies.

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Metadaten
Titel
The case for minimax-TD
verfasst von
Richard B. Darlington
Publikationsdatum
31.01.2023
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 3/2023
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09390-w

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