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Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 3/2023

27.01.2023 | Original Paper

The case for the five in final five voting

verfasst von: Katherine Gehl

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 3/2023

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Abstract

My central concern is not, which electoral system would elect the best winner, but rather: which electoral system would be most likely to elect a Congress that would deliver optimal democratic outcomes? I use a theory of politics as an industry, first presented in Gehl & Porter (2017), that analyzes incentives and behaviors through the lens of competition. I argue that the optimal system is Final Five Voting (FFV), which is the combination of an open top-five primary and instant runoff voting (IRV) in the general election. Open, non-partisan primaries that select two candidates exist in California and Washington, while Alaska elects four in its open primary. Here I explain why the optimal number of candidates to advance from the primary to the general election is five.

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Fußnoten
1
Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1964), explains that plurality voting tends to produce two-party systems.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The case for the five in final five voting
verfasst von
Katherine Gehl
Publikationsdatum
27.01.2023
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 3/2023
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09386-6

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