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Erschienen in: Marketing Letters 4/2014

01.12.2014

The impact of buyer–seller relationships and reference prices on the effectiveness of the pay what you want pricing mechanism

verfasst von: Ju-Young Kim, Katharina Kaufmann, Manuel Stegemann

Erschienen in: Marketing Letters | Ausgabe 4/2014

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Abstract

Pay what you want (PWYW) is a new participative pricing mechanism that delegates the whole price determination to the buyer. Previous research on PWYW suggests that the final prices paid are not only affected by consumer characteristics but also by varying conditions, such as social distance within buyer–seller relationships and the provision of reference prices. Through an online survey and two field experiments, we test varying conditions of PWYW, such as social distance (buyer–seller relationship), provision of external reference price, product value, level of reputation, and duration of an application of PWYW. The results indicate that the provision of an external reference price is advantageous for the seller as the prices paid increase. The seller should also avoid offering products with high product value under PWYW conditions. Furthermore, increasing social distance may decrease the prices paid. Finally, a high level of reputation may be beneficial.

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Fußnoten
1
Study stimuli (for online and offline experiments) as well as additional analyses (pretests) are available upon request
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The impact of buyer–seller relationships and reference prices on the effectiveness of the pay what you want pricing mechanism
verfasst von
Ju-Young Kim
Katharina Kaufmann
Manuel Stegemann
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2014
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Marketing Letters / Ausgabe 4/2014
Print ISSN: 0923-0645
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-059X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-013-9261-2

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