The Potential Use of Sociological Perspectives for Business Ethics Teaching

In practice, such interdisciplinary, sociological, etc. understanding could be related or added explicitly to any written-down course objectives (such as reflection, holistic understanding) and/or communicated and rewarded in exam assignment texts.

More precisely: general-sociological concepts and perspectives (i.e. in contrast to more domain-specific concepts within so-called special sociologies, such as economic sociology, or sociology of organizations, of finance, of consumption, of law, of education, etc.)

Cf also note 7 below with a reference to Socratic dialogue design.

Instead of a more lengthy and less selective review, see instead review articles such as Stivers (1996), Hitlin and Vaisey (2013), also the first and the last chapter in Hitlin and Vaisey (2010).

One can present classical and easy-to-understand definitions as the ones quoted here, or even better, ask the students to search the web for such definitions and then choose up to three “favorite” ones (sources such as https://​answers.​yahoo.​com/​question/​index?​qid=​20120920011203AA​kLvkh or online access encyclopedia entries such as http://​elibrary.​bsu.​az/​books_​163/​N_​117.​pdf; the result of such a search will most likely result in highly diverse definitions, illustrating the discipline’s diversity).

These two definitions focus on the purpose of sociology and recommend implicitly to proceed from micro- to meso- to macro-level analyses rather than the opposite, for pedagogical reasons. An additional argument in a business ethics context could be, perhaps, that macro-level coverage should be left to complementary approaches by close relatives of business ethics (such as CSR, stakeholder management, Corporate citizenship), departing from macro-level issues, such as the role or societal or global responsibility of business in society.

Two candidates for additional definitions as additional food for thought could be the following ones: “Sociology is simply defined as the scientific study of human life, social groups, whole societies and the human world as such… The scope of sociology is extremely wide… … Sociology insists that we take a broader view in order to understand why we act in the ways we do… We … discuss… sociology as a way of thinking about the world or as a different way of seeing which, once you have mastered it, becomes very difficult to avoid. In short, once a sociologist, always a sociologist… (…) Sociology has developed as a discipline in which we often set aside our personal view of the world in order to look more carefully at the influences that shape our lives and those of others…” (Giddens and Sutton 2013, pp. 4, 26) and/or “For sure, sociology is about society (the big picture) and about social relationships (even in small units). It is about what happens between human beings, about social interaction (…) I won’t try to deliver any definition of sociology… Many will answer … that we need to consider several traditions, several approaches which are based on different basic assumptions…” (Aubert 1979, pp 12, 17).

A fourth approach, perhaps, could have been a review of, e.g. Hitlin and Vaisey (2010), Abend (2010), and Godwyn (2015) with a focus on the texts’ potential relevance for present-day business ethics. Or, ideally, one could as a fifth approach stage a “Socratic dialogue” (see Brinkmann 2015) among business ethics colleagues with an academic primary socialization in sociology for sharing their reflections about the unique contribution of “their” sociology to “their” business ethics teaching and/or research.

For sociology as a discipline without conceptual discipline, well-intended instructor presentations of a common conceptual core risk to be blamed for wishful thinking (and risk an anti-thesis that sociology in reality is a rather confusing market of competing, conflicting, complementary approaches, such as actor versus system, conflict versus consensus approaches—see, e.g. Giddens and Sutton 2013, chs. 1 and 3, Collins 1994, O’Byrne 2011, Stromberger and Teichert 1992). A short list of such terms to learn, understand, and apply would most likely contain some ten to twenty of them, single ones or in pairs. Candidates in alphabetical order would be: actors and action, change, communication, conflict and consensus, control and sanctions, deviance, groups, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, inequality, institutions, interaction, macro and microsociology, norms and expectations, organizations, power, roles, risk and uncertainty, socialization, society, systems.

See also these authors’ well-known step-by-step contextualizing of drinking a cup of coffee; see also a few youtubes: https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​dMR74ytkXKI or https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​4FduU3EokBY.

The first user of the term was most likely Fuller 1936.

Cf for further reading C. Frade’s article of 2009, The Sociological Imagination and its Promise Fifty Years Later…, with an investigation of the actuality of Mills’ sociological imagination, accessible online here: http://​cosmosandhistory​.​org/​index.​php/​journal/​article/​view/​134/​248.

Surprisingly, the term “sociological imagination” has only been referred to once in the Journal of Business Ethics (by Whitaker 2009).

Cf. ibid., the “characteristics” of moral imagination: “1. Beginning not with the general but with a particular situation; 2. Entailing the ability to disengage from one’s primary framework or to extend or adapt that framework in a meaningful way; 3. Dealing not merely with fantasies but with possibilities or ideals that are viable and actualizable. Such possibilities have a normative or prescriptive character; they are concerned with what one ought to do…” (for further elaboration see Werhane 1999, esp. ch. 5, with a more lengthy definition on p 93 and a conclusion on pp 107–108. In addition, see e.g. Ciulla 2004, Werhane 2002, Werhane 2008, Werhane 2014).

Cf, however, once more note 8 above about sociology as an arena of “competing, conflicting, complementary” approaches.

Or perhaps simply on “slow thinking”, see Kahnemann (2011,

https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​yeNXWC30KIw).

Some classical pro & con positivism contributions in the German Positivismusstreit (positivism dispute) are collected, translated and published in Adorno et al. (1976) [1968]. As an additional and even more classical reference see still Horkheimer (1972) [1937]. About the positivism dispute’s predecessor, the German Werturteilsstreit (value judgment dispute), see, e.g. Weiss (2004), or Hart (1938). These two overlapping disputes seem to be less about how to conduct (e.g.) bias-free empirical research and analyse data in practice, than if and to what degree social science is and should feel responsible or co-responsible for the choice of its research topics and questions and the application of its research findings.

As an easily accessible introduction to Habermas’ work in English see the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia, http://​plato.​stanford.​edu/​entries/​habermas/​.

For a review of the moral silence and whistle-blowing literature see, e.g. Brinkmann (2015), De George (2010, 2015), MacGregor and Stuebs (2014), Miceli et al (2008).

H Ibsen, An Enemy of the People, cf http://​ibsen.​nb.​no/​id/​495.​0, transl. from M M Andersen, Ibsenhåndboken, Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1995 (story slightly shortened). The full text is found here: http://​www.​gutenberg.​org/​files/​2446/​2446-h/​2446-h.​htm.​ There is also a 2005 movie in Norwegian, rather close to Ibsen’s plot, slightly updated as a case of marketing contaminated bottled water (with Norwegian West coast scenery as a backdrop and with subtitles in English), see http://​www.​imdb.​com/​title/​tt0447638/​).

Unpublished EBEN conference presentation, somewhat modified for anonymity.

Such an “own” story could, e.g. be about speaking up (or not) about academic dishonesty among colleagues and/or among students, in spite (or because) of reluctance to cast first stones against deviant sinners, of widespread role cynicism, of fears of harassment.

As stories with a similar size format cf Heinz' dilemma (Kohlberg 1969, cf. also Rest et al. 1986), Sam's dilemma (Stratton et al. 1981), The Estate agent’s dilemma (Brinkmann 2009b), Nora’s dilemma (Brinkmann 2009a), The apprentice dilemma (Brinkmann and Henriksen 2008). About so-called scenario or moral conflict vignettes in business ethics teaching (and research) see, e.g. Alexander and Becker (1978), Mudrack and Mason (2013a, b), Robertson (1993), Weber (1992).

Instead of deviance, role, and power one could have selected other, fewer, or (in a book without space limitations) even additional sociological concepts and frameworks, such as communication, conflict, socialization climate, and then related them to business ethics publications, see with such a potential (Beschorner 2006; Bird 1996; Brinkmann 2015; Brinkmann and Ims 2004; Dahrendorf 1959; Dahrendorf 1988; Martin and Cullen 2006; Martin and Cullen 2009; Shafer 2015), all with further references.

Normality and conformity can be, but don’t need to be two sides of the same coin: Minorities are easier to blame for violations, too frequent violations are votes against norms. On the other hand, in a “deviant” subculture (e.g. a mafia economy) deviance from larger society norms would be normal, while conformity with such larger society norms would be deviant.

Cf. Merton’s typology of “anomie” (Merton 1968), where cultural pressure to become rich and successful explains illegal but successful (“innovative”) strategies for becoming rich.

Cf as studies of conflicts between individual conscience and role expectations, e.g. Chonko and Hunt (1985), Posner and Schmidt (1993), Brinkmann (2002).

Selecting and presenting these concepts and perspectives one at a time does not mean that they can’t be combined: Being deviant can often be understood as an outsider or criminal or enemy role, and deviance can be deviance from role norms. Power can imply an ability to define norms, deviance and deviants, such as opponents or rebels (who typically try to develop counter-power). Also, there are ruler roles, and social roles can vary by power and self-determination, etc.

Cf also Crozier and Friedberg: “The phenomenon of power is simple and universal, but the concept of power is elusive and complex” (1980, p. 30), or Lukes’ description of power as an “essentially contested and complex term” (quoted by Powell in Ritzer 2007, p. 3597, also by Giddens and Sutton 2014, p. 209). Then, it seems to be proper procedure to draft how power is approached quite differently by different sociologists, see references under “Appendix III”, in addition Sadan’s overview (2004) which is accessible online: http://​www.​mpow.​org/​elisheva_​sadan_​empowerment_​chapter1.​pdf.

On a micro-level one could wonder if stakeholders have been “invented” years earlier by sociologists, as role-norm senders and as normative reference groups (see Rommetveit 1953).

Cf. “The majority never has right on its side… That is one of these social lies against which an independent, intelligent man must wage war… The majority has might on its side—unfortunately; but right it has not. I am in the right—I and a few other scattered individuals. The minority is always in the right…” (Enemy of the People, act 4, http://​www.​gutenberg.​org/​files/​2446/​2446-h/​2446-h.​htm).

Most interpersonal moral conflict situations (dilemmas, temptations, obedience situations) can be described and understood convincingly as intra- and inter-role conflicts. Either one uses role terminology or other concepts and frameworks such as social interaction, the main point is that unique individuals are less interesting than exchangable individuals, e.g. as role owners and role players.

In addition, see Adobor (2006), Applbaum (1999), Brinkmann (2002), Brinkmann (2009b), Grover and Chun (1994), Hung (2011), Valentine et al. (2010).

A quick EBSCO search (as of Dec 2016) identifies 42 JBE-articles with power as an author supplied keyword, 40 articles where power appears in the title, and 299 articles where power is mentioned in the abstract.

Such a sociologically inspired self-reflection could ask to what extent business ethics is a business school deviant, as a different, strange, peripheral subject, which risks being stigmatised as redundant (or as hopelessly idealistic) by colleagues and students, as useful for AACSB recognition only. Or, we could wonder how our business school colleagues define the role of business ethics faculty at a business school and in the business community: as clerics, critics, conscientious objectors, cynics, or as clowns? Or, one could try to map and discuss the relative power (or powerlessness) of business ethics at a specific business school, as a function of internally or externally justified legitimacy, least interest, or moral model power.

Cf also as a short presentation online https://​sites.​google.​com/​site/​entelequiafiloso​fiapratica/​aconselhamento-filosofico-1/​the-structure-and-function-of-a-socratic-dialogue-by-lou-marinoff.

If there is time enough and if the participants know the methodology, one could even consider a preparatory dialogue, about “What are fruitful Socratic dialogue questions for investigating deviance, social roles, or power, in a business ethical context?”

Ideally and eventually, sociological research means theory-based empirical research. On the other hand, empirical research methodology is rather shared with other social sciences than unique for sociology.

Ideal–typical, i.e. artificially clear and sometimes simplified distinctions, see the text table in “Appendix iv”, prepared as an assumed teacher’s answer to an assumed student assignment, to compare moral sociology to moral philosophy on the one hand and moral psychology on the other.

Cf A Giddens’ concept of structuration, developed, e.g. in his book of 1984, The constitution of society, esp chs 1 and 6.

I.e. units such as roles, groups, situations, organizations, societies and their environments, deviance, and variables such as deviance, status, membership, power.

See in addition Turner (1956), Merton (1957), Brinkmann (1994).