The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Ethical Factor in Giuseppe Toniolo’s Thought

For a deeper insight onto the origins and philosophical properties of the PS, see Millon-Delsol (1993, 2012). Begg (1993), de Noriega (2002), Estella (2002) and Colombo (2004) treat the PS in the EU. Socio-economic and political implications of the PS can be found in Beabout (1998, 2008), Føllesdal (1998), Hittinger (2002), Kelly (2004), Archer and Donati (2008), Aßländer (2011), Evans and Zimmermann (2014), Fleming and Levy (2014). As for the theological dimension of the principle, see Hittinger (2008) and Guitián (2010).

Martini (2007), p. 89.

Donati (2007a), pp. 27 ff.

There is an ongoing debate on the actual application of the PS principle and its compatibility with solidarity at EU level. In fact, until now the PS has been often interpreted as a safeguard for the preservation of traditional national sovereignty. While welfare policies have remained largely a competence of national governments, the emergence of new social risks triggered by globalization, de-regulation and market flexibility have cast doubt on the efficacy of such a framework, calling for more coordinated or even EU-managed policy instruments. For a discussion on this point, see Moreno (2007). For policy proposals aimed at solving the so-called subsidiarity–solidarity trade-off, see Drèze and Decoster (2009) and Van Parijs (2012).

Carozza, (2007), p. 115. See also Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (2004), #132–133.

Millon-Delsol (2012), p. 27 and Duret (2000). See also Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (2004), #185. We should also emphasize that there are various forms of utilitarianism which are not necessarily coherent with a strict libertarian (i.e. the so-called Millian “act utilitarianism”) or Hobbesian view (although they may not be in line with Toniolo’s thought). For example, “ideal utilitarianism”, by Moore, rejected the purely hedonistic view and argued that it is implausible that pleasure is the sole measure of what is good; “rule utilitarianism”, put forward by Urmson, Brandt and Hooker, called for the need of rules in utilitarian thinking; “preference utilitarianism”, put forward in 1977 by Harsanyi, Hare and Singer, claimed that an agent morally ought to do an act if and only if that act maximizes desire satisfaction or preference fulfilment, regardless of whether the act causes sensations of pleasure. For a deeper insight on utilitarianism, see Shafer-Landau (2013), Sinnott-armstrong (2015) and Habib (2015). We thank an anonymous referee for raising such a point.

Millon-Delsol (1993); the author also points out that Althusius, a Calvinist syndic from Emden (Germany) of the beginning of the 17th century, and, more recently, Von Ketteler, Catholic German bishop and politician of the mid 1800, are to be recognized as forerunners of the PS.

Hittinger (2002), pp. 385–386.

Putnam (1994).

Romani (1961), p. 160 and Pecorari (1977).

Leo XIII (1891), parr. 22 ff.

Bazzichi (2012), p. 33.

Walras (1896), pp. VI-VII.

Sachs (2013), p. 86.

MacIntyre (1981).

Sachs (2013), p. 87.

Sen (1987), p. 28. See also Morris (2010).

Cardini (2014).

Zamagni (2015), p. 27.

Duchini (1972), p. 467.

Pantaleoni (1889, pp. 17 ff.) and Keynes (1904, p. 119) use this paradigm as well.

Faucci (2014), ch. 5.

Manzalini (2009), pp. 14–15.

Bianchini (1996).

Pecorari (1977), p. 50.

In his writing “Provvedimenti Sociali Popolari” of 1901, consisting in some policy proposals in favour of the working class, Toniolo explicitly distances himself from the “state socialism” that was being implemented by the Bismarckian social laws. In fact, in his view, such reforms should be not imposed from the top, as it was happening in Germany, but elaborated by a spontaneous psychological process of the ruling class (in view of the organic cooperation of classes) and inspired by solidarity among social bodies and classes (see Are 1990, p. 30).

Acerbi (1984).

See the introduction Toniolo wrote for the reprinted edition of his “Treatise” in 1915.

Spicciani (1984a). In effect, the German economic theories did not produce a large body of studies in Italy, and Toniolo remained one of the few Italian scholars who contributed to this strand of thought (Spicciani (1984b), p. 168). However, it should be borne in mind that Toniolo was certainly not completely ignored by the academic establishment of his day (Manzalini (2009), p. 32).

Toniolo (1915), p. 395.

Spicciani (1984a), p. 166.

Antonio Genovesi, contemporary of Smith, had a similar position, too. According to Sen, “the nature of modern economics has been substantially impoverished by the distance that has grown between economics and ethics” (Sen 1987, p. 7). In fact, this was not the case in the classical approach: “The ethical questions are obviously taken more seriously by some than by others. For example, it has a greater hold on the writings of, say, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill (despite what Bentley says), Karl Marx, or Francis Edgeworth, than on the contributions of, say, William Petty, Francois Quesnay, David Ricardo, Augustine Cournot, or Leon Walras, who were more concerned with the logistic and engineering problems within economics” (ibidem, p. 6).

Bruni (2005), pp. 206–207.

This theme has been extensively studied: for all aspects, Salimbeni (1990), pp. 303 ff., Acerbi (1984), pp. 59 ff.

Toniolo (1915), pp. 7–8.

For all, Toniolo (1882). See also the first series of volumes of the Opera Omnia published by the “Comitato per l’Opera Omnia di G. Toniolo”, Vatican City, 1952.

Pecorari (1997), p. 19.

Toniolo (1915), p. 309. Italics in the text.

According to Toniolo, the social class “is an institution or social (and not purely economic) body and it responds to a human need to achieve, by wider reciprocity of aid, the legitimate and dutiful purposes of the existence […]. The class as a social fact […] arises from a more intimate rapprochement of ideas, feelings, mutual services, common goals, dependent on affinity of educations, professions, civil interests, habits of life”. (Toniolo 1951, p. 176).

Toniolo (1915), pp. 316–317.

Ibidem. Figuera (2014) writes that according to Toniolo, “social classes were part of a hierarchical context the respect of which guaranteed the correct working of society and the achievement of common good […]. Toniolo wanted to constrast the ideas of those who (like Marx, Loria and Sombart) attributed the origin of classes to ‘social and economic causes’ […]. Toniolo did not consider social conflict the instrument to determine income distribution, adopting rather an inter-classist and gradualist approach” (p. 428).

Toniolo (1915), p. 319. Italics in the text.

Ibidem, p. 320. Italics in the text. It should, however, be stated once again that in addition to his rejection of the minimal State, founded on an individualistic an utilitarian philosophy that he outspokenly condemned, Toniolo also and equally strongly rejected the proposal of the State that he defined as “the State of culture” (a forerunner of the “ethical” and of the “socialist” State), which would be expected to fulfil a duty “as a supreme pantheistic organism, providing for the indefinite evolution of civilization by means of laws” (ibidem, p. 336).

Toniolo (1893).

Pollard (2008), pp. 61 ff and Nello (2012).

Cerasi (2014), pp. 88 ff.

Toniolo (1893).

Negri Zamagni (2012), pp. 17 ff.

For a deeper insight on the subject, see Hursthouse (1999); for an historical perspective of virtue ethics in economic science, see Zamagni (2015).

MacIntyre (1981), Zamagni (2014).

Benedictus XVI (2009), n. 57.

During the twentieth century, the PS has continued to be a cornerstone of Catholic social thought with many papal encyclicals and official documents (e.g. Pius XII’s speech at the Semaine sociale de France in 1947, John XXIII’s Mater et magistra, in 1961, Gaudium et Spes with the conclusion of the second Vatican Council, Gravissimum educationis, by Paul VI in 1965, John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus of 1991, the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church). In 2009, Benedict XVI has explicitly stated that “the governance of globalization must be marked by subsidiarity" (Caritas in veritate, n. 57).

Martini (2007), p. 90.

Ostrom (1990).

Donati and Paci (2010) and references therein. This point opens interesting perspectives on the attempt of “modernizing” Toniolo’s thought and possibly “exploit” his views and hermeneutical tools to deal with the crisis of modern welfare states (we thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to this issue). We are conscious that Toniolo was far from pondering most of the issues that are of particular concern today as for the sustainability of modern welfare states. In fact, he lived in a historical phase in which welfare systems were embryonic and not yet conceived in the modern form (i.e. universalistic and mandatory schemes). This is why he never proposed mandatory pension or social insurance schemes, nor the use of public funds for social expenditure. Nonetheless, besides promoting widespread firm ownership, cooperative banks and social legislation for women and children, Toniolo called for solidaristic and voluntary schemes of social insurance, to be organized by guilds (Toniolo 1904), thus offering a possible (and very actual) solution to problems and issues still open today.

Antonini (2007), pp. 213 ff.

Carozza (2007), pp. 114 ff.

Antonini (2007), p. 225.

See, for example, Simon (1983), who introduced the concept of “bounded rationality” and Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000), who have provided an alternative descriptive view (based on cognitive psychology) to the “strict economic rationality” principle of choices in the presence of risk. The latter authors argue that “Outcomes are commonly perceived as positive or negative in relation to a reference outcome that is judged neutral[…].The reference outcome is usually a state to which one has adapted; it is sometimes set by social norms and expectations” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 456). Recent contributions in evolutionary game theory have shed light on the mechanisms of norms evolutions. In this stream of literature, Sacco and Zamagni (1996, 2001) focus on the conditions under which reciprocity and altruism may survive and even spread over as social norms (see Sacco et al. 2006 for a survey). More in general, experimental works of the last thirty years, reviewed by Engel (2010) and Güth and Kocher (2014), provide evidence that in most cases individuals do not behave as homini oeconomici. Among the latter works, Butler (1992) argues that “Morality, then, appears to be a preference variable. It is embedded within a type of 'extended rationality' (as described by Zamagni, 1991) in which it is 'rational for each individual to do his part to maintain a mutually advantageous arrangement' (ibid, p. 5). If it costs us relatively little, most will do the co-operative, collectively rational thing” (p. 299).

Bruni and Zamagni (2007, 2013) and Zamagni (2008).

On this issue of Toniolo’s thought, see Pecorari (1997) pp. 18–19 and Zamagni (2014), p. 123.

On the same topic, Kahneman et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence that quality and quantity of personal relations do matter in subjective well-being.

On this topic, see also the work by Sachs, which documents that in the USA the race towards greater affluence and prosperity has taken place at the expense of an erosion of social capital, mental well-being and ethical behaviour (Sachs 2011). Similarly, the “World Happiness Report” has been documenting for several years that ethical elements not only form the basis of social capital and well-being, but also exert considerable influence on a country’s performance and economic development (Helliwell et al. 2013).

See also Becchetti (2009) and his emphasis on ethical finance.

The always greater need to assess problems involving the environmental sustainability of economic development and the disalignment observed in numerous countries between the trend of GDP and prosperity led to these new trends. This phenomenon (known as the “Paradox of Easterlin”, from the name of the author who first identified it in the context of the USA) reveals that happiness does not increase with increasing incomes, or at least not if the starting point is represented by a certain income threshold (Easterlin 1974). Thus, alternative happiness indicators have been set up on the basis of these studies (for an overview, see Istat, 2015), according to which the wealth of a nation does not so much consist in the flow of goods and services produced and sold on the market as, rather, in the stock of economic, spiritual, cultural, environmental and relations goods of the community.

Becker (1991).

Toniolo (1871, 1879). It has sometimes been rightly pointed out that Toniolo's view on this subject prefigured and to some extent inspired the economic theory of the districts.

For their clarity, the following sentences drawn from Toniolo (1898) are worth quoting: “The easiness of loans […], increased by the transferability of the debt securities that represent it […], can multiply the commercial crises, properly so called, and the bank crises as well. Indeed representative debt instruments of monetary capital loan, multiplied and spread worldwide, become in their turn subject of speculation on natural or artificial fluctuations of their value and cause the stock market crisis” (p. 501).

On this point, Toniolo (1915) states that the current situation implied “for economists and for those holding political office that it is crucial to encourage the formation of an economic social conscience, for the progress of wealth”, defined as a set of concepts, sentiments, intentions and proposals in which the populations participate within their material interests” (p. 53). This vision, which attributes great importance to the cultural question as a driving impulse for the development of society, effectively prefigures the concept of “social capital” which is widespread throughout much of present-day economic literature (Coleman 1990).

Spicciani (1984a), p. 194.

Molesti (2005), p. 130.