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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. The Specific Supervisory Tasks of the European Central Bank and Its Cooperation with National Competent Authorities

verfasst von : Christos V. Gortsos

Erschienen in: European Central Banking Law

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the specific supervisory tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB) and its cooperation with national competent authorities within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The first section presents individual specific tasks as laid down in Article 4(1) of the SSM Regulation (including granting and withdrawing authorisations and ensuring compliance with micro-prudential regulations), and Article 5 thereof, which governs macro-prudential tasks and tools used by national authorities and the ECB. The second section is on the cooperation between the ECB and national competent authorities within the SSM, discussing, in particular, the general principles and obligations on the operation of this mechanism, the dichotomy between significant and less significant supervised entities, and the criteria and procedure for classifying supervised entities as significant, as well as the micro-prudential supervision of significant and less significant supervised entities and groups.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Basic Tasks of the European Central Bank Within the Eurosystem and Issuance of Banknotes and Coins

Nächstes Kapitel Other Specific Tasks and Competences of the European Central Bank Relating to Financial Stability

According to Article 13(2), point (a) CRD IV, credit institutions must have both their registered office and their head office in the same Member State.

The scope of the tasks finally adopted is narrower than under the Commission’s initial proposal of September 2012.

SSMR, Article 1, third, fourth and fifth–sixth sub-paragraphs, respectively (and recital (17)).

On this principle, see Castro Carvalho et al. (2017), Lehmann (2017), Joosen et al. (2018) and Joosen and Lehmann (2019).

‘NDAs’ are defined in the SSMR those within the meaning of EU banking law (Article 2, point (7)); according to Article 458 CRR on macro-prudential or systemic risk identified at the level of a Member State, this must designate the authority in charge of its application.

SSMR, Article 1, fifth sub-paragraph; see also recital (28).

The substantive EU rules governing this aspect are mainly laid down in MiFID II.

The substantive EU rules governing this aspect are mainly laid down in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 2015 “on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (…)” (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73-117) (the so-called fourth AML Directive).

It is noted that in most Member States, the policy objective of consumer protection in financial services is a responsibility of one or more administrative authorities other than (or in cooperation with) the NCA. On the national authorities competent in this field, see at: https://www.eba.europa.eu/consumer-corner/national-competent-authorities-for-consumer-protection.

On this aspect, see the note of the ECB, available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2018/html/ssm.nl180516_2.en.html.

For a summary, see also Table 8.1; the allocation of tasks between the ECB and NCAs is summarised in Table 8.2.

SSMR, Article 4(2); these aspects are governed, respectively, by Articles 35–39 and 40–46 CRD IV.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 14.

Ibid., Article 16. Detailed procedural provisions govern the notification of the exercise of the right of establishment within the SSM by credit institutions established in non-participating Member States, and the notification of the exercise of the freedom to provide services within the SSM by such credit institutions (ibid., Articles 13 and 15, respectively).

Article 4 SSMR is analysed in detail in Lackhoff (forthcoming), who, inter alia, addresses the (contestable) issue on whether the list of specific tasks laid down in the SSMR is restrictive or not. For a critical view, see also D’Ambrosio (2019), pp. 160–165.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (a).

This aspect is regulated in Articles 8–18 and 21 CRD IV and, in the context of the SSM, by Article 14 SSMR.

SSMR, Article 14(1)–(2).

SSMR, Article 14(3)–(4) and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 78(4)–(5). ECB Decisions must be based on its assessment of the application, the draft Decision and comments provided by the applicant (ibid., Article 78(2) with reference to Article 77).

On this right, see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.3.1.

SSMR, Article 14(5) and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 83(1).

SSMR, Article 14(6) and SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 83(3) and 84.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (b).

CRD IV, Articles 33–46.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 17. Detailed procedural provisions govern the right of establishment of and the exercise of the freedom to provide services within the SSM by credit institutions established in participating Member States (ibid., Articles 11 and 12).

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (c). ‘Qualifying holding’ means a direct or indirect holding in an undertaking which accounts for 10% or more of the capital or voting rights or makes it possible to exert significant influence on the management of that undertaking (ibid., Article 2, point (8), with reference to point (36) of Article 4(1) CRR).

CRD IV, Articles 22–27.

For an analysis of these provisions, as they were introduced by Directive 2007/44/EC and have been carried over verbatim in the CRD IV, see Kerjean (2008), pp. 47–79.

Ibid., Article 15(1).

Article 85 SSM Framework Regulation stipulates in this respect that the NCA must notify the ECB of such notification no later than five working days following the acknowledgement of receipt under Article 22(2) (first sub-paragraph) CRD IV, also notify it if the assessment period must be suspended due to a request for additional information and inform it of the date by which the decision to oppose or not to oppose the acquisition of a qualifying holding has to be notified to the applicant pursuant to the relevant national law.

Article 86 SSM Framework Regulation provides for a period of at least 15 working days.

SSMR, Article 15(2)-(3) and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 87.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (d).

CRR, Articles 25–386 and 404–410, 387–403, 411–426, 429–430 and 431–455, respectively.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (e).

CRD IV, Articles 74 and 75 and 88–96. On this aspect, see indicatively Hopt (2012), and in particular on banks’ remuneration policies and practices also Célérier (2014), Nobel (2014), Seiler (2014) and Avgouleas and Cullen (2015).

Ibid., Articles 76–87.

Available, respectively, at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.icaap_guide_201811.en.pdf and https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.ilaap_guide_201811.en.pdf.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (f).

CRD IV, Articles 97–101. According to Article 101, NCAs have the power to require an institution to take the necessary measures (including the supervisory powers referred to in Article 104(1)) at an early stage to address relevant problems in two cases: if the institution does not meet the requirements laid down in the CRD IV or in the CRR, and if the authorities have evidence that it is likely to breach these requirements within the following 12 months.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (g).

CRD IV, Articles 111–118.

SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 8–10; for a summary, see also Table 8.3.

According to the Article 51(1) (second sub-paragraph) CRD IV, a branch is considered to be significant on the basis of the following three aspects: whether its market share of in terms of deposits exceeds 2% in the host Member State, the likely impact of a suspension or closure of the operations of the institution on systemic liquidity and the payment and settlement systems therein and its size and importance in terms of number of clients in the host Member State.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (h).

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 18.

SSMR, Article 4(1), point (i).

BRRD, Articles 5–9 and 27–30, respectively.

‘Recovery plan’ means a plan drawn up and maintained by an institution in accordance with Article 5 BRRD (Article 2(1), point (32); it is governed by Articles 5–9; on this, see Van Heukelem (2017). On both recovery and resolution planning under the BRRD, see Binder (2015), Section II, Haentjens (2017), pp. 197–206, as well as Merc (2017a) and (2017b).

‘Resolution powers’ are those referred to in Articles 63–72 BRRD.

SSMR, Article 3(4); see also Chap. 9, Sects. 9.2.1 and 9.2.2.

On Article 5, see Gortsos (2015), pp. 152–161 and Alexander (forthcoming). The macro-prudential procedures laid down in Article 5(1)–(2) do not constitute ECB or NCAs’ ‘supervisory procedures’ within the meaning of the SSM Framework Regulation; accordingly, Articles 25–32 SSMR do not apply to them, without prejudice to Article 22 on the due process for adopting supervisory Decisions addressed to individual supervised entities (SSM Framework Regulation, Article 101(2)). The ECB Rules of Procedure (Article 13h(1)–(3)) lay down specific rules on Decisions to adopt procedures for the purpose of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 5 SSMR.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 102(1).

SSMR, Article 5(1), first sentence; Articles 5(1), second to fourth sentences SSMR and 104 SSM Framework Regulation lay down the related procedural conditions.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 101(1).

‘Domestically authorised institution’ means an institution that has been authorised in the Member State for which a particular NDA is responsible for setting the countercyclical buffer rate (ibid., Article 128, point (8)). Under Article 458 CRR, if an NCA or an NDA identifies changes in the intensity of macro-prudential or systemic risk in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative effects on the financial system and the real economy, which it considers would be better addressed by means of stricter national measures, it must notify accordingly the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the ESRB and the EBA, and submit, inter alia, draft national measures for domestically authorised institutions intended to mitigate changes in the intensity of risk.

CRR, Articles 124 and 164, respectively.

The CRD IV provides (Article 131(1), fourth and fifth sentences, and 131(2), first and second sub-paragraph, respectively) that a G-SII must be an EU parent institution, an EU parent financial holding company, an EU parent mixed financial holding company, or an institution, and in no event an institution that is its subsidiary. The methodology for identifying G-SIIs must be based on the following five categories: size of the group, its interconnectedness with the financial system, substitutability of its services or of the financial infrastructure provided by it, its complexity and its cross-border activity. Each category must receive an equal weighting and consist of quantifiable indicators. The most recent (9 August 2019) list of these institutions is available at: https://eba.europa.eu/-/the-eba-updates-data-used-for-the-identification-of-global-systemically-important-institutions-g-sii-2.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 128, points (2)–(6) and (1), respectively.

SSMR, Article 1, sixth sub-paragraph, and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 103, respectively.

SSMR, Article 5(1)–(5) and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 102; further procedural conditions, which, mutatis mutandis, are similar to those applying when NCAs make use of macro-prudential tools, are laid down in Article 105 SSM Framework Regulation.

SSMR, Article 6(1), first and second sentences, respectively.

SSMR, Article 6(2), first sub-paragraph, and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 20.

This aspect is governed by Decision ECB/2014/29 (OJ L 214, 19.7.2014, pp. 34–37).

SSMR, Article 6(2), second sub-paragraph, and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 21.

This is without prejudice to the ECB’s responsibility and accountability with regard to its specific tasks under Articles 4 and 5; on ECB accountability, see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.4.2.

SSMR, Articles 6(3) and 6(8).

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 22.

See Sect. 8.1.2.

SSMR, Article 6(4), first sub-paragraph; this applies subject to Articles 6(5)–(6) SSMR and 96–100 SSM Framework Regulation. The criteria and conditions for classifying supervised entities as significant are presented in detail later; for a summary, see also Table 8.4.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 40 (Article 40(3) with reference to Article 39).

Ibid., Articles 41 and 42.

Ibid., Article 39(1)–(3).

Ibid., Article 39(4).

On this Article, see Sect. 8.2.4.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 39(5)–(6).

SSMR, Article 6(4), second sub-paragraph, point (i), and SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 50–55.

SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 70–71(1); the ECB decision must state the reasons leading to the conclusion that such circumstances exist (ibid., Article 71(3), second sentence).

SSMR, Article 6(4), second sub-paragraph, points (ii) and (iii); this criterion is further specified in Articles 56–58 SSM Framework Regulation.

SSMR, Article 6(4), third sub-paragraph, and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 59; the terms ‘cross-border assets’ and ‘cross-border liabilities’ are defined in Article 60 of the latter.

SSMR, Article 6(4), fourth sub-paragraph; it is worth noting that the EFSF had not provided any direct public financial assistance during its existence; on the DRI, see Chap. 4, Sect. 4.3.3.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 61.

Ibid., Articles 62–64; the provisions of Article 62 apply without prejudice to the obligation (set out in Article 96) to inform the ECB of the deterioration of a less significant supervised entity’s financial situation.

SSMR, Article 6(4), fifth sub-paragraph, and SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 65 and 66.

ECLI:EU:T:2017:337, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170054en.pdf. The appeal on this judgment in Case C-450/17 was dismissed by the Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 8 May 2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:372, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-450/17&language=en).

On this judgment, see Tröger (2017), Annunziata (2018) and Chiti (2019), pp. 129–130.

SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 43(1)–(2) (applying unless the Regulation provides otherwise), 43(3)–(5) and 43(7).

Ibid., Article 43(6).

Ibid., Articles 44(1) and 44(4)–(5); the notification must be made within the timeframe laid down in Article 45. When taking decisions on the classification of a supervised entity or a supervised group as significant, and unless otherwise specified, the ECB must apply the procedural rules set out in Articles 25–35 (ibid., Article 44(1)).

Ibid., Article 45.

Ibid., Article 46.

Ibid., Article 47(1)–(3), respectively.

Ibid., Article 47(4).

The information must be provided immediately after the authority whose competence ends becomes aware of the imminent change in competence and be updated on a continuous basis, when there is new information on a supervisory procedure to report, unless duly justified conditions require reporting on a less frequent basis (ibid., Article 48(1)).

Ibid., Article 48(2)–(4). The ECB and the relevant NCA must cooperate with regard to the completion of any pending procedure and may exchange any relevant information to this end (ibid., Article 48(5); that Article does not apply to the common procedures laid down in Articles 73–88 (ibid., Article 48(6)).

‘Joint supervisory team’ means a team of supervisors in charge of the supervision of a significant supervised entity or a significant supervised group (ibid., Article 2, point (6)).

Ibid., Article 3(1) in conjunction with Article 6.

CRD IV, Article 97(1); when making the above reviews and evaluations, NCAs must take into account the technical criteria set out in Article 98.

See Sect. 8.1.2.

100

These Guidelines, which also cover supervisory stress testing, are available at: https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2282666/Revised+Guidelines+on+SREP+%28EBA-GL-2018-03%29.pdf.

101

According to Article 99(1) CRD IV, the NCAs must, at least annually, adopt a supervisory examination programme for the institutions they supervise, containing, inter alia (point (c)), a plan for inspections at the premises used by an institution, including its branches and subsidiaries established in other Member States according to Articles 52, 119 and 122.

102

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 3(2); on-site inspections, conducted under Article 12 SSMR, and on-site inspection teams are governed by Articles 143–146.

103

Ibid., Articles 4(1), 4(4)–(5) and 5(1); Article 4(2)–(3) lays down the appointment conditions.

104

Ibid., Article 6.

105

Ibid., Article 89.

106

Article 91 provides in this respect that, in accordance with Article 6(3) and (7), point (b) SSMR, the ECB may request an NCA to prepare a draft decision regarding the exercise of its specific tasks under Article 4 SSMR for consideration, specifying the time limit for sending. An NCA may also, on its own initiative, submit a draft decision in respect of a significant supervised entity to the ECB for its consideration through the JST.

107

Ibid., Article 90.

108

Ibid., Article 95, with reference to Article 91; this applies without prejudice to the specific procedures provided for in Articles 73–88 SSM Framework Regulation and to its ordinary interaction with its NCA.

109

For details, see Gortsos (2014), pp. 125–126.

110

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 92.

111

Ibid., Article 93(1); see also Sect. 8.1.2. This is without prejudice to relevant EU and national law and Articles 73–88 SSM Framework Regulation, specifying the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 SSMR on the granting and withdrawal of credit institutions’ authorisations, and the assessment of notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in them. The term ‘management body’ is defined in Article 3(1), point (7) CRD IV.

112

Ibid., Article 93(2).

113

See ECB 2014 Guide to Banking Suprevision ECB Guide of November 2014, paragraph 67. As regards the process and criteria used for this assessment, applicable are the Joint ESMA and EBA Guidelines of 21 March 2018 “on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders” (ESMA 71-99-598, EBA/GL/2017/12, available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/joint-esma-and-eba-guidelines-assessment-suitability-members-management-body-and-key-0), the ECB “Guide to fit and proper assessments” of May 2019 (at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.fap_guide_201705_rev_201805.en.pdf), and paragraph 89 of the (above-mentioned) EBA Guidelines on the SREP (EBA/GL/2018/03). On this aspect, see Busch and Teubner (2019).

114

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 94.

115

These supervisory powers are laid down in Article 16(2) SSMR. As already mentioned, in the cases of points (a) and (c) of Article 4(1), the relevant supervisory tasks are performed by the ECB itself for all supervised entities according to Articles 14–15.

116

Ibid., Article 6(5), points (a) and (c)–(e).

117

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 7.

118

SSMR, Article 6(5), point (b), and SSM Framework Regulation, Article 67(1).

119

In the latter case, the NCA must inform the ECB as soon as it becomes aware of the possible need for public financial assistance and submit its assessment of the financial situation of the less significant supervised entity to the ECB, for its consideration, before submitting it to the ESM, except in duly justified cases of urgency (SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 67(2) and 62). It is noted that, in the author’s knowledge, the ECB has not yet made any use of these powers.

120

Points (a), (c) and (h) of Article 4(1) SSMR are exempted.

121

Ibid., Article 6(6), first to third sub-paragraphs.

122

Ibid., Article 96; this applies without prejudice to Article 62.

123

Ibid., Article 97.

124

Such decisions must be sent by NCAs to the ECB at least ten days in advance of the planned date of adoption of the decision and the latter must express its views within a reasonable time before the planned adoption of the decision. In cases of urgency, a reasonable time period for sending a material draft decision to the ECB is be defined by the relevant NCA (ibid., Article 98).

125

Ibid., Articles 99–100.

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Titel: The Specific Supervisory Tasks of the European Central Bank and Its Cooperation with National Competent Authorities
verfasst von: Christos V. Gortsos
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: European Central Banking Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-34563-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-34564-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34564-8_8