Skip to main content
Erschienen in: Energy Efficiency 8/2020

12.09.2020 | Short Communication

The strategic use of auctioning revenues to foster energy efficiency: status quo and potential within the European Union Emissions Trading System

verfasst von: Catharina Wiese, Richard Cowart, Jan Rosenow

Erschienen in: Energy Efficiency | Ausgabe 8/2020

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Auctioning revenues in the European Union Emissions Trading System are likely to increase in the future. This projection is driven by recent changes within the system’s framework, which address the current surplus of emission allowances and reduce the overall cap. Considering a growing amount of auctioning revenues, it becomes even more important to assess the use of these revenues and their potential contribution to accelerate decarbonisation efforts. We argue that strategic investments in energy efficiency programmes provide opportunities for realising multiple benefits: additional emission reductions from both ETS and non-ETS sectors, lower economic and societal decarbonisation costs and support for the political process to further tighten the ETS cap. Our assessment of the status of auctioning revenue use at the EU Member State level shows that Member States have made only limited use of these multiple benefits in recent years. In 2017, no more than 21.4% of total revenues have been strategically invested in energy efficiency programmes, as Member States have officially reported to the European Environment Agency’s reporting obligations database. However, efficiency programmes funded by auctioning revenues in Germany and Czech Republic present promising cases for the strategic use of auctioning revenues. We conclude that the EU carbon price can provide important signals to investors and energy users, but auctioning revenues can also be a powerful tool in the energy transition and the strategic use of revenues needs to be accelerated in all Member States.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
In Europe and globally, energy use patterns changed dramatically in the first half of 2020 due to the COVID-19 global pandemic, and total energy consumption is expected to decline meaningfully in 2020 (see Le Quéré et al. 2020). While such reductions may help Member States to meet overall energy consumption targets in 2020, reductions in energy use due to economic crises, natural disasters and political disruption are hardly the kind of demand reductions sought by energy efficiency policies. Moreover, they are unlikely to persist so as to meet Europe’s emission targets for 2030 and 2050. For these reasons, it remains an important public policy goal to continue making progress on embedded improvements in energy efficiency, even in times of broad economic stress.
 
2
This increase compares the total auctioning revenues in 2016 and 2017 for all EU Member States but France, which has not reported revenues for 2017 yet, and Bulgaria, which has locked its report for public view in 2016 and 2017. 2016 total revenues without France and Bulgaria amounted to 3.47 billion euros. 2017 total revenues amounted to 5.09 billion euros.
 
5
The policy mix for reaching decarbonisation targets cost effectively is not limited to energy efficiency policies but also includes, e.g. renewable energy support and research and development for clean technologies, which also overcome some of the limits to carbon pricing and the reliance on a single pricing instrument. However, the economic and societal cost advantages of energy efficiency and the need for funding to stimulate efficiency investments among a large number of end-users make it a particularly important resource to utilise. These are principal justifications for the policies adopted by the EU and other jurisdictions that call for implementing the ‘energy efficiency first principle’.
 
6
While this paper presents and focuses on the rationale and evidence for investing EU ETS auctioning revenues in cost-effective energy efficiency measures, the topic of reinvesting carbon revenues could also be relevant on a broader scale. The European Commission and Parliament as well as individual Member States are currently considering a range of energy policies and tax reforms that could also yield new revenues. These include the carbon border adjustment mechanism proposed in the European Green Deal, carbon floor prices adopted or under discussion in Member States, extending the ETS to the buildings and transport sectors and revising the energy taxation directive (e.g. European Commission 2019c; Euractiv 2020).
 
7
This calculation is based on the power price increases due to carbon pricing, i.e. the extra cost to consumers and the avoided tonnes of GHG emissions due to the impact on the merit order of dispatch (Cowart 2011). Note: Although the modelling timeframe in the study from Cambridge Econometrics and the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (2013) was set to 2020, the analysis of interactions between cap reductions, carbon prices, emissions and end-use energy efficiency are still relevant and provide meaningful results at all timescales.
 
8
The wholesale power price is lower due to the demand reduction for energy and EU allowances. Both demand reductions have a lowering effect on the clearing price on competitive power markets.
 
9
Note: We do not want to claim that using auctioning revenues is inherently better than other ways to fund energy efficiency. However, there are at least two reasons to promote it: (i) It is aligned with the whole goal of the EU ETS, which is to reduce emissions at lowest practicable cost and should thus be viewed as integral to the design of the EU ETS, just like the LRF or the MSR. (ii) As a matter of practical politics, making the revenue available via a dedicated revenue stream avoids the problems of stop-and-go funding when energy efficiency relies on annual appropriations.
 
10
Art. 10(3) and Art. 3d(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC provide a more detailed list of eligible purposes. Retrieved from: https://​eur-lex.​europa.​eu/​legal-content/​EN/​TXT/​PDF/​?​uri=​CELEX:​02003L0087-20140430&​from=​EN.
 
12
International use comprises funding of multilateral (e.g. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Green Climate Fund) or bilateral programme support.
 
13
Member states submit their reports to the European Environment Agency’s reporting obligations database (ROD), part of the European Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET). Deliveries are available at http://​rod.​eionet.​europa.​eu/​obligations/​698/​deliveries (Accessed 09 January 2019).
 
14
This amount of 2017 auctioning revenues and the further assessment of the Member States’ reporting do not include France, which has not reported its revenues for 2017 yet, and Bulgaria, which has locked its report for public view.
 
15
Romania reports to use 0% of their 2017 auctioning revenue for energy- and climate-related purposes, while Malta reports to use a higher amount for energy- and climate-related purposes than their total auctioning revenue. This difference might occur due to the use of carryover revenues from years before 2017. However, the reported data provides no further explanation.
 
16
We are aware that this approach only gives an approximation of Germany’s auctioning revenue use; however, the available data does not allow for more detailed conclusions. The analysis of domestic use required the following additional data processing: (1) interpretation of committed versus disbursed spending on a country-by-country basis. Some Member States report both committed and disbursed amounts, with the disbursed amounts being included in the committed amounts, while other Member States report both amounts separately. (2) Where Member States report ambiguous domestic types of use or the reported type does not match the purpose of revenue use (i.e. specific programme support), we took a further look at the individual programmes, if provided, to categorise the Member States’ domestic use.
 
17
The aggregated use category includes funding of research and development (R&D) for clean technologies and energy efficiency (1.0%), of R&D and demonstration projects for reducing emissions and for adaptation (0.1%), other reductions of GHG emissions (0.2%), forestry sequestration in the Union (0.1%), adaptation to the impacts of climate change (1.0%), cross-cutting measures (2.0%) and coverage of administrative expenses of the management of the ETS scheme (0.3%). These investment categories are officially listed as energy- and climate-related purposes in the EU ETS Directive. We have added the category ‘cross-cutting measures’, in case multiple purposes have been reported for the same amount of spending and aggregated the categories for which only a small share of domestic revenues is used in order to ensure a clearer presentation in Fig. 1.
 
18
For an assessment of all Member States providing cost compensation, see, e.g. Marcu et al. (2019).
 
19
This debate is not limited to energy efficiency improvements but even more established with respect to increased adoption of renewable energy sources (e.g. Del Río González 2007) and starts to include policy changes on the national level, e.g. coal phase-out proposals (Ecofys 2016).
 
20
The ability of the MSR to absorb the impact of complementary policies on the supply and demand imbalance and the carbon price effect are, however, still uncertain and rely on potential adjustments after the MSR reviews scheduled for 2021 and 2026. The opposite MSR mechanism to release allowances to the market when a lower threshold of allowances in circulation is reached is not expected to be utilised before 2030 (Marcu et al. 2018).
 
21
Through 2017, RGGI states allocated 58% of revenues to energy efficiency, 14% to clean and renewable energy, 14% in direct bill assistance and 8% to other GHG abatement measures (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc. 2019).
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Barranzini, A., van den Bergh, J., Carrattini, S., Howarth, R., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4). Barranzini, A., van den Bergh, J., Carrattini, S., Howarth, R., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4).
Zurück zum Zitat Bennear, L. S., & Stavins, R. N. (2007). Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments. Environmental and Resource Economics, 37(1), 111–129.CrossRef Bennear, L. S., & Stavins, R. N. (2007). Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments. Environmental and Resource Economics, 37(1), 111–129.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cunha Montenegro, R., Lekavičius, V., Brajković, J., Fahl, U., & Hufendiek, K. (2019). Long-term distributional impacts of European cap-and-trade climate policies: a CGE multi-regional analysis. Sustainability, 11, 6868.CrossRef Cunha Montenegro, R., Lekavičius, V., Brajković, J., Fahl, U., & Hufendiek, K. (2019). Long-term distributional impacts of European cap-and-trade climate policies: a CGE multi-regional analysis. Sustainability, 11, 6868.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Del Río González, P. (2007). The interaction between emissions trading and renewable electricity support schemes. An overview of the literature. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 12(8), 1363–1390.CrossRef Del Río González, P. (2007). The interaction between emissions trading and renewable electricity support schemes. An overview of the literature. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 12(8), 1363–1390.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ecofys. (2016). The waterbed effect and the EU ETS: an explanation of a possible phasing out of Dutch coal fired power plants as an example. Ecofys. (2016). The waterbed effect and the EU ETS: an explanation of a possible phasing out of Dutch coal fired power plants as an example.
Zurück zum Zitat Gillingham, K., Newell, R. G., & Palmer, K. (2009). Energy efficiency economics and policy. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 1(1), 597–620.CrossRef Gillingham, K., Newell, R. G., & Palmer, K. (2009). Energy efficiency economics and policy. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 1(1), 597–620.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jaffe, A. B., & Stavins, R. N. (1994). The energy-efficiency gap: What does it mean? Energy Policy, 22(10), 804–810.CrossRef Jaffe, A. B., & Stavins, R. N. (1994). The energy-efficiency gap: What does it mean? Energy Policy, 22(10), 804–810.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klenert, D., Mattauch, L., Combet, E., Edenhofer, O., Hepburn, C., Rafaty, R., & Stern, N. (2018). Making carbon pricing work for citizens. Nature Climate Change, 8, 669–677.CrossRef Klenert, D., Mattauch, L., Combet, E., Edenhofer, O., Hepburn, C., Rafaty, R., & Stern, N. (2018). Making carbon pricing work for citizens. Nature Climate Change, 8, 669–677.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Le Quéré, C., Jackson, R. B., Jones, M. W., et al. (2020). Temporary reduction in daily global CO2 emissions during the COVID-19 forced confinement. Nature Climate Change, 10, 647–653.CrossRef Le Quéré, C., Jackson, R. B., Jones, M. W., et al. (2020). Temporary reduction in daily global CO2 emissions during the COVID-19 forced confinement. Nature Climate Change, 10, 647–653.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Perino, G. (2018). New EU ETS Phase 4 rules temporarily puncture waterbed. Nature Climate Change, 8(4), 262–264.CrossRef Perino, G. (2018). New EU ETS Phase 4 rules temporarily puncture waterbed. Nature Climate Change, 8(4), 262–264.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rabe, B. G. (2016). The durability of carbon cap-and-trade policy. Governance, 29(1), 103–119.CrossRef Rabe, B. G. (2016). The durability of carbon cap-and-trade policy. Governance, 29(1), 103–119.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rabe, B. G. (2018). Can We Price Carbon? MIT. Cambridge: University Press.CrossRef Rabe, B. G. (2018). Can We Price Carbon? MIT. Cambridge: University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Raymond, L. (2016). Reclaiming the Atmospheric Commons: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and a New Model of Emissions Trading. MIT. Cambridge: University Press.CrossRef Raymond, L. (2016). Reclaiming the Atmospheric Commons: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and a New Model of Emissions Trading. MIT. Cambridge: University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rosenow, J., & Kern, F. (2017). EU Energy Innovation Policy - The curious case of energy efficiency. In R. Leal-Arcas & J. Wouters (Eds.), Research Handbook on EU energy law and policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Rosenow, J., & Kern, F. (2017). EU Energy Innovation Policy - The curious case of energy efficiency. In R. Leal-Arcas & J. Wouters (Eds.), Research Handbook on EU energy law and policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Zurück zum Zitat Thema, J., Suerkemper, F., Couder, J., Mzavanadze, N., Chatterjee, S., Mzavanadaze, N., Chaterjee, S., Teubler, J., Thomas, S., Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Bo Hansen, M., Bouzarovski, S., Rasch, J., & Wilke, S. (2019). The multiple benefits of the 2030 EU energy efficiency potential. Energies, 12(14), 2798.CrossRef Thema, J., Suerkemper, F., Couder, J., Mzavanadze, N., Chatterjee, S., Mzavanadaze, N., Chaterjee, S., Teubler, J., Thomas, S., Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Bo Hansen, M., Bouzarovski, S., Rasch, J., & Wilke, S. (2019). The multiple benefits of the 2030 EU energy efficiency potential. Energies, 12(14), 2798.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
The strategic use of auctioning revenues to foster energy efficiency: status quo and potential within the European Union Emissions Trading System
verfasst von
Catharina Wiese
Richard Cowart
Jan Rosenow
Publikationsdatum
12.09.2020
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Energy Efficiency / Ausgabe 8/2020
Print ISSN: 1570-646X
Elektronische ISSN: 1570-6478
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-020-09894-0

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 8/2020

Energy Efficiency 8/2020 Zur Ausgabe