Three Difficulties in Phenomenological Discourse: Husserlian Problems and a Heideggerian Solution

It should not strike us as an accident that Heidegger uses the same technical terms as Husserl.

The idea of motivation here comes from a comment Husserl makes on soliloquy: he explains that the kind of pointing that occurs in soliloquy is unlike that in communicative speech: “this pointing is not an indication [Anzeigen] in the sense previously discussed. The existence of the sign neither ‘motivates’ [motiviert] the existence of the meaning, nor, properly expressed, our belief in the meaning’s existence” (1984a: A36; 2000: 279). He implies that in communicative speech the indication motivates the belief in the meaning’s existence.

This jibes nicely with Crowell’s identification of the ultimately self-responsibility of phenomenology. An intellectually responsible listener, i.e., one who is both curious and desires evidence, will not merely have the intention made known to them [Kundgegeben] but will be put on alert for it and want to test it. See Crowell (2013: 76, 92–94).

Crowell says that this empty intention offers “something like satisfaction conditions that must hold of the intended object if the claim inherent in the act is veridical” (2013: 36).

For another straightforward example of empty, and specifically signitive, intentions see Zahavi (2003: 27–31).

In the years leading up to Being and Time Heidegger consistently uses the term ‘formale Anzeige’. However, he also uses other terms that have an indicative connotation. For example, later in these years he uses the terms ‘aufweisen,’ ‘andeuten,’ ‘aufzeigen,’ and ‘angeben’ to describe communication in general and phenomenological communication in particular. For example see Heidegger (1975: 241f.; 1982: 170). Heidegger also uses the term ‘formale Anzeige’ in a subsequent semester. See Heidegger (1983: 422–430; 1995b: 291). I will generally treat these different expressions with an indicative connotation as being interchangeable. This strategy is not absent in the literature on formal indication. See Dahlstrom (1994: 787). Moreover, this interpretive principle is substantiated by Heidegger’s experimental attitude in this time and the constraints under which these lectures were written: since he is trying new things every semester and writing the lectures under time constraints we should have no expectation that he would deploy terminology with perfect consistency. Finally, because of the experimental nature of these courses it is not contradictory to say that Heidegger uses language carefully but also inconsistently.

van Buren expresses a similar view (1994: 326–328).

This function is only obliquely alluded to in Burch’s paper (2011: 9).

Wort: 1988: 14; Titel: 1967: 231; Terminus: “Anzeige der Hermeneutischen Situation”, 240; Warnung: 1995a: 63; Ansetzen: 1995a: 64; Definition: 1985a: 19f.; Bestimmung: 1985a: 52, 1967: 114; Satz: 1994: 250, 1979: 119, 1988: 80; Begriff: 1976b: 10, 1983: 422; chararactiziert: 1993: 74; Explikation: 1976b: 29, 1995a: 63ff.

For an extended treatment of Heidegger’s concern with the ability of language to damage or cover over what is trying to be said/spoken of see Campbell (2007: 47–68).

This is consistent with Oudemans’ claim that “Anzeige” can be understood “als Ortbestimmung des Denkens” or that “[d]ie formale Anzeige hat die Aufgabe, in der phänomenologischen Explikation für diese Explikation die Richtung vorzuzeichnen” (1990: 89, 94).

Smith thinks that formal indications “signal or indicate phenomena and structures of factical life without de-worlding them––that is, without wresting them from the flux of lived experience in order to become dead specimens of objective theoretical thought”. However, if the way the phenomena are taken is not modified––for the listener––through the indication, then the indications are effectively mundane indications that do not allow the phenomena to show up as phenomena. For this reason, we need to recognize that a change in comportment (intention) does occur for the listener without becoming a theoretical/observational comportment. This is what formal indications attempt to accomplish (Smith 1998: 371).

Dahlstrom emphasizes the understanding of formal indications in which they are concepts, but this emphasis comes at the cost of considering the other ways in which Heidegger conceived of formal indications by focusing on a few instances in which he says they are Begriffe. Even when Dahlstrom recongnizes that they can function as warnings he reduces them to concepts (Dahlstrom 1994: 775f., see also Smith 1998: 92).

This way of stating the formal indications best highlights what can be called the ‘negative moment’ of the formal indication. See Dahlstrom (1994), and van Buren (1995).

Dahlstrom recognizes that formal indications are empty, but narrows the kind of emptiness they possess. He thinks that they are empty of content, but they are at least also empty in the sense of being emptily intended meanings. If we consider both kinds of contentfulness they could be conceptually contentful but not intuitively contentful (Dahlstrom 1994: 782). Streeter correctly identifies the kind of emptiness characteristic of formal indications, i.e., the emptiness of the intention. However, he ties this emptiness to Husserl’s analysis of occasional expressions, which he––like van Buren––argues are the Husserlian forbearers of formal indications. None of these philosophers, however, link the emptiness of the intention to the robust form of communication involved in phenomenological description (Streeter 1997: 413–430); van Buren 1994, 1995).

Elsewhere I have argued that Heidegger has a substantial conception of intentionality in the early Freiburg and Marburg years. Citation omitted for review.

It might be argued that this interpretation is merely expository and Heidegger in no way speaks for himself in it. Against that I would argue first that Heidegger’s use of the idea of an emptily intended meaning in the Hermeneutics of Facticity––a lecture course in which Heidegger is severely critical of Husserl––gives us at least some permission to see ownership in the exposition of emptily intended meanings, second that Heidegger makes clear when and how he is critical of Husserl in these courses, and third that Heidegger’s expositions of other philosophers usually serve the aim of the analysis he is trying to offer. Finally, the passages in question figure importantly in understanding Heidegger’s development as a philosopher. See Heidegger (2003: 65–67; 1986: 378). See also Taminiaux (1977); Dastur (1991); Pöggeler (1989); and Oudemans (1990).

Van Buren, Smith, Kisiel, and Burch, amongst others have linked the communicative role of formal indications to Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication. Smith however, has pointed out that the two strategies have precisely the opposite intent. This alone is good reason to believe that a more proximal source for the method of formal indication lies in Husserl (Smith 1998: 379).

Lafont points out that Heidegger “has to show that the traditional assumption of the possibility of a neutral perception or a ‘simple seeing’ is just a misconception of what can in fact only be a ‘simple understanding seeing’” (2005: 12).

Kisiel expresses a similar argument. See (1995: 49f.).

Lafont points out that this is the kind of theory of perception Heidegger rejects by interpreting “designation as an implicit attribution” (2005: 13).

Caputo has argued that there is a stronger sense of “hermeneutics” operative in Husserl’s works than is ordinarily recognized there. I agree with Caputo only so far. My point is that any intuition always already has a sense (Caputo 1984).

Wrathall argues that Heidegger has two conceptions of truth: truth as uncoveredness and truth as correspondence. I accept his argument regarding truth (= uncoveredness) as a condition for the possibility of truth because in phenomenology truth is an experience, not a property of assertions, and ‘uncoveredness’ is a formal indication that describes the experience of truth in the comportment. However, I reject the argument that Heidegger conceives of the truth of assertions as correspondence because, as we will see, he endorses Husserl’s identity theory of truth, i.e., evidence (Wrathall 1999).