Transparency in the E-Journals Market: Controlled Preferences and Altered Rational Choices

Studies on the transparency in the e-journals markets and its overall effect on public debates and democratic controls are scarce. This paper aims to evaluate the relevance of the microeconomic model when analyzing the systemic behavior of e-journalism. Through a simple theoretical model, where producers and consumers of information are exchanging two types of news (soft and hard news), we examine the overall effect of transparency on the market structure and how the systemic behavior impacts rational choices and decision making. We argue that e-journalism markets are imperfect, even when information seems to be perfectly transparent, as they allow individuals, communities and corporate agents to produce or share an abundant amount of information, exceeding the capacities of each single entity to filter, process, verify or debate the news. More importantly, the direct effect of revealing information has a cross-effect on others, with unpredictable retroactions on the agents’ preferences and choices. Our model reveals the limits of rational choices of free individual agents, within market structures characterized by distorted choices and manipulated attitudes.