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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Unifying Kleptographic Attacks

verfasst von : George Teşeleanu

Erschienen in: Secure IT Systems

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We present two simple backdoors that can be implemented into Maurer’s unified zero-knowledge protocol [22]. Thus, we show that a high level abstraction can replace individual backdoors embedded into protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm (e.g. the Schnorr and Girault protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of an \(e^{th}\)-root (e.g. the Fiat-Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation (e.g. the Okamoto protocol) and protocols for proving knowledge of an \(e^{th}\)-root representation.

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Vorheriges Kapitel AppLance: A Lightweight Approach to Detect Privacy Leak for Packed Applications

Nächstes Kapitel Steady

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

A black-box is a device, process or system, whose inputs and outputs are known, but its internal structure or working is not known or accessible to the user (e.g. tamper proof devices).

That implements the mechanisms to recover the keys.

Associated with her identity.

For systems based on discrete logarithm representations a backdoor was described in [31].

We refer the reader to Appendix A for a definition of the concept.

At least 2048 bits, better 3072 bits.

At least 192 bits, better 256 bits.

Peggy sends t, Victor sends c, Peggy sends r.

If Peggy knows her secret she is able to detect the SETUP mechanism using its description and parameters (found by means of reverse engineering a black-box, for example).

As in Definition 5.

This proof can be seen as a more efficient version of a proposal made by Chaum et al. [8].

See Remark 1.

Not only the ones obtained using the Fiat-Shamir transform.

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Titel: Unifying Kleptographic Attacks
verfasst von: George Teşeleanu
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Secure IT Systems
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03637-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-03638-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03638-6_5

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