Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
SLX-Digitalkonferenz: Zukunftswerkstatt 2024

Mehr Umsatz mit Top-Kontakten

Am 7. Mai erfahren Sie, wie Vertriebsteams Leadgenerierung, Leadnurturing und Leadstrategien effizient steuern können.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Social Choice and Welfare
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare 2/2016

07.06.2016 | Original Paper

Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing

verfasst von: Marco Faravelli, Priscilla Man, Bang Dinh Nguyen

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 2/2016

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

We generalize Börgers’ (Am Econ Rev 94:57–66, 2004) results to a broad class of power sharing electoral systems. We show that voluntary voting under a power sharing regime Pareto dominates both random decision making and compulsory voting. We also show, however, that voluntary voting is not socially optimal, as individuals vote too frequently.
Vorheriger Artikel Corruption and bicameral reforms
Nächster Artikel Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
Castanheira (2003), Kartal (2015) and Faravelli and Sanchez-Pages (2015), among others, have also investigated the participation and welfare implications of power sharing.
 
2
“Ideal” meaning that seats are infinitely divisible.
 
3
All omitted proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
 
4
However, compulsory voting does not interim Pareto dominate these voluntary voting equilibria. Those who are not voting at these equilibria could have a higher payoff under voluntary voting as their voting cost may be too high.
 
5
There is a local maximum at \(p=0.9809\) for the social planner problem, achieving an ex-ante welfare of 0.5767. See Appendix 7.6.
 
6
It is not true that at least one equilibrium must occur at a point where there is negative externality of voting. We could have constructed the cost distribution function such that the only voluntary voting equilibrium occurs on the interval where the expected gross benefit of voting is increasing.
 
7
It should be noted that the G function in this example could have been made continuous (by making the function linear on the \(\varepsilon \)-balls around 1 / 3 and 2 / 3) and the same qualitative results would remain. It is the curvature, not (dis)continuity, that drives this example.
 
8
For notational convenience, we adopt the convention \(0^0 = 1\) throughout this paper.
 
9
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this simple proof.
 
Literatur
Castanheira M (2003) Victory margins and the paradox of voting. Eur J Polit Econ 19:817–841CrossRef
Faravelli M, Man P (2014) Generalized majority rules. Working Paper, University of Queensland
Faravelli M, Man P, Walsh R (2015) Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections. Games Econ Behav 93:1–23CrossRef
Faravelli M, Sanchez-Pages S (2015) (Don’t) make my vote count. J Theor Polit 27(4):544–569CrossRef
Herrera H, Morelli M, Palfrey TR (2014) Turnout and power sharing. Econ J 124:F131–F162CrossRef
Kartal M (2015) A comparative welfare analysis of electoral systems with endogenous turnout. Econ J 125:1369–1392CrossRef
Krasa S, Polborn MK (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting? Games Econ Behav 66:275–291CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing
verfasst von
Marco Faravelli
Priscilla Man
Bang Dinh Nguyen
Publikationsdatum
07.06.2016
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 2/2016
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0970-3

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2016

Social Choice and Welfare 2/2016 Zur Ausgabe

Original Paper

Corruption and bicameral reforms

Original Paper

A note on extended stable sets

Original Paper

Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity

Original Paper

Decision sciences and the new case for paternalism: three welfare-related justificatory challenges

Original Paper

Limit representations of intergenerational equity

Original Paper

Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice