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Group Decision and Negotiation

Erschienen in:

16.10.2019

Assignment Games with a Central Player

verfasst von: Saadia El Obadi, Silvia Miquel

Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation | Ausgabe 6/2019

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Abstract

We introduce a two-sided market situation with a central player. This player plays both the role of buyer and seller. From this situation we consider the corresponding TU-game and describe the core of the game in terms of the market data. We also study two point solutions: the nucleolus and the \(\tau \)-value. When we allow the central player to have multiple partners, the game is still balanced and each competitive equilibrium provides a core allocation.

Vorheriger Artikel Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration: The Best Way to Avoid Negotiation Failure

Nächster Artikel Probabilistic Option Prioritizing in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

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For technical reasons, we will consider, if necessary, that in case of only one seller we can assume a fictious seller with \(a_{2h}=0\), and similarly, a fictious second buyer with \(a_{h2}=0\) in case of only one buyer.

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Titel: Assignment Games with a Central Player
verfasst von: Saadia El Obadi
Silvia Miquel
Publikationsdatum: 16.10.2019
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation / Ausgabe 6/2019
Print ISSN: 0926-2644
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9907
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09638-1

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