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Group Decision and Negotiation

Erschienen in:

05.09.2019

A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints

verfasst von: Haris Aziz

Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation | Ausgabe 6/2019

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Abstract

Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computational intractability in general, and (2) inability to suggest a solution for instances where the hard constraints cannot be met. We propose a cubic-time algorithm for diverse committee selection that satisfies natural axioms and draws on the idea of using soft bounds.

Vorheriger Artikel Direct Iterative Procedures for Consensus Building with Additive Preference Relations Based on the Discrete Assessment Scale

Nächster Artikel DSmT-Based Group DEMATEL Method with Reaching Consensus

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The model where synergies or presence of diverse agents provide additional points to the committee has been considered in a general model by Izsak et al. (2018).

More general models also allow for expressing upper quotas. The goal of the upper quotas can easily be met by setting lower quotas on the complement of the set of types.

Note that \(\underline{q^t}\) is not a vector. The underscore denotes that it is a lower bound.

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Titel: A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints
verfasst von: Haris Aziz
Publikationsdatum: 05.09.2019
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation / Ausgabe 6/2019
Print ISSN: 0926-2644
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9907
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09634-5

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