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Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications 1/2022

11.10.2021

Dynamic Games of Social Distancing During an Epidemic: Analysis of Asymmetric Solutions

verfasst von: Ioannis Kordonis, Athanasios-Rafail Lagos, George P. Papavassilopoulos

Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Ausgabe 1/2022

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Abstract

Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID-19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a continuum of players and individual infection dynamics. The evolution of the players’ infection states follows a variant of the well-known SIR dynamics. We assume that the players are not sure about their infection state, and thus, they choose their actions based on their individually perceived probabilities of being susceptible, infected, or removed. The cost of each player depends both on her infection state and on the contact with others. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and characterize Nash equilibria using nonlinear complementarity problems. We then exploit some monotonicity properties of the optimal policies to obtain a reduced-order characterization for Nash equilibrium and reduce its computation to the solution of a low-dimensional optimization problem. It turns out that, even in the symmetric case, where all the players have the same parameters, players may have very different behaviors. We finally present some numerical studies that illustrate this interesting phenomenon and investigate the effects of several parameters, including the players’ vulnerability, the time horizon, and the maximum allowed actions, on the optimal policies and the players’ costs.
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Data availability: The datasets generated during and analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Dynamic Games of Social Distancing During an Epidemic: Analysis of Asymmetric Solutions
verfasst von
Ioannis Kordonis
Athanasios-Rafail Lagos
George P. Papavassilopoulos
Publikationsdatum
11.10.2021
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Dynamic Games and Applications / Ausgabe 1/2022
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Elektronische ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00403-1

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