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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Finanzpolitik

verfasst von : Oliver Pamp, Jan Schnellenbach

Erschienen in: Politik und Wirtschaft

Verlag: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag liefert einen Überblick über die politik- und wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung zur Erklärung staatlichen finanzpolitischen Handelns. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass die durch den politischen Prozess erzeugten finanzpolitischen Entscheidungen sich häufig von jenen Maßnahmen unterscheiden, welche eine rein an Effizienzkriterien ausgelegte ökonomische Analyse empfehlen würde. Die Untersuchung der politik-ökonomischen Determinanten der Finanzpolitik erlaubt ein besseres Verständnis staatlichen Handelns und ermöglicht die Formulierung wissenschaftlich fundierter Reformvorschläge. Einige davon werden am Ende des Beitrags diskutiert.

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Titel: Finanzpolitik
verfasst von: Oliver Pamp
Jan Schnellenbach
Verlag: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
Buch: Politik und Wirtschaft
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-06226-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-658-06227-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06227-9_9