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Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 3/2014

01.09.2014 | Original Paper

Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan

verfasst von: James D. Gwartney, Randall G. Holcombe

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 3/2014

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Abstract

James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities to accomplish together ends that they would be unable to accomplish individually, or through bilateral exchange. Buchanan’s vision of politics as exchange is a normative framework for evaluating the rules within which political activity takes place. Rules that meet the criterion of agreement are desirable constitutional rules, and Buchanan recognized that not all government activity satisfies that criterion. Buchanan is the father of the subdiscipline of constitutional political economy, and his “politics as exchange” approach provides the foundation for much work in that area. Buchanan has created a foundation that is rich in ideas, but leaves behind a number of unanswered questions that point the way toward a further development of the research program in constitutional political economy.

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Fußnoten
1
We note with some pride, as members of the Florida State University economics department, that Allen, Buchanan, and Colberg were all members of our department when they wrote that book.
 
2
This passage is related to Buchanan’s (1969) book on the subjective nature of cost. One can never know what the results might have been of an option that was foregone.
 
3
Buchanan (1990) depicts his constitutional political economy research program as analyzing the choice among constraints, contrasting it with models of individual behavior in which individuals make choices subject to constraints.
 
4
Indeed, Hayek (1944) and Schumpeter (1947) both made arguments that people were consenting to give up their liberty.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan
verfasst von
James D. Gwartney
Randall G. Holcombe
Publikationsdatum
01.09.2014
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 3/2014
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9165-z

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