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Public Choice

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01.12.2013

The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years

verfasst von: Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Mary Stegmaier

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2013

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Abstract

Nannestad and Paldam (Public Choice 79:213–245, 1994) published herein an extremely influential review of the literature linking economics and elections, what they called the “VP functions.” In that work, they offered a number of conclusions, in proposition form, about the state of the evidence in this field. We present the key ones (16 in all), and assess the extent to which they continue to hold, in light of the new evidence about what has come to be known as economic voting. As shall be shown, Nannestad and Paldam were prescient in their early establishment of many of the principal results explaining how the economy moves the vote choice.

Vorheriger Artikel Public choice, political economy and development: an introduction to the life, times and themes of Martin Paldam

Nächster Artikel Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence

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One partial exception comes from the investigation of Van der Brug et al. (2007: 181), who find that under conditions wherein responsibility is unclear, the prospective effect might be stronger. We focus further on such conditionalities below.

It is worth noting that the Standard Error of Estimate, in some ways a better measure of comparative model fit, follows the same rank-order as these adjusted R-squareds.

For current reviews of the election forecasting literature on the United States and other countries, see Lewis-Beck and Tien (2011), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2014), and the annotated bibliography of Stegmaier and Norpoth (2013).

But, as we noted earlier with regard to the use of approval as an independent variable, here vote (t−1) is influenced by the economic conditions leading up to that earlier election, underscoring the complexity involved in identifying the strength of the p- and e-parts.

Cohabitation is when the French President and Prime Minister hail from different political parties.

When indirect effects and reciprocal links between economic and political variables are taken into account, in systems of equations, this judgment may be qualified.

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Titel: The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years
verfasst von: Michael S. Lewis-Beck
Mary Stegmaier
Publikationsdatum: 01.12.2013
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2013
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0086-6

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