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Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

01.04.2015

Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

verfasst von: Rainer Schwabe

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 4/2015

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Abstract

I develop a model of campaign finance in primary elections in which campaigns, which supply hard information about candidates’ electability, must be financed by strategic donors. I provide a rationale for Super Tuesday electoral calendars in which a block of voters vote simultaneously early in the election followed by other voters voting sequentially. For a range of campaign costs, such a calendar maximizes expected donations to nomination campaigns and, thus, the ex-ante probability of electing the best candidate over all possible electoral calendars.

Vorheriger Artikel Voting power apportionments

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Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

In 2008, it was February 5th. Dramatically, Florida and Michigan decided to ignore this rule and hold their primaries in January. They were disciplined by having their right to seat delegates at the national conventions curtailed.

The model abstracts from several important issues in U.S. presidential primaries including the prominent role of Iowa and New Hampshire as the first primaries in the nomination process (see Klumpp and Polborn 2006).

Numbers from The Campaign Finance Institute. See http://www.cfinst.org/pr/prRelease.aspx?ReleaseID=205.

In the context of U.S. presidential primaries, it is natural to interpret this as five states, each with a representative voter.

Five is the smallest number of voters with which the paper’s main results can be derived. When there are three voters, sequential \(\{1{\text {-}}1{\text {-}}1\}\) and Super Tuesday \(\{2{\text {-}}1\}\) calendars are strategically equivalent.

The two uses of \(\theta (\cdot )\) should not cause confusion as one has a number as an argument while the other has a voter.

To lessen the reader’s notational burden, I use the same notation for actions and strategies. I could allow for mixed strategies, but they do not play a role in my analysis.

The calendars {3-1-1} and {1-2-1-1} are strategically equivalent so I could refer to either as a Super Tuesday calendar. Perhaps the second is more reminiscent of Super Tuesday since it allows for a single early vote, like Iowa and New Hampshire might be in the U.S. presidential primary, to happen before the block of voters are scheduled.

Note that this utility function is identical to the SIG’s utility function described in equation 2.3 with the significant difference that the SIG subtracts the sum of all information acquisition costs while, in this case, voters internalize only their own information acquisition cost.

Dragon slaying as in Palfrey and Conlin (1984).

Having funded an odd number n of campaigns, the biggest impact an additional informed vote can have is to tie the election.

Battaglini’s result only holds for a large number of voters.

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Titel: Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections
verfasst von: Rainer Schwabe
Publikationsdatum: 01.04.2015
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 4/2015
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0856-1

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