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Constitutional Political Economy
Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 2/2012

01.06.2012 | Original Paper

Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states

verfasst von: George R. Crowley

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 2/2012

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Abstract

Several theories suggest that states’ choices of constitutional rules are at least partially a function of neighboring constitutions. This paper provides the first analysis of spatial dependence of specific provisions within state constitutions in the United States. The analysis effectively makes constitutional rules endogenous, contributing to a relatively underdeveloped branch of constitutional economics. By employing a series of probit estimations of nineteen specific constitutional rules, I find evidence of spatial dependence in state constitutions. Specifically, the presence of specific constitutional constraints pertaining to term limits, supreme court justice selection, recall, home rule, direct democracy, constitutional amendment by convention, balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limits, line item veto, victims’ bill of rights, health and welfare, right to privacy, environmental protection, sex discrimination, abortion, and official language all exhibit some evidence spatial dependence.
Vorheriger Artikel Economic freedom and growth. Which policies matter the most?
Nächster Artikel Ethnic segregation and the quality of government: the importance of regional diversity

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Fußnoten
1
An interesting unit of analysis for the study of this phenomenon would be cities which form along a state’s border. While such an undertaking is beyond the scope of the present paper, it would likely prove to be a worthwhile avenue for future research. I thank Donald Lacombe for this insight.
 
2
If X i is expressed in relative terms, it is not necessary to include X −i in Eq. 2.
 
3
Contiguity is determined using latitude and longitude coordinates and Delaunay triangles.
 
4
For example, the elements of w corresponding to Florida and Georgia takes a value of ‘1’ (since they share a common border) while the elements corresponding to Florida and Texas takes a value of ‘0’ (since they do not share a common border).
 
5
In general, former Confederate States have had a far greater number of constitutions than similarly-aged Northern states. Confederate States each adopted new constitutions following secession, asserting their place in the newly formed Confederate States of America. Following the end of the American Civil War, these states again adopted new constitutions rejoining the United States. Many adopted yet another constitution following Reconstruction.
 
6
A full description of the Gibbs sampler and Bayesian econometric technique employed is well beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is pointed to LeSage and Pace (2009) who provide a full treatment of the methodology. Fiva and Rattsø (2007) also provide an excellent summary of the procedure.
 
7
A full treatment of the Bayesian estimation of the spatial autoregressive probit model can be found in LeSage and Pace (2009) Chapter 10. The models were estimated using the ‘sarp_g’ function found in LeSage’s spatial econometrics toolbox, available at http://​www.​spatial-econometrics.​com.
 
8
While the results are nearly identical, the time needed for computation increases greatly. As such, I present the results based on fewer MCMC draws as my primary findings.
 
9
Diffuse priors are also known as uninformative priors and indicate uncertainty about the expected values of the parameters. Specifically, the assumed prior mean for the β coefficients is zero, the prior variance of β is very large, and the parameter ρ has a range of [−1,1]. For more information on the role of priors in Bayesian estimation, see LeSage and Pace (2009).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states
verfasst von
George R. Crowley
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2012
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 2/2012
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-012-9117-4

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