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Erschienen in:
Einleitung – Psychologie als Wissenschaft Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

15. Logisches Denken

verfasst von : Prof. Dr. Markus Knauff, Prof. Dr. Günther Knoblich

Erschienen in: Allgemeine Psychologie

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Zusammenfassung

Als „logisch“ bezeichnet man ein Denken, das bei Abwägung der verfügbaren Informationen als folgerichtig und widerspruchsfrei gelten kann. Beim sicheren logischen Schließen ist eine Schlussfolgerung sicher wahr, wenn man von wahren Voraussetzungen ausgeht. Beim unsicheren logischen Schließen können Schlüsse auch möglich, plausibel oder wahrscheinlich sein. Bei der Bewertung solcher Schlüsse wird auf Rationalitätsnormen Bezug genommen. Empirische Befunde zeigen, dass sich Menschen oft an diese normativen Vorgaben halten, aber manchmal auch von diesen Sollwerten abweichen. Die Theorien, die diese Abweichungen erklären wollen, werden diskutiert und ihre neuronalen Grundlagen dargestellt. Es werden außerdem einige wichtige Fragen des Forschungsgebiets diskutiert. Dabei geht es auch um die Beziehung zwischen logischem Denken und Rationalität und die Frage, was als vernünftiges Denken, Argumentieren, Urteilen und Entscheiden gelten soll.
Schlüsselwörter: Logik; Rationalität; Denken; Argumentation; Deduktion; Konditionales Schließen; Relationales Schließen; Syllogismen; Nichtmonotones Schließen; Logisches Gehirn

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Metadaten
Titel
Logisches Denken
verfasst von
Prof. Dr. Markus Knauff
Prof. Dr. Günther Knoblich
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Allgemeine Psychologie

Print ISBN: 978-3-642-53897-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-53898-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-53898-8_15

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