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Constitutional Political Economy

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01.09.2008 | Original Paper

Regulation and revenue

verfasst von: Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 3/2008

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Abstract

The power to tax and the power to regulate are often analyzed separately. We argue that, when in the hands of a single authority, the power to tax may act as a check on the power to regulate, thereby discouraging regulations that adversely affect GDP, and promoting regulations that enhance GDP. This effect will be stronger the higher are (marginal) taxes. This argument is used both to suggest an explanation for the observed positive correlation between high taxes and economic freedom, and to warn against the granting of regulatory but not fiscal powers at the European level.

Vorheriger Artikel Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism

Nächster Artikel Social Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations

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See Suber (1990) and Hart (1961). On related puzzles see Ross (1969), Hoerster (1972), Raz (1972) and from a more general point of view Garzon-Valdes (1983), Kliemt (1978).

The trade-off between having a restrictive constitution decreasing the ease of change and increasing the likelihood of radical change by substituting it altogether is discussed perceptively in Lutz (1994).

On the level of the individual the abstraction of a monolithic rational choice maker who is capable of instantaneous opportunism in each instance of choice making is useful for some, but misleading for many other purposes as well. From a constitutionalist perspective the interplay between individual and collective constraints is discussed in Brennan and Buchanan (1985).

See, from an economic psychology point of view, Frank (1988); for a recent statement in this ongoing debate Vanberg (2008).

Hume (1777/1985) on opinion; Hart (1961) on the internal point of view to rules; Baurmann (2002) on virtues; and Brennan and Hamlin (2000) on dispositions all emphasize points relevant to the individualistic basis of collective constitutional commitments, as does Kliemt (1993).

See Buchanan and Tullock (1962) on optimally fixing the majority parameter for the relevant analogy.

These rules are not necessarily constitutional ones but are enacted according to the constitution.

We include into rent-seeking not only the pursuit of monetary rents but also ideological rents that result from biasing the legal order in favour of some ‘Weltanschauung’ or other.

The relationship we have in mind is not the Laffer curve type of argument of reducing the marginal tax rate to enhance total tax revenues.

It is even more widely accepted than ‘tax harmonization’ which, of course, is different from the authority to levy taxes.

See Brennan (1990).

Recent regulations concerning the commercialisation of human body parts, tissue and organs, are a case in point.

On merit goods at the polls see Brennan and Lomasky (1983), and generally on the strange altruism of ‘the masses’, Arendt (1951).

A simple model is developed in Brennan (2004).

For example, Barro (1997) and Gwartney et al. (1998).

This is a bit like pre-adapted features of an organism that originally evolved due to other factors but serve now a different purpose.

Arendt, H. (1951). The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Books.

Barro, R. (1997). Determinants of economic growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Baurmann, M. (2002). The market of virtue. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Berggren, N. (2003). The benefits of economic freedom: A survey. The Independent Review, 8, 193–211.

Brennan, G. (1990). The tale of the slave owner. Sixth annual Virginia political economy lecture. Virginia: Center for Study of Public Choice. http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/VA Political Econ/Virginia Political Economy Lecture Series.pdf.

Brennan, G. (2004). The political economy of regulation: A prolegomenon. In G. Eusepi & F. Schneider (Eds.), Changing institutions in the European Union. A public choice perspective. Chelenham: Edward Elgar.

Brennan, H. G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brennan, H. G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The reason of rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brennan, G., & Hamlin, A. (2000). Democratic devices and desires. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brennan, H. G., & Kliemt, H. (1990). Logo logic. Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), 125–127.CrossRef

Brennan, G., & Lomasky, L. (1983). Institutional aspects of ‘Merit Goods’ analysis. Finanzarchiv, N.F., 41(2), 183–206.

Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

de Jasay, A. (1985/1998). The state. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Elster, J. (1979). Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frank, R. (1988). The passions within reason: Prisoner’s Dilemmas and the strategic role of the emotions. New York: Norton.

Garzon-Valdes, E. (1983). Die gesetzliche Begrenzung des staatlichen Souveräns. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, LXVIII/4, 431–444.

Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., & Holcombe, R. (1998). Economic freedom and the environment for economic growth. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 155, 1–21.

Hart, H. L. A. (1961). The concept of law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hayek, F. A. v. (1973–79). Law, legislation and liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Hoerster, N. (1972). On Alf Ross’s alleged puzzle in constitutional law. Mind, 81(323), 422–426.CrossRef

Hume, D. (1739/2000). A treatise on human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hume, D. (1777/1985). Essays. Moral, political and literary. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Kliemt, H. (1978). Can there be any constitutional limits to constitutional powers. Munich Social Science Review, 4, 99–108.

Kliemt, H. (1993). Constitutional commitments. Jahrbuch für Neuere Politische Ökonomie., 12, 145–173.

Krueger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review, 64(3), 291–303.

Lutz, D. (1994). Toward a theory of constitutional amendment. American Political Science Review, 88(2), 355–370.CrossRef

Raz, J. (1972). Professor A. Ross and some legal puzzles. Mind, 81(323), 415–421.CrossRef

Ross, A. (1969). On self-reference and a puzzle in constitutional law. Mind, 78(309), 1–24.CrossRef

Rowley, C. K., Tollison, R. D., & Tullock, G. (Eds.). (1988). The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Suber, P. (1990). The paradox of self-amendment. New York: Peter Lang.

Tullock, G. (1993). Rent seeking. In C. Rowley (Ed.), Property rights and the limits of democracy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Vanberg, V. (1975). Die zwei Soziologien. Individualismus und Kollektivismus in der Sozialtheorie. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.

Vanberg, V. (1982). Markt und Organisation. Individualistische Sozialtheorie und das Problem Korporativen Handelns. Tübingen: J.C.·B. Mohr.

Vanberg, V. (1993). Rational choice, rule-following and institutions. In U. Mäki, B. Gustafsson, & C. Knudsen (Eds.), Rationality, institutions and economic methodology. London: Routledge.

Vanberg, V. (1994). Rules and choice in economics. London: Routledge.

Vanberg, V. (2008). Rationality, rule-following and emotions: On the economics of moral preferences. In F. Forte & H. Kliemt (Eds.), Money, markets and morals. Munich: Accedo.

Titel: Regulation and revenue
verfasst von: Geoffrey Brennan
Hartmut Kliemt
Publikationsdatum: 01.09.2008
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 3/2008
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9054-4

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