Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
ATZ-Fachkongress

Chassis.tech plus 2024


4 Kongresse in einer Veranstaltung

Treffen Sie in München die Fachleute von Chassis, Lenkung, Bremsen sowie Reifen/Räder.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Erschienen in:
Einleitung – Psychologie als Wissenschaft Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

17. Urteilen und Entscheiden

verfasst von : Prof. Dr. Arndt Bröder, Prof. Benjamin E. Hilbig, PhD

Erschienen in: Allgemeine Psychologie

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Zusammenfassung

Menschen müssen ständig unterschiedlichste Situationen beurteilen oder Entscheidungen treffen. Dabei können die Informationen mehr oder weniger eindeutig und die Folgen der Entscheidung mehr oder weniger schwerwiegend sein. Die Psychologie erforscht die Struktur von Urteilen und Entscheidungen sowie Einflussfaktoren und Prozesse, die sowohl „gute“ als auch „irrationale“ Urteile und Entscheidungen hervorbringen. Die empirische Erforschung des Urteilens und Entscheidens hat faszinierende Einblicke in die einzelnen Bestandteile des Entscheidens gewährt, zum Bespiel über typische Fehlleistungen, verwendete Strategien der Suche nach relevanter Information sowie über deren weitere Verarbeitung. Spannende Befunde und die daraus entwickelten psychologischen Theorien des Urteilens und Entscheidens werden in diesem Kapitel vorgestellt.
Schlüsselwörter: Urteilen; Entscheiden; Informationsverarbeitung; Rationalität; Heuristik; Täuschungen; Strategie

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Vorheriges Kapitel Problemlösen
Nächstes Kapitel Planung und exekutive Kontrolle von Handlungen
Literatur
Adelman, L. (1981). The influence of formal, substantive, and contextual task properties on the relative effectiveness of different forms of feedback in multiple-cue probability learning tasks. Organizational Behavior und Human Performance, 27, 423–442.CrossRef
Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axioms de l’e’cole americaine [Rational man’s behavior in face of risk: Critique of the American School’s postulates and axioms]. Econometrica, 21, 503–546.CrossRef
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the tribes of fluency to form a metacognitive nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13, 219–235.PubMedCrossRef
Balzer, W. K., Doherty, M. E., & O’Connor, R. (1989). Effects of cognitive feedback on performance. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 410–433.CrossRef
Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica, 44, 211–233.CrossRef
Barbey, A. K., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. Behavioral und Brain Sciences, 30, 241–297.
Baron, J. (2004). Normative models of judgment and decision making. In D. J. Koehler, & N. Harvey (Hrsg.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (S. 19–36). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.CrossRef
Baron, J. (2008). Thinking and deciding (4. Aufl.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Barron, G., & Erev, I. (2003). Small feedback-based decisions and their limited correspondence to description-based decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16, 215–233.CrossRef
Bazerman, M. H., & Gino, F. (2012). Behavioral ethics: Toward a deeper understanding of moral judgment and dishonesty. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 8, 85–104.CrossRef
Beach, L. R., & Mitchell, T. R. (1978). A contingency model for the selection of decision strategies. Academy of Management Review, 3, 439–449.
Bechara, A., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision. Games and Economic Behavior, 52, 336–372.CrossRef
Begg, I. M., Anas, A., & Farinacci, S. (1992). Dissociation of processes in belief: Source recollection, statement familiarity, and the illusion of truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 121, 446–458.CrossRef
Bell, D. E. (1985). Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 33, 1–27.CrossRef
Bergert, F. B., & Nosofsky, R. M. (2007). A response-time approach to comparing generalized rational and take-the-best models of decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 107–129.PubMed
Betsch, T., & Haberstroh, S. (Hrsg.). (2005). The routines of decision making. Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Betsch, T., Funke, J., & Plessner, H. (2011). Denken – Urteilen, Entscheiden, Problemlösen. Berlin: Springer.CrossRef
Billings, R. S., & Marcus, S. A. (1983). Measures of compensatory and noncompensatory models of decision behavior: Process tracing versus policy capturing. Organizational Behavior und Human Performance, 31(3), 331–352.CrossRef
Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Causes of Allais common consequence paradoxes: An experimental dissection. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 48, 87–106. doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2004.01.001.CrossRef
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008). Evaluation of the priority heuristic as a descriptive model of risky decision making: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006). Psychological Review, 115, 253–260. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.115.1.253.PubMedCrossRef
Birnbaum, M. H. (2011). Testing mixture models of transitive preference: Comment on Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011). Psychological Review, 118, 675–683.PubMedCrossRef
Birnbaum, M. H., & Jou, J.-W. (1990). A theory of comparative response times and „difference“ judgments. Cognitive Psychology, 22, 184–210.CrossRef
Blank, H., Musch, J., & Pohl, R. F. (2007). Hindsight bias: On being wise after the event. Social Cognition, 25, 1–9.CrossRef
Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). Making choices without trade-offs: The priority heuristic. Psychological Review, 113, 409–432. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.113.2.409.PubMedPubMedCentralCrossRef
Brehmer, B. (1980). In one word: Not from experience. Acta Psychologica, 45, 223–241.CrossRef
Brehmer, B. (1994). The psychology of linear judgement models. Acta Psychologica, 87, 137–154.CrossRef
Brehmer, A., & Brehmer, B. (1988). What have we learned about human judgment from thirty years of policy capturing? In B. Brehmer, & C. R. B. Joyce (Hrsg.), Human judgment: The SJT view (S. 75–114). Oxford, England: North-Holland.CrossRef
Brehmer, B., & Joyce, C. R. B. (Hrsg.). (1988). Human judgment: The SJT view. Oxford, England: North-Holland.
Bröder, A. (2000a). A methodological comment on behavioral decision research. Psychologische Beiträge, 42, 645–662.
Bröder, A. (2000b). Assessing the empirical validity of the „Take-the-best“ heuristic as a model of human probabilistic inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26(5), 1332–1346.PubMed
Bröder, A. (2003). Decision making with the „adaptive toolbox“: Influence of environmental structure, intelligence, and working memory load. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 611–625.PubMed
Bröder, A. (2005). Entscheiden mit der „adaptiven Werkzeugkiste“: Ein empirisches Forschungsprogramm. Lengerich: Pabst.
Bröder, & Eichler, A. (2006). The use of recognition information and additional cues in inferences from memory. Acta Psychologica, 121, 275–284.PubMedCrossRef
Bröder, A., & Gaissmaier, W. (2007). Sequential processing of cues in memory-based multiattribute decisions. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 14, 895–900.CrossRef
Bröder, A., & Newell, B. R. (2008). Challenging some common beliefs: Empirical work within the adaptive toolbox metaphor. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 205–214.
Bröder, A., & Schiffer, S. (2003). Take The Best versus simultaneous feature matching: Probabilistic inferences from memory and effects of representation format. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 277–293.CrossRef
Bröder, A., & Schiffer, S. (2006). Adaptive flexibility and maladaptive routines in selecting fast and frugal decision strategies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 904–918.PubMed
Brunswik, E. (1952). The conceptual framework of psychology. (Int. Encycl. unified Sci., v. 1, no. 10.). Oxford, England: Univ. Chicago Press.
Brunswik, E. (1955). Representative design and probabilistic theory in a functional psychology. Psychological Review, 62, 193–217.PubMedCrossRef
Budescu, D. V., & Weiss, W. (1987). Reflection of transitive and intransitive preferences: A test of prospect theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 184–202.CrossRef
Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision field theory: A dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an uncertain environment. Psychological Review, 100, 432–459. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.100.3.432.PubMedCrossRef
Camilleri, A. R., & Newell, B. R. (2011). When and why rare events are underweighted: A direct comparison of the sampling, partial feedback, full feedback and description choice paradigms. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 18, 377–384. doi:10.3758/s13423-010-0040-2.CrossRef
Casscells, W., Schoenberger, A., & Graboys, T. B. (1978). Interpretation by physicians of clinical laboratory results. The New England Journal of Medicine, 299, 999–1001.PubMedCrossRef
Castela, M., Kellen, D., Erdfelder, E., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 21, 1131–1138.CrossRef
Chapman, G. B., & Johnson, E. J. (2002). Incorporating the irrelevant: Anchors in judgments of belief and value. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Hrsg.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (S. 120–138). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Chase, V. M., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Visions of rationality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 206–214. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613%2898%2901179-6.PubMedCrossRef
Christensen-Szalanski, J. J., & Willham, C. F. (1991). The hindsight bias: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 48, 147–168.CrossRef
Chu, P. C., & Spires, E. E. (2003). Perceptions of accuracy and effort of decision strategies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91(2), 203–214.CrossRef
Cohen, M., Jaffray, J.-Y., & Saϊd, T. (1987). Experimental comparison of individual behavior under risk and under uncertainty for gains and for losses. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 1–22.CrossRef
Combs, B., & Slovic, P. (1979). Newspaper coverage of causes of death. Journalism Quarterly, 56, 837–849.CrossRef
Czerlinski, J., Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1999). How good are simple heuristics? In Simple heuristics that make us smart (S. 97–118). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Dawes, R. M. (2001). Everyday irrationality. How pseudo-scientists, lunatics, and the rest of us systematically fail to think rationally. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989). Clinical versus actuarial judgment. Science, 243, 1668–1674.PubMedCrossRef
Dechêne, A., Stahl, C., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2010). The truth about the truth: A meta-analytic review of the Truth Effect. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 238–257.PubMedCrossRef
Dougherty, M. R., Franco-Watkins, A. M., & Thomas, R. (2008). Psychological plausibility of the theory of Probabilistic Mental Models and the Fast and Frugal Heuristics. Psychological Review, 115, 199–213.PubMedCrossRef
Eddy, D. M. (1982). Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and opportunities. In D. Kahneman, & P. Slovic Tversky et al. (Hrsg.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (S. 249–267). New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Einhorn, H. J., Kleinmuntz, D. N., & Kleinmuntz, B. (1979). Linear regression and process-tracing models of judgment. Psychological Review, 86, 465–485.CrossRef
Eisenführ, F., Weber, M., & Langer, T. (2010). Rational Decision Making. Berlin, London: Springer.CrossRef
Erdfelder, E., Küpper-Tetzel, C. E., & Mattern, S. D. (2011). Threshold models of recognition and the recognition heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 6, 7–22.
Ettlin, F., Bröder, A. und Henninger, M. (2015). A new task format for investigating information search and organization in multi-attribute decisions. Behavior Research Methods. 47, 506–518.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278.PubMedCrossRef
Fechner, G. T. (1860). Elemente der Psychophysik. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot.
Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50, 123–129.CrossRef
Fiedler, K. (1993). Kognitive Täuschungen: Faszination eines modernen Forschungsprogramms. In W. Hell, K. Fiedler, & G. Gigenzer (Hrsg.), Kognitive Täuschungen. Fehl-Leistungen und Mechanismen des Urteilens, Denkens und Erinnerns (S. 7–12). Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag.
Fiedler, K. (2000). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases. Psychological Review, 107, 659–676.PubMedCrossRef
Fiedler, K. (2010). How to study cognitive decision algorithms: The case of the priority heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 21–32.
Fiedler, K., & Walka, I. (1993). Training lie detectors to use nonverbal cues instead of global heuristics. Human Communication Research, 20(2), 199–223.CrossRef
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1, 288–299.
Galesic, M., Garcia-Retamero, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (2009). Using icon arrays to communicate medical risks: Overcoming low numeracy. Health Psychology, 28, 210–216.PubMedCrossRef
Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond „heuristics and biases“. In W. Stroebe, & M. Hewstone (Hrsg.), European Review of Social Psychology (Bd. 2, S. 83–115). Chichester: Wiley.
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky. Psychological Review, 103, 592–596.CrossRef
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650–669.PubMedCrossRef
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (2011). The recognition heuristic: A decade of research. Judgment and Decision Making, 6, 100–121.
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102, 684–704.CrossRef
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & Todd (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 295–314.CrossRef
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (Hrsg.). (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008a). Do people make decisions under risk based on ignorance? An empirical test of the priority heuristic against cumulative prospect theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 107, 75–95.CrossRef
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008b). Modeling option and strategy choices with connectionist networks: Towards an integrative model of automatic and deliberate decision making. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 215–228.
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008c). Multiple-reason decision making based on automatic processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, und Cognition, 34, 1055–1075.
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2012). Decisions beyond boundaries: When more information is processed faster than less. Acta Psychologica, 139, 532–542.PubMedCrossRef
Glöckner, & Bröder, A. (2014). Cognitive integration of recognition information and additional cues in memory-based decisions. Judgment and Decision Making, 9(1), 35–50.
Glöckner, A., Hilbig, B. E., Henninger, F, & Fiedler, S. (2016). The reversed Description-Experience gap: disentangling sources of presentation format effects in risky choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 486–508.
Glöckner, A., & Witteman, C. (2010). Beyond dual-process models: A categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision making. Thinking und Reasoning, 16, 1–25.CrossRef
Glöckner, A., Betsch, T., & Shindler, N. (2010). Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference tasks. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 439–462.CrossRef
Glöckner, A., Hilbig, B. E., & Jekel, M. (2014). What is adaptive about adaptive decision making? A parallel constraint satisfaction account. Cognition, 133, 641–666.PubMedCrossRef
Gluck, M. A., & Bower, G. H. (1988). Evaluating an adaptive network model of human learning. Journal of Memory and Language, 27(2), 166–195.CrossRef
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109, 75–90.PubMedCrossRef
Goldstein, W. M., & Hogarth, R. M. (1997). Judgment and decision research: Some historical context. In W. M. Goldstein, & R. M. Hogarth (Hrsg.), Research on judgment and decision making: Currents, connections, and controversies (S. 3–65). New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.
Greifeneder, R., Bless, H., & Pham, M. T. (2011). When do people rely on affective and cognitive feelings in judgment? A review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 107–141. doi:10.1177/1088868310367640.PubMedCrossRef
Grove, W. M., Zald, D. H., Lebow, B. S., Snitz, B. E., & Nelson, C. (2000). Clinical versus mechanical prediction: A meta-analysis. Psychological Assessment, 12, 19–30.PubMedCrossRef
Hagmayer, Y. (2010). Investigating causal intuitions. In A. Glöckner, & C. Witteman (Hrsg.), Foundations for tracing intuition: Challenges and methods (S. 160–178). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press.
Hahn, U., Prat-Sala, M., Pothos, E. M., & Brumby, D. P. (2010). Exemplar similarity and rule application. Cognition, 114, 1–18.PubMedCrossRef
Hall, G. C. N. (1988). Criminal behavior as a function of clinical and actuarial variables in a sexual offender population. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 773–775.PubMedCrossRef
Hammond, K. R. (1955). Probabilistic functioning and the clinical method. Psychological Review, 62, 255–262.PubMedCrossRef
Hammond, K. R., Hursch, C. J., & Todd, F. J. (1964). Analyzing the components of clinical inference. Psychological Review, 71(6), 438–456.PubMedCrossRef
Hammond, P. J. (1997). Rationality in economics. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 105, 247–288.
Hardman, D. (2009). Judgment and decision making: Psychological perspectives. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, Leicester, England.
Hastie, R., & Dawes, R. M. (2001). Rational choice in an uncertain world: The psychology of judgment and decision making. Thousand Oaks, CA US: Sage Publications.
Hausmann, & Läge, D. (2008). Sequential evidence accumulation in decision making: The individual desired level of confidence can explain the extent of information acquisition. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 229–243.
Hausmann, D., Läge, D., Pohl, R. F., & Bröder, A. (2007). Testing quickEst: No evidence for the quick-estimation heuristic. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 19, 446–456.CrossRef
Helversen, B. von, & Rieskamp, J. (2008). The mapping model: A cognitive theory of quantitative estimation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 73–96.CrossRef
Helversen, B. von, Herzog, S. M., & Rieskamp, J. (2014). Haunted by a doppelgänger: Irrelevant facial similarity affects rule-based judgments. Experimental Psychology, 61, 12–22.CrossRef
Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The conjunction fallacy revisited: How intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 275–306.CrossRef
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from experience and the effect of rare events in Risky Choice. Psychological Science, 15, 534–539.PubMedCrossRef
Hertwig, R., Benz, B., & Krauss, S. (2008a). The conjunction fallacy and the many meanings of and. Cognition, 108, 740–753.PubMedCrossRef
Hertwig, R., Herzog, S. M., Schooler, L. J., & Reimer, T. (2008b). Fluency Heuristic: A model of how the mind exploits a by-product of information retrieval. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, und Cognition, 34, 1191–1206.
Herzog, S. M., & Hertwig, R. (2013). The ecological validity of fluency. In C. Unkelbach, & R. Greifeneder (Hrsg.), The experience of thinking: How feelings from mental processes influence cognition and behavior (S. 190–219). London: Psychology Press.
Hilbig, B. E. (2008). One-reason decision making in risky choice? A closer look at the priority heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 457–462.
Hilbig, B. E. (2010). Reconsidering „evidence“ for fast-and-frugal heuristics. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 17, 923–930.CrossRef
Hilbig, B. E., & Glöckner, A. (2011). Yes, they can! Appropriate weighting of small probabilities as a function of information acquisition. Acta Psychologica, 138, 390–396.PubMedCrossRef
Hilbig, B. E., & Moshagen, M. (2014). Generalized outcome-based strategy classification: Comparing deterministic and probabilistic choice models. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 21, 1431–1443.CrossRef
Hilbig, B. E., & Pohl, R. F. (2008). Recognizing users of the recognition heuristic. Experimental Psychology, 55, 394–401.PubMedCrossRef
Hilbig, B. E., & Pohl, R. F. (2009). Ignorance- versus evidence-based decision making: A decision time analysis of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 1296–1305. doi:10.1037/a0016565.PubMed
Hilbig, B. E., & Richter, T. (2011). Homo heuristicus outnumbered: Comment on Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009). Topics in Cognitive Science, 3, 187–196.PubMedCrossRef
Hilbig, B. E., Erdfelder, E., & Pohl, R. F. (2010). One-reason decision-making unveiled: A measurement model of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, und Cognition, 36, 123–134.
Hilbig, B. E., Erdfelder, E., & Pohl, R. F. (2011). Fluent, fast, and frugal? A formal model evaluation of the interplay between memory, fluency, and comparative judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, und Cognition, 37, 827–839.
Hilbig, B. E., Erdfelder, E., & Pohl, R. F. (2012). A matter of time: Antecedents of one-reason decision making based on recognition. Acta Psychologica, 141, 9–16.PubMedCrossRef
Hoffman, P. J. (1960). The paramorphic representation of clinical judgment. Psychological Bulletin, 57, 116–131.PubMedCrossRef
Hoffmann, J. A., Helversen, B. von, & Rieskamp, J. (2014). Pillars of judgment: How memory abilities affect performance in rule-based and exemplar-based judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 2242–2261.CrossRef
Hoffrage, U., & Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Using natural frequencies to improve diagnostic inferences. Academic Medicine, 73, 538–540.PubMedCrossRef
Hogarth, R. M. (2001). Educating intuition. Chicago, IL US: University of Chicago Press.
Hogarth, R. M., & Karelaia, N. (2007). Heuristic and linear models of judgment: Matching rules and environments. Psychological Review, 114, 733–758.PubMedCrossRef
Hsee, C. (1996). The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation for preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of alternatives. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67(3), 247–257.CrossRef
Huber, J., Payne, J. W., & Puto, C. (1982). Adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives: Violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis. Journal of Consumer Research, 9(1), 90–98.CrossRef
Huber, O. (1980). The influence of some task variables on cognitive operations in an information-processing decision model. Acta Psychologica, 45, 187–196.CrossRef
Huber, O. (1982). Entscheiden als Problemlösen. Bern: Huber.
Jahn, G., Renkewitz, F., & Kunze, S. (2007). Heuristics in multi-attribute decision making: Effects of representation format. In D. S. McNamara, & G. Trafton (Hrsg.), Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (S. 383–388). Mawah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Jensen, N. E. (1967). An introduction to Bernoullian utility theory: I. Utility functions. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 69, 163–183.CrossRef
Jerger, J. (1992). Das St. Petersburg-Paradoxon. WiSt-Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium. (S. 407–410).
Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302(5649), 1338–1339.PubMedCrossRef
Johnson, E. J., & Payne, J. W. (1985). Effort and accuracy in choice. Management Science, 31, 395–414.CrossRef
Juslin, P., & Persson, M. (2002). PROBabilities from EXemplars (PROBEX): A „lazy“ algorithm for probabilistic inference from generic knowledge. Cognitive Science, 26(5), 563–607.CrossRef
Juslin, P., Olsson, H., & Olsson, A.-C. (2003). Exemplar effects in categorization and multiple-cue judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 133–156.CrossRef
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2004). Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In M. Augier, & J. G. March (Hrsg.), Models of a man: Essays in memory of Herbert A. Simon (S. 411–432). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972a). On prediction and judgment. ORI Research Monographs, 12, 430–454.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972b). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430–454.CrossRef
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237–251.CrossRef
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–292.CrossRef
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103, 582–591. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.582.PubMedCrossRef
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1325–1348.CrossRef
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status-quo bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 193–206.CrossRef
Karelaia, N., & Hogarth, R. M. (2008). Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of lens model studies. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 404–426. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.134.3.404.PubMedCrossRef
Karlsson, L., Juslin, P., & Olsson, H. (2008). Exemplar-based inference in multi-attribute decision making: Contingent, not automatic, strategy shifts? Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 244–260.
Kaufmann, E., Reips, U.-D., & Wittmann, W. (2013). A critical meta-analysis of lens model studies in human judgment and decision-making. PLoS ONE, 8(12), e83528.PubMedPubMedCentralCrossRef
Khader, P. H., Pachur, T., Meier, S., Bien, S., Jost, K., & Rösler, F. (2011). Memory-based decision-making with heuristics: Evidence for a controlled activation of memory representations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 3540–3554.PubMedCrossRef
Khader, P. H., Pachur, T., & Jost, K. (2013). Automatic activation of attribute knowledge in heuristic inference from memory. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 20, 372–377.CrossRef
Klayman, J. (1988). Cue discovery in probabilistic environments: Uncertainty and experimentation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14(2), 317–330.
Knowlton, B. J., Squire, L. R., & Gluck, M. A. (1994). Probabilistic classification learning in amnesia. Learning und Memory, 1, 106–120.
Koehler, J. J. (1996). The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges. Behavioral und Brain Sciences, 19, 1–53.CrossRef
Koop, G. J., & Johnson, J. G. (2013). The response dynamics of preferential choice. Cognitive Psychology, 67, 151–185.PubMedCrossRef
Krajbich, I., & Rangel, A. (2011). Multialternative drift-diffusion model predicts the relationship between visual fixations and choice in value-based decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 13852–13857.CrossRef
Krajbich, I., Armel, C., & Rangel, A. (2010). Visual fixations and the computation and comparison of value in simple choice. Nature Neuroscience, 13, 1292–1298.PubMedCrossRef
Lagnado, D. A., & Sloman, S. (2004). The advantage of timely intervention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30(4), 856–876.PubMed
Lee, M. D., & Cummins, T. D. (2004). Evidence accumulation in decision making: Unifying the „take the best“ and the „rational“ models. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 11, 343–352.CrossRef
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89(1), 46–55.CrossRef
Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Layman, M., & Combs, B. (1978). Judged frequency of lethal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4, 551–578.
List, J. A. (2002). Preference reversals of a different kind: The „more is less“ phenomenon. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1636–1643.CrossRef
Locke, J. (1997). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London: Penguin Classics. 1690, revised edition
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1986). Disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies, 53, 271–282.CrossRef
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1987). Testing for regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 97, 118–129.CrossRef
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1998). Testing different stochastic specifications of Risky Choice. Economica, 65, 581–598.CrossRef
Loomes, G., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1991). Observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods. Econometrica, 59, 425–439. doi:10.2307/2938263.CrossRef
MacCrimmon, K. R., & Larsson, S. (1979). Utility theory: Axioms versus ‘paradoxes. In M. Allais, & O. Hagen (Hrsg.), Expected utility and the Allais paradox (S. 333–409). Dordrecht: NL: Reidel Publishing.CrossRef
Martignon, L., & Hoffrage, U. (2002). Fast, frugal, and fit: Simple heuristics for paired comparison. Theory and Decision, 52, 29–71.CrossRef
Mata, R., Schooler, L. J., & Rieskamp, J. (2007). The aging decision maker: Cognitive aging and the adaptive selection of decision strategies. Psychology and Aging, 22(4), 796–810.PubMedCrossRef
McClelland, A. G. R., & Bolger, F. (1994). The calibration of subjective probability: Theories and models 1980–94. In G. Wright, & P. Ayton (Hrsg.), Subjective probability (S. 453–482). Oxford, England: John Wiley und Sons.
Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory of classification learning. Psychological Review, 85, 207–238.CrossRef
Meehl, P. E. (1954). Clinical versus statistical prediction: A theoretical analysis and a review of the evidence. Minneapolis, MN, US: University of Minnesota Press.CrossRef
Mellers, B. A., & Biagini, K. (1994). Similarity and choice. Psychological Review, 101, 505–518.CrossRef
Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I. (1997). Decision affect theory: Emotional reactions to the outcomes of risky options. Psychological Science, 8, 423–429.CrossRef
Mellers, B., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D. (2001). Do frequency representations eliminate conjunction effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration. Psychological Science, 12, 269–275.PubMedCrossRef
Messer, W. S., & Griggs, R. A. (1993). Another look at Linda. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 31, 193–196.CrossRef
Miller, P. M. (1971). Do labels mislead? A multiple cue study, within the framework of brunswik’s probabilistic functionalism. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 6, 480–500. doi:10.1016/0030-5073(71)90029-8.CrossRef
Moyer, R. S., & Bayer, R. H. (1976). Mental comparison and the symbolic distance effect. Cognitive Psychology, 8, 228–246. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(76)90025-6.CrossRef
Muchinsky, P. M., & Dudycha, A. L. (1975). Human inference behavior in abstract and meaningful environments. Organizational Behavior und Human Performance, 13(3), 377–391.CrossRef
Mussweiler, T., Englich, B., & Strack, F. (2004). Anchoring effect. In Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory (S. 183–200). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Neumann, J. von, & Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Newell, B. R. (2005). Re-visions of rationality? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 11–15. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.11.005.PubMedCrossRef
Newell, B. R., & Fernandez, D. (2006). On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentially of further knowledge: Two critical tests of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 333–346.CrossRef
Newell, B. R., & Shanks, D. R. (2003). Take the best or look at the rest? Factors influencing „one-reason“ decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 53–65.PubMed
Newell, B. R., Lagnado, D. A., & Shanks, D. R. (2007a). Straight choices: The psychology of decision making. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Newell, B. R., Lagnado, D. A., & Shanks, D. R. (2007b). Challenging the role of implicit processes in probabilistic category learning. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 14, 505–511.CrossRef
Onken, J., Hastie, R., & Revelle, W. (1985). Individual differences in the use of simplification strategies in a complex decision-making task. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 11(1), 14–27.PubMedCrossRef
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2003). Not so fast! (and not so frugal!): Rethinking the recognition heuristic. Cognition, 90, B1–B9.PubMedCrossRef
Oskarsson, A. T., Van Boven, L., McClelland, G. H., & Hastie, R. (2009). What’s next? Judging sequences of binary events. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 262–285.PubMedCrossRef
Over, D. (2004). Rationality and the normative/descriptive distinction. In D. J. Koehler, & N. Harvey (Hrsg.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (S. 3–18). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Pachur, T., & Bröder, A. (2013). Judgment: a cognitive processing perspective. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews. Cognitive Science, 4(6), 665–681. doi:10.1002/wcs.1259.PubMed
Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2006). On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 983–1002. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.32.5.983.PubMed
Pachur, T., Bröder, A., & Marewski, J. (2008). The recognition heuristic in memory-based inference: Is recognition a non-compensatory cue? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21, 183–210.CrossRef
Payne, J. W. (1982). Contingent decision behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 382–402.CrossRef
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1988). Adaptive strategy selection in decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14, 534–552.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Pennington, N., & Hall, J. A. (2014). An analysis of humor orientation on Facebook: A lens model approach. Humor: International Journal of Humor Research, 27, 1–21.CrossRef
Persson, M., & Rieskamp, J. (2009). Inferences from memory: Strategy- and exemplar-based judgment models compared. Acta Psychologica, 130(1), 25–37.PubMedCrossRef
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York, NY, US: W W Norton und Co.
Platzer, C., & Bröder, A. (2012). Most people do not ignore salient invalid cues in memory-based decisions. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 19(4), 654–661.CrossRef
Platzer, C., & Bröder, A. (2013). When the Rule is Ruled Out: Exemplars and Rules in Decisions from Memory. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(5), 429–441. doi:10.1002/bdm.1776.CrossRef
Platzer, C., Bröder, A., & Heck, D. W. (2014). Deciding with the eye: How the visually manipulated accessibility of information in memory influences decision behavior. Memory & Cognition, 42(4), 595–608. doi:10.3758/s13421-013-0380-z.CrossRef
Pleskac, T. J. (2007). A signal detection analysis of the recognition heuristic. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 14, 379–391.CrossRef
Pohl, R. F. (Hrsg.). (2004a). Cognitive illusions: A handbook of fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement, and memory. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Pohl, R. F. (2004b). Hindsight bias. In R. F. Pohl (Hrsg.), Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory (S. 364–378). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Pohl, R. F. (2006). Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 251–271. doi:10.1002/bdm.522.CrossRef
Pohl, R. F. (2007). Ways to assess hindsight bias. Social Cognition, 25, 14–31.CrossRef
Pohl, R. F., & Hilbig, B. E. (2012). The role of subjective linear orders in probabilistic inferences. Psychonomic Bulletin und Review, 19, 1178–1186.CrossRef
Rakow, T., & Newell, B. R. (2010). Degrees of uncertainty: An overview and framework for future research on experience-based choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 1–14.CrossRef
Reber, R. (2004). Availability. In R. F. Pohl (Hrsg.), Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory (S. 147–166). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on judgments of truth. Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal, 8, 338–342. doi:10.1006/ccog.1999.0386.CrossRef
Regenwetter, M., Dana, J., & Davis-Stober, C. P. (2011). Transitivity of preferences. Psychological Review, 118(1), 42–56.PubMedCrossRef
Renkewitz, F., & Jahn, G. (2012). Memory indexing: A novel method for tracing memory processes in complex cognitive tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 1622–1639.PubMed
Richter, T., & Späth, P. (2006). Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 150–162.PubMed
Rieskamp, J. (2008). The probabilistic nature of preferential choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 1446–1465. doi:10.1037/a0013646.PubMed
Rieskamp, J., & Hoffrage, U. (2008). Inferences under time pressure: How opportunity costs affect strategy selection. Acta Psychologica, 127, 258–276.PubMedCrossRef
Rieskamp, J., & Otto, P. E. (2006). SSL: A theory of how people learn to select strategies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 207–236.CrossRef
Russo, J. E. (2011). Eye fixations as a process trace. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger, & R. Ranyard (Hrsg.), A handbook of process tracing methods for decision research: A critical review and user’s guide (S. 43–64). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press.
Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. Oxford, England: John Wiley und Sons.
Scheibehenne, B., Rieskamp, J., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2013). Testing adaptive toolbox models: A Bayesian hierarchical approach. Psychological Review, 120, 39–64. doi:10.1037/a0030777.supp.PubMedCrossRef
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1982). The expected utility model: Its variants, purposes, evidence and limitations. Journal of Economic Literature, 20, 529–563.
Schooler, L. J., & Hertwig, R. (2005). How forgetting aids heuristic inference. Psychological Review, 112, 610–628. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.112.3.610.PubMedCrossRef
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Kühberger, A., & Ranyard, R. (Hrsg.). (2011). A handbook of process tracing methods for decision research: A critical review and user’s guide. New York, NY, US: Psychology Press.
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195–202.CrossRef
Sedlmeier, P., & Renkewitz, F. (2013). Forschungsmethoden und Statistik für Psychologen und Sozialwissenschaftler. München: Pearson.
Sedlmeier, P., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Are judgments of the positional frequencies of letters systematically biased due to availability? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24, 754–770.
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man; social and rational. Oxford England: Wiley.
Simon, H. A. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 1–19.PubMedCrossRef
Simonson, I. (1989). Choice based on reasons: The case of attraction and compromise effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(2), 158–174. doi:10.1086/209205.CrossRef
Söllner, A., Bröder, A., & Hilbig, B. E. (2013). Deliberation versus automaticity in decision making: Which presentation format features facilitate automatic decision making? Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 278–298.
Speekenbrink, M., & Shanks, D. R. (2013). Decision making. In D. Reisberg (Hrsg.), The Oxford handbook of cognitive psychology (S. 682–703). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.
Stanovich, K. E. (2010). Decision making and rationality in the modern world. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00003435.PubMedCrossRef
Starmer, C. (2000). Developments in non-expected Utility Theory: The hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 332–382.CrossRef
Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1991). Does the random-lottery incentive system elicit true preferences? An experimental investigation. American Economic Review, 81, 971–978.
Stein, E. (1996). Without good reason. The rationality debate in philosophy and cognitive science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Strack, F., & Mussweiler, T. (1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 437–446.CrossRef
Svenson, O. (1979). Process descriptions of decision making. Organizational Behavior und Human Performance, 23, 86–112.CrossRef
Teigen, K. H. (2004). Judgements by representativeness. In R. F. Pohl (Hrsg.), Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory (S. 165–182). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Wie man kluge Entscheidungen anstößt. Berlin: Econ.
Thorngate, W. (1980). Efficient decision heuristics. Behavioral Science, 25(3), 219–225. doi:10.1002/bs.3830250306.CrossRef
Todd, P. M., Gigerenzer, G., & The ABC Research Group (2012). Ecological rationality: Intelligence in the world. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Tucker, L. R. (1964). A suggested alternative formulation in the developments by Hursch, Hammond, and Hursch, and by Hammond, Hursch, and Todd. Psychological Review, 71(6), 528–530.PubMedCrossRef
Tversky, A. (1969). Intransitivity of preferences. Psychological Review, 76, 31–48. doi:10.1037/h0026750.CrossRef
Tversky, A. (1972). Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. Psychological Review, 79(4), 281–299. doi:10.1037/h0032955.CrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207–232.CrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.PubMedCrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458.PubMedCrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Evidential impact of base rates. In D. Kahneman, & P. Slovic Tversky et al. (Hrsg.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (S. 153–160). New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.CrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.CrossRef
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psychological Review, 95(3), 371–384. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.95.3.371.CrossRef
Unkelbach, C., & Greifeneder, R. (Hrsg.). (2013). The experience of thinking: How feelings from mental processes influence cognition and behavior. New York: Psychology Press.
Villejoubert, G., & Mandel, D. R. (2002). The inverse fallacy: An account of deviations from Bayes’s theorem and the additivity principle. Memory und Cognition, 30, 171–178.CrossRef
Visschers, V. H. M., Meertens, R. M., Passchier, W. W. F., & Vries, N. N. K. de (2009). Probability information in risk communication: A review of the research literature. Risk Analysis, 29, 267–287.PubMedCrossRef
Vlaev, I., & Chater, N. (2006). Game relativity: How context influences strategic decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 131–149.PubMed
Wänke, M., Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (1995). The availability heuristic revisited: Experienced ease of retrieval in mundane frequency estimates. Acta Psychologica, 89, 83–90.CrossRef
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009). Mindful judgment and decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 53–85.PubMedCrossRef
Wilson, T. D., Houston, C. E., Etling, K. M., & Brekke, N. (1996). A new look at anchoring effects: Basic anchoring and its antecedents. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 387–402.CrossRef
Wright, P. (1974). The harassed decision maker: Time pressures, distractions, and the use of evidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 59, 555–561.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Urteilen und Entscheiden
verfasst von
Prof. Dr. Arndt Bröder
Prof. Benjamin E. Hilbig, PhD
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Allgemeine Psychologie

Print ISBN: 978-3-642-53897-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-53898-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-53898-8_17

Premium Partner

    Bildnachweise