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Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science 4/2021

27.04.2021 | Book Review

Xiang Gao, Delegation and Development: Local Government in China’s Market Transition

(Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2020), 212p, $6.89 paperback

verfasst von: Xiao Ma

Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science | Ausgabe 4/2021

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Excerpt

Scholars often turn to local governments, and their relationships with the central government, to uncover the institutional underpinnings of China’s economic growth. These attempts have produced some of the most influential work in comparative political economy. Concepts and notions such as “local state corporatism” [1], “market-preserving federalism” [2], “bureaucratic integration” [3], “M-form government” [4], “promotion tournament” [5], and “regionally decentralized authoritarianism” [6, 7] are foundational in offering different explanations of the incentive structures that have propelled China’s development. Gao’s latest book, Delegation and Development, marks a novel contribution to this seminal line of research. …

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Literatur
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Zurück zum Zitat Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast. 1995. “Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for economic success in China.” World Politics, 50–81. Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast. 1995. “Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for economic success in China.” World Politics, 50–81.
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Zurück zum Zitat Huang, Yasheng. 1999. Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-local Relations during the Reform Era. Cambridge University Press. Huang, Yasheng. 1999. Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-local Relations during the Reform Era. Cambridge University Press.
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Zurück zum Zitat Maskin, Eric, Yingyi Qian, and Xu. Chenggang. 2000. Incentives, information, and organizational form. The Review of Economic Studies 67.2: 359–378.CrossRef Maskin, Eric, Yingyi Qian, and Xu. Chenggang. 2000. Incentives, information, and organizational form. The Review of Economic Studies 67.2: 359–378.CrossRef
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Zurück zum Zitat Xu, Chenggang. 2011. The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. Journal of Economic Literature 49.4: 1076–1151.CrossRef Xu, Chenggang. 2011. The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. Journal of Economic Literature 49.4: 1076–1151.CrossRef
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Zurück zum Zitat Landry, Pierre F. 2008. Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: the Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Landry, Pierre F. 2008. Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: the Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
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Metadaten
Titel
Xiang Gao, Delegation and Development: Local Government in China’s Market Transition
(Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2020), 212p, $6.89 paperback
verfasst von
Xiao Ma
Publikationsdatum
27.04.2021
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Journal of Chinese Political Science / Ausgabe 4/2021
Print ISSN: 1080-6954
Elektronische ISSN: 1874-6357
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09743-6

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