Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean

The Arctic environment as a great object of international cooperation is both an ancient and a topical subject.

Changes are inevitable – but the pace and nature differ over time, where the changes taking place these years have gone much faster due to a number of factors. Change can come from within as a desire or wish to improve current conditions, or it can be externally induced from a desire from external actors to have a say about matters. It can also be from actions which we do not have control over, for example markets abroad eyeing new opportunities in the Arctic, or it can be because people have the best intentions for the Arctic. Often, if not always, there is an intricate relationship between inside and external forces of change. Several regime changes are taking place including, with the Arctic Council and how the Arctic Ocean countries are taking up the challenges. Instead of talking about traditional potential conflicts, it is more a conflict between different mindsets of how the Arctic should be dealt with in the future. In this process of change, the critical aspect will be how change is handled by those affected, or “inside” the Arctic.

On behalf of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, allow me to most sincerely congratulate the organizers of this workshop, particularly Dr. Paul Berkman, and to express our gratitude for involving NATO parliamentarians in the debate on the High North. I believe that it is an excellent format to bring together scientists, experts, government officials and legislators, and I hope that we will have more opportunities in the future to participate in the events organised within the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security programme.

Rapid changes are occurring to Arctic sea ice thickness and extent. We survey the reasons for them, and the methods being used to monitor the changing thickness. Through the late twentieth century Arctic sea ice extent shrank at a relatively modest rate of 3–4% per decade (annually averaged) but after 1996 this speeded up to 10% per decade and in summer 2007 there was a massive collapse of ice extent to a new record minimum of only 4.1 million sq km. Thickness has been falling at a more rapid rate (43% in the 25 years from the early 1970s to late 1990s) with a specially rapid loss of mass from pressure ridges. The summer 2007 event may have arisen from an interaction between the long-term retreat and more rapid thinning rates. We review thickness monitoring techniques which show the greatest promise on different spatial and temporal scales, and for different purposes, and we show results from some recent work from submarines.

Climate change in the Arctic is creating complex new security challenges, primarily environmental and political. There is concern that melting Arctic sea ice could trigger a new “great game” of international power politics as nations race to extend their Arctic Ocean territorial shelf claims and extract the abundance of newly accessible natural resources. These concerns are exaggerated in light of the commitment of Arctic coastal states to institutional solutions through the Arctic Council, the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

and diplomacy. Indeed, there are few, if any, concrete signs of military buildups or increased tensions amongst Arctic coastal states. And, the global economic downturn following the financial crisis starting in 2008 seems to have slowed the economic but perhaps not the strategic pressure for development of Arctic energy and mineral resources. This, however, may only be temporary. All these factors give the international community the opportunity to deal with Arctic security challenges before they result in tension, confrontation and environmental damage.

The Arctic region is affected by climate change through accelerated melting of snow, ice and permafrost. The consequences include biodiversity loss, disruption to ecosystems, migrating fish stocks, coastal erosion, land use changes and global sea level rise. Some of the drivers of change are global mega trends beyond the control of the Arctic states, such as population growth and growing demand for natural resources, the state of the world economy, changing trade patterns, commodity prices or global climate change. International cooperation is needed to address the global drivers, but when it comes to ensuring sustainable development in the Arctic, most of the responsibility lies with the Arctic states as most of the economic activities take place on their land or in their coastal waters. Large-scale economic activities have been taking place for decades, through extraction of natural resources, fisheries, shipping or forestry. However, the Arctic environment is still considered clean not least due to the relatively low level of human activities this far. But with an increase in human activities – coupled with other stressors – action is needed to safeguard the environment, to ensure a sustainable development and maintaining the ecosystem services that the region provides for the local population as well as for the globe as such. Creating job opportunities and allowing for industrial activities are not incompatible with safeguarding a sustainable development as long as the necessary measures are in place to protect the environment and to avoid accidental effects from increased exploitation of the living and non-living resources.

The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) report to the Arctic Council in 2004 was the “first” comprehensive assessment of climate change in the Arctic. It delivered dramatic messages to the world on the changes in the Arctic climate and the critical role of this region for the future development of the global climate. These messages were confirmed in the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007. Hence, this chapter seeks to summarize the findings of the ACIA that are increasingly viewed as foundational security issues for a sustainable future for the Arctic region and a bellwether of change for the rest of the world. Further, there follows a discussion of the Arctic Council assessments that followed the ACIA as well as an outline of a potential comprehensive follow-on assessment that is designed to assess the many elements of change, many of which have security implications for the eight Arctic countries, the peoples of the north, and for the world at large.

Indigenous peoples from all regions of the world depend upon the natural environment. Their rich and detailed traditional knowledge reflects and embodies a cultural and spiritual relationship with the land, ocean and wildlife. Human activity is changing the world’s climate and altering the natural environment to which Indigenous Peoples are so closely attached and on which they so heavily rely.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects an acceleration and deepening of the impacts and effects of climate change globally with potentially serious implications for the cultures, subsistence economies, health and futures of Indigenous Peoples. Climate change is particularly marked in high latitudes. The

2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment

(ACIA) prepared by the eight-nation Arctic Council with the assistance of six Arctic Indigenous Peoples Organizations projected severe and growing impacts in this region in coming decades with worldwide effects.

In a very real sense, Indigenous Peoples are on the front lines of climate change. They observe climate and environmental changes first-hand and use traditional knowledge and survival skills to adapt to these changes as they occur. Moreover, they do so at a time when their cultures and livelihoods are already undergoing significant changes due, in part, to the accelerated development of natural resources from their traditional territories.

Reflecting their position as “stewards” of the environment and drawing upon age-old traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples were among the first to call upon national governments, corporations and civil society to do more to protect the Earth and human society from climate change.

The Arctic policy of the United States has remained broadly constant over the years since the early 1970s, when initial efforts to craft a unified U.S. government inter-agency approach to the Arctic were reviewed. It has been based on several key principles, which include the protection of our national security interests and the preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace, as well as the development and implementation of programs and activities to facilitate international cooperation in the areas of exploration, scientific research, resource development, exchange of scientific and technical data and the engagement of indigenous and local communities. The past two decades have witnessed an evolutionary trend and growth in United States perspective to welcome greater structured international and multilateral cooperation, which has resulted in more cohesion and better communication among Arctic countries.

Russia as a leading maritime power that earned

“this status because of geographical location with access to three oceans and sea borders, as well as a tremendous contribution to the study of the oceans, to the development of shipping, many great discoveries made by famous Russian navigators and adventurers

” (Russian Federation (2001) Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation until 2020. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2001. Pr-1387). The Russian state is implementing a national marine policy through its public authorities on a regional basis. Russian companies are involved in the development and implementation of national maritime policy through their representatives in federal and local governments and different associations operating on the basis of the Russian Constitution and the laws of the Russian Federation.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you Paul Berkman for the invitation to speak here this evening. It is always a pleasure to be back at Cambridge, and especially to be here as a guest of the Scott Polar Research Institute. Our event tonight builds on a highly valued partnership between the Institute and the Canadian High Commission. The central theme for our collaboration is, of course, the Arctic, and, tonight, I am delighted to speak about Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy to such an audience of distinguished experts. I don’t pretend to be an expert myself, but the Arctic has been something of a constant theme throughout my career in Canada’s foreign service.

Climate change and global warming have put the Arctic Ocean on the politic, economic, scientific and diplomatic agendas worldwide. While the involvement of non-arctic nations in discussions regarding the fate of this still largely pristine part of the world is a bone of contention for many, and particularly for circumpolar countries, ensuring peace and stability in the Arctic Ocean is a matter of global concern. Despite having no inherent strategic interest in the north polar region, France has over the years reinforced its involvement, position and views regarding the future of the northern regions via its scientific, politic and diplomatic actions. This short paper presents a non-exhaustive list of French institutes carrying out scientific research on the poles, some associations and non-governmental organisations aimed at bridging the gap between science and governance, the duty of involvement of France in case of a conflict emerging in the Arctic region, through its position as a Member State in NATO and the European Union, and the diplomatic actions undertaken by the country via the nomination of an Ambassador for the international negotiations on the Arctic and the Antarctic.

Since 1958, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has funded a programme of scientific activities with the aim of promoting conditions of stability and well-being. Under its current title of

Science for Peace and Security

, the programme has evolved from being entirely science-driven to having a closely-defined link with security in a broad sense. This paper traces this evolution and places the present Advanced Research Workshop in its evolutionary context, particularly in relation to the environmental security theme of the Workshop. The observations in the paper are addressed mainly to the scientific community and draw on the author’s experience of the programme in a variety of roles.

That the Arctic is experiencing transformative change is no longer news. But what are the implications of this development with regard to matters of governance and policy? This article makes the case that the answer to this question depends on the paradigm or discourse we employ as a conceptual framework for interpreting the meaning and significance of changes in the circumpolar Arctic. It contrasts interpretations produced by observers whose thinking is rooted in the neo-realist/geopolitical paradigm with those offered by others whose thinking rests on a socio-ecological systems paradigm. Although journalists and popular writers tend to gravitate toward the neo-realist/geopolitical paradigm, those who possess a more intimate knowledge of recent developments in the Arctic are inclined to base their thinking on the socio-ecological systems paradigm. Because the assumptions and precepts of paradigms or discourses are not falsifiable, it is fruitless to try to demonstrate that one of the two paradigms is somehow superior to the other. Nevertheless, for those dedicated to preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace, the socio-ecological systems paradigm has strong attractions.

When an area is about to transform in a dramatic manner, we can expect that policy analysts and legal scholars aim to identify whether there are gaps in governance of the region. After all, the

status quo

does not seem anymore plausible solution for such a place. This is particularly the case in regards to the Arctic Ocean, which is changing due to economic globalisation and climate change with an accelerating speed. The article will first look at what types of normative “gaps” we might observe in the gradually emerging new Ocean and then how the Arctic policy actors have planned to respond to these. It was two unrelated events – the Russians planted their flag underneath the North Pole on the Lomonosov ridge in August 2007 and 1 month later satellite imagery confirmed that the extent of summer sea ice on the Arctic Ocean had decreased to a record low – that triggered a serious discussion on how to best to govern a region that was seen by many as inaccessible desert without any need for governance. Yet, gradually, the region’s states and other actors have identified the “gaps” that need to be addressed, together with procedures for filling them in. The article will finally examine whether the current consensus between the region’s actors can be seen as the best possible approach to governing the Arctic Ocean.

The Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) released in 2009 has become a framework for the Council’s response to enhancing Arctic marine safety and environmental protection. AMSA can be viewed in three ways: as a baseline, snapshot for Arctic marine activity early in the twenty-first century; as a strategic guide for a host of stakeholders and actors; and, as a policy document of the Arctic Council since the report was negotiated and approved after consensus of the eight Arctic states was reached. The 2009 AMSA Report communicates to the global maritime community the current and future state of Arctic marine activity, and a set of complex drivers of change that must be considered in responding to the future. A set of 17 AMSA recommendations lays out a comprehensive strategy to address three themes: Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety; Protecting Arctic people and the Environment; and, Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure. AMSA addresses issues related to Arctic indigenous communities, the legal governance of the Arctic Ocean, today’s infrastructure limitations, and significant environmental issues including great concern for the release of oil in Arctic waters. As a holistic assessment providing an integrated framework from which to address the challenges of expanded, Arctic marine use, AMSA represents a first-order guide by the Council to an array of environmental security issues confronting the Arctic Ocean.

The first Arctic onshore oil well was drilled in Canada in 1920 and the first offshore well was drilled in Alaska in 1963. Large Arctic onshore operations started in the 1970s in Alaska and Russia. Offshore production from the sub-arctic region started much more recently. Currently, the Arctic produces about 10% of the world’s oil and 25% of its gas, of which the majority is produced in the Russian Arctic onshore. The United States Geological Survey (2008. Circum-Arctic resource appraisal: estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle.

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf

. Accessed 20 Aug 2011) estimated that the Arctic contains 13% of the world’s ‘yet to find’ oil, 30% of the world’s ‘yet to find’ gas, and 20% of world’s ‘yet to find’ natural gas liquids. About 84% of these estimated resources are believed to lie offshore. Overall hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic are equivalent to some 10 years of total global oil and gas demand at current consumption rates. Developed responsibly, they will help provide secure energy for the world as the time of ‘easy oil’ comes to an end. This article aims to present an overview on Shell’s perspectives on upstream oil and gas exploration and development and related issues in the Arctic Ocean.

Media, research literature, workshops, and political meetings over the past years have had a surprisingly rich, and partly under informed by fact, debate on race for resources and possible conflicts in the Arctic. This paper takes a careful look at UN Law of the Seas, Article 76 which regulate rights to the seabed outside exclusive economic zone for the Arctic Basin. It is evident that the Arctic will in future include seabed not under jurisdiction by any of the coastal states, but all area with expected major resources is already, or will become unquestionably under control by one of the coastal states. It is also evident that any potential territorial disagreements will be about relative small areas, and these areas have very low expectation for major resources.

Throughout the 1990s the Arctic had transformed into a region of peace and cooperation from being a zone of conflict and competition throughout the Cold War. However, the early 2000s new developments have begun to complicate the relationships between the Arctic states. Scientists and Northern Peoples began to discover that the Arctic was warming and the ice was melting. Arctic maritime boundaries were redrawn as the result of an international treaty. In addition; a growing number of resources were discovered in the region. As a result of these changes, debate emerged about the possibility of conflict in the Arctic. New security realities suggest that the Arctic could become a zone of security and military activity, rather than remaining a region of peace and cooperation. Ultimately, the Arctic Ocean is increasingly becoming an ocean like any other ocean. It will increasingly be used like all other oceans. Thus, it will increasingly see an increase of activities that may involve both cooperation and conflict. This paper will examine this increasingly complex Arctic security environment. While leaders of the arctic nations, (as well as a number of non-arctic) have issued statements promising peace and cooperation in the region, it is telling that many of the Arctic states are allocating substantial funds to improve their Arctic combat capabilities. Although currently there are no obvious flashpoints in the region, the willingness of these states to spend suggests that they are beginning to worry that the region will not remain an era of cooperation forever. But the question remains as to what

will be

the future nature of the region.

The dramatic changes currently taking place in and around the Arctic basin – ice melting, sea level rise, permafrost thaw, coastal erosion, etc. – are likely to have a major impact on the security situation of the Arctic coastal states, as well as that of outside actors, in the coming decades. The changes raise not only environmental security concerns, but also secondary concerns related to the dynamics of Arctic interstate relations. In some scenarios, climate change may serve as an “instability accelerator” and aggravate tensions between states over issues such as the access to offshore oil and gas resources, living marine resources, and shipping lanes. This is not to say that a “remilitarization” of the Arctic Ocean to be expected, or that the Arctic is more conflict-prone than other regions. The link between climate change and conflict is far from self-evident. There are many other intervening variables, such as the role of regional institutions, governments, and social actors in managing the process of environmental change, mitigating resource pressures, and containing potential tensions.

Global change processes, economic and geo-political transformations, and the increased integration of the Arctic region with global markets all affect important economic and resource strategic interests. The changing demand and supply conditions for Arctic commercial resources affect market as well as non-market economies of the North. Global change is projected to have substantial future impacts on renewable resources. At the same time it may reduce the opportunity to engage in traditional activities important to the identity and way of life of northern residents. Life in the Arctic is increasingly shaped or influenced by events, decisions and activities happening elsewhere, with the future of the Arctic linked to and influenced by other, non-Arctic regional, social, political and economic interests. Socio-economic challenges related to global change pressures can be expected to play a growing role in decisions on resource allocation, resource use, ownership and control, and with important consequences for Arctic economies and prospects for their future economic sustainability. Strategies for sustainable development and Arctic environmental protection need to consider the economic, social and environmental linkages between the Arctic and other regions of the globe.

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) across the Arctic Ocean has been a significant feature of Russia for much of the past century and will play an increasingly important role in the future of the Russian Federation across the twenty-first century. This paper highlights historical features of traffic associated with the NSR, including legal and regulatory strategies of the Russian Federation for international use of the NSR.

The paper presents an overview of progress from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regarding various requirements for ships operating in polar waters, with special emphasis on the requirements for the Arctic, including provisions concerning matters such as stability, life-saving appliances, navigation, guidelines for ships operating in polar waters, special area status, carriage requirements for heavy grade fuel oil, certification of ice navigators, and fishing vessels. Relevant international conventions include the following:

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS 1974)

http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201184/v1184.pdf

.; 1973

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto

(MARPOL 73/78)

http://treaties.un.org/untc//Pages//doc/Publication/UNTS/%20Volume%201340/volume-1340-I-22484-English.pdf

.);

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers

(STCW 1978)

http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/stcw1978.html

.); and

Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessel, 1977, as modified by the Torremolinos Protocol of 1993 relating thereto

http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE001173.doc

.). IMO’s ongoing work on the development of a mandatory International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters is described in some detail. The paper also briefly touches on relevant provisions of the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS 1982) as well as on other international requirements and activities concerning the subject in which IMO is directly or indirectly involved.

This staff working paper describes some of the difficulties of spill response in the Arctic.

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In the staff’s view, response challenges in the Arctic are important for the Commission to consider in its recommendations for the future of offshore drilling. This paper provides background information regarding the status of offshore drilling in Arctic waters, identifies problems with responding to oil spills in Arctic waters, and highlights areas for further Commission inquiry with respect to Arctic drilling.

Impacts from rapidly occurring climate change in the Arctic region are creating shifts in economic priorities, especially in the energy, transport, fisheries and tourism sectors. Economic expansion combined with escalating environmental stress poses unique management challenges for these vulnerable socio-economic and ecological systems. This shifting economic landscape brings new challenges that threaten fragile Arctic ecosystems and the survival of indigenous communities and their way of life. Results from a multi-stakeholder transatlantic dialogue conducted through the

Transatlantic Policy Options for Supporting Adaptations in the Marine Arctic

(Arctic TRANSFORM) project in 2008–2009 reveal both sectoral and cross-sectoral regulatory gaps and present a set of policy options. Progress to ensure environmental security in the Arctic depends on the development of resilient, adaptable, and coherent governance regimes capable of protecting terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems. However, the current governance framework is more a patchwork of legal instruments, ranging from soft-law arrangements to bilateral and multilateral agreements, supra-national, national and sub-national arrangements. In addition, most of these instruments and related institutions focus on global issues, rather than specifically targeting the Arctic. Thus, there is need for coordination in an integrated governance and regulatory system both among Arctic states and at the international level to manage the Arctic region.

This chapter examines the interplay between regional institutions for governing the Arctic and broader institutions applicable there and elsewhere. Despite rapid environmental change in the Arctic, political stability remains high. One reason is that Arctic states have relatively few unsettled maritime boundary issues and manage the remaining ones in a cooperative manner. Another reason is that an international legal framework exists for governing economic use of the region. The framework is based on global, customary international law codified in the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS,

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

.) and obliges states to respond individually and jointly to the new challenges deriving from increasing economic activities. The chapter then examines the adequacy of regional means for strengthening the Arctic governance system, and finds that regional institutions like the Arctic Council have only partial roles to play – the Arctic Ocean needs multilevel governance. The fact that Arctic environmental challenges cannot be addressed without significant contributions from broader or global institutions raises the question of how the Arctic Council should deal with certain non-Arctic states wishing to participate in Council work. Important governance functions like generating knowledge on environmental risks and response options, obtaining Arctic-sensitive regulations in broader international fora, and mobilizing resources and legal competence to support rule implementation stand to benefit from greater involvement of other interested states. Providing effective and legitimate governance is the best basis for ensuring political stability in the Arctic.

The international polar research community has just finished celebrating the 125th anniversary of the first International Polar Year (IPY) 1882–1883. Although the full impact and benefits of IPY 2007–2008 will not be felt for some years – many of its research projects and activities are still underway – attention has now shifted to the legacy aspects of IPY. Over the course of IPY 2007–2008, Arctic nations offered non-Arctic nations unprecedented access to Arctic research infrastructure (e.g. research stations, observation and monitoring networks). Despite the growing body of knowledge, we do not completely understand the potential environmental and social consequences of rapid climate change in the Arctic. The region is attracting international interest for its resource potential, possible new shipping routes as a result of decreasing ice cover, and international boundary and sovereign rights issues that have not yet been settled. Along with climate change, Arctic residents will have to overcome many other challenges such as large-scale economic development, and accelerating health and social issues in communities. Sound knowledge-based strategies are needed to help address the cumulative effects of climate change while taking into account multi-jurisdictional regulations and interests, and environmental impacts. These must involve responsible economic development, sustainable communities, and the use of local expertise in northern communities. This paper examines the need for a sound understanding of the processes at work in the Arctic, a solid bridge that links science and policy, and the importance of long-term sustainable scientific collaboration to improving governance and avoiding conflict in Arctic regions.

The contribution puts the question of who deals with present challenges of globalization in the Arctic Ocean. It argues that there are a number of qualified observers of the Arctic game who can claim that events in the polar region have a considerable impact on them. The

“stewardship”

by the coastal States of the Arctic Ocean, as expressed in their

Ilulissat Declaration

(Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean conference, 27 May 2008.

http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf

. ), should be exercised in the interest of all humankind and carries with it an obligation to address the institutional interplay. To shed more light on this interplay, the contribution examines the existing institutional regional structures that deal with the affairs and impact of environmental change in the Arctic, in particular in the Arctic Ocean. Specific attention is given to the Arctic Council, the apparently existing hierarchy amongst Arctic Council members, membership and observership in the Council, security aspects, the provisions of the Law of the Sea as enshrined in UNCLOS (1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

.) (including the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) and the yearly United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on oceans and law of the sea. The contribution concludes that improvements could be made in regard to the Arctic Councils’ structures, it rules of procedure, the possibility of an UNCLOS implementation agreement and, finally, appropriate amendments to relevant UNGA Resolutions. The contribution reaffirms finally that Arctic Ocean matters are matters of global importance.

The OSPAR Commission implements the regional seas convention for the North-East Atlantic and has been at the forefront of delivering the ecosystem approach through the development of robust measures to deal with marine pollution. For purposes of assessment the OSPAR Maritime Area is divided into five Regions, Region I representing ‘Arctic Waters.’ OSPAR Region I includes the transition between the Boreal and true Arctic biogeographic zones, incorporates the presence of the North Atlantic Current as well as the northward flowing Norwegian Coastal Current, and is characterised by seasonally high primary productivity and high natural variability. The starting point for a ‘collaborative arrangement’ between relevant competent authorities, with the aim of ensuring a highest level of conservation of selected areas in the North-East Atlantic beyond national jurisdiction, was explored at an informal Workshop in Madeira in March 2010. The Ministerial Meeting of OSPAR, held in Bergen in September 2010, agreed unprecedented protection of six extensive marine protected areas (MPAs) in Region V, on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge and isolated seamounts. Whilst being required to protect biodiversity, OSPAR does not have competence for those activities that are arguably the most likely to have the most impact in these remote areas, namely fisheries, international shipping and seabed mining. Most multilateral environmental agreements have adopted key principles that enshrine sustainable development and governance ideals. Regimes of this sort, designed to limit pressures and impacts of human activities, have elements in common with built in checks and balances designed to govern exploitation. By focussing on a defined geographic area and recognising the value of its natural capital, it has proven possible to scope complementary and mutually reinforcing management measures. OSPAR, the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) [

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] and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) have started to consider this in respect of one MPA – the Charlie Gibbs Fracture Zone. The intention is to broaden the discussion to include other competent authorities. A combined regime of this nature demands transparency and trust between competent authorities. It becomes incumbent on States in agreement within one competent authority to influence and work within other competent authorities. It also requires that States reach a common position internally between those dealing with different sectors within their administrations. Given that such a solution is unprecedented, there is merit in establishing a pilot case to focus the best scientific and legal minds. Ultimately, however, such a solution becomes a matter of political will and decision.

The effects of global climate change for the Arctic Ocean are momentous. New aspirations arise in light of global needs for resources and transport routes. This has mobilized calls for political vision and innovation, in order to provide for timely measures to protect the environment and the livelihoods of indigenous and other people. Warnings about looming conflict or confrontation in the Arctic Ocean have also been issued. However, the latter have not been grounded in a thorough analysis of the existing legal framework and the scope and depth of on-going cooperation by coastal States in that area. Nor have calls for new legal frameworks drawn on a clear understanding of the role and potentialities of the comprehensive legal framework already applicable to the Arctic Ocean. Legal analysis is necessary in a complex, globalized world also in order to formulate effective policies. The focus of the article is on the existing legal framework and its possibilities. The international law of the sea has a particularly practical import for the identification and timely adoption of measures to resolve concrete issues and promote international cooperation across boundaries. The role and interplay of various institutions will also be illustrated. This includes the key policy role in several contexts of the Arctic Council, which is the high level forum for cooperation in the Arctic.

Why is it worth discussing the subject of international law and cooperation in the Arctic? Or to put it more bluntly: Do states and organisations have a duty to cooperate in Arctic affairs? And can a state or an organisation claim a right to be involved in Arctic cooperation? Do the Arctic states have any special responsibility? With respect to the first question – why it is worth discussing the subject of international law and cooperation in the Arctic – there are several major reasons why this is so, and they relate to: (a) the need for cooperation in the Arctic; (b) the manner in which cooperation takes place in the Arctic; (c) the development of the international law of cooperation; and (d) the link between the obligation to cooperate and responsibility.

Interests are awakening globally to take advantage of extensive energy, shipping, fishing and tourism opportunities associated with diminishing sea-ice in the Arctic Ocean. This environmental state-change in the Arctic Ocean also is introducing inherent risks of political, economic and cultural instabilities. With urgency – building on the

“common arctic issues”

of sustainable development and environmental protection established by the Arctic Council – environmental security offers an holistic context to assess opportunities, risks and infrastructure responses within international law. Special attention is given to law of the sea as the

“extensive international legal framework”

to

“promote the peaceful uses”

of the Arctic Ocean.