Introduction
Maqasid al-Shari’ah as the Ethical Framework for Islamic Banks
Based on such foundational axioms, IME as a system, in a consequential manner, “refers to economic and sustainable development, social justice and social investing-oriented principles” (Asutay 2012, p. 96). Therefore, it can be argued that an effective IME system requires that IBs conduct their activities in accordance with the principles of maqasid with an emphasis on social and economic dimensions by essentialising and adopting sustainable development practices along with fulfilling Islamic fiqhi or jurisprudential requirements.Tawhid as complementarity and unitarity or God’s unity and sovereignty, constitutes the nature of knowledge and its articulation implying that none of the stakeholders can have dominance over the others. This identifies that IME suggests an extended stakeholder governance system for IBs based on ihsan or equilibrium. For example, the prohibition of riba accordingly implies de-centring of capital and bringing capital to the same level with other stakeholers through the ihsani process.Al-adl wa’l-ihsan refers to socio-economic justice and beneficence to establish equilibrium between the interests of all the stakeholders in an intergenerational and intragenerational manner, which defines the objective function of IBs. When justice cannot establish equal access, then ihsan through its balancing nature aims to overcome exclusion and fairness.Rububiyyah refers to a developmentalist path in the form of divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and guidance towards perfection, which identifies the operational objectives of IBs. It implies that all the stakeholders have a given path for development, and therefore, such development path must be sustained through the opportunity spaces.Tazkiyah implies growth in harmony within tawhid’s complementarity so that interests of all stakeholders can be served without harming any other, which implies a constraint on the operation of IBs.Khilafah or vicegerency and accountability defines the role of humans in such an extended stakeholder governance; andMaqasid al-Shari’ah, or the higher objectives of Islam, implies ‘well-being’ indicating that whatever action is taken and whatever is done should be in line with the well-being all of the stakeholders including human well-being.
Maqasid al-Shari’ah | Corollaries |
---|---|
(i) Invigorating the value of human life | |
(a) Faith (b) Human rights | |
(ii) Invigorating the human self | |
(a) Self (b) Intellect | |
(iii) Invigorating society | |
(a) Posterity (b) Social entity | |
(iv) Invigorating the physical environment | |
(a) Wealth (b) Environment (ecology) |
Islamic Banking and Finance and Its Ideal Identities
Survey of the Empirical Literature
Ethical, Social and Financial Performance of Islamic Banking and Financial Institutions
Determinants of Islamic Banks’ Performance and Disclosures
Methodology
Construction of maqasid al-Shari’ah Index: Composition and List of Indicators for Disclosure Analysis
Hypotheses Development
Secondly, the size of the Muslim population in countries where IBs operate may influence their maqasid performance. Based on the concept of a ‘relevant public’ to whom the corporations are accountable, Newson and Deegan (2002) found evidence of a positive impact of the size of Muslim populations on the social reporting of IBs. Therefore, it is expected that the higher the Muslim population, the higher the maqasid performance of IBs, as Muslim communities could put pressure on IBs to perform better in the ethical, social and environmental dimensions of their activities. Hence hypothesis 4 is formulated as follows:H1: Human development positively affects the maqasid performance of IBs;H2: Political and civil repression negatively influences the maqasid performance of IBs;H3: Civil law based legal systems negatively influence the maqasid performance of IBs.
As for the third factor, the ownership structure of IBs, Zouari and Taktak (2012) indicated that, according to the existing literature, the ownership structure and concentration are crucial factors that impact a company’s financial performance and stability. However, they summarise that previous empirical studies reported mixed results on the relationship between ownership concentration and structure and performance. Nevertheless, their empirical study showed that family and government ownership of IBs positively influences their financial performance, whereas the same impact was not found in institutional and foreign shareholders. Therefore, it is expected that ownership structure either positively or negatively affects the maqasid performance of IBs, which is stated in hypothesis 5 as follows:H4: The share of the Muslims population in a country’s total population positively affects the maqasid performance of IBs.
The fourth factor is corporate governance related organizational structures and the features of the board of directors in IBs. Mollah and Zaman (2015) summarised that, according to the existing available literature related to all types of companies, there is mixed empirical evidence of the influence of governance mechanisms on a company’s performance. Nevertheless, their study showed that a board of directors’ size and independence are negatively affected by the financial performance of IBs. In contrast, Zeitoun (2013) identified that, within several corporate governance features of companies, only ‘board independence’ has a significantly positive effect on social performance. Thus, based on the above rationalisation, it is expected that the corporate governance structure may affect the maqasid performance of IBs, as identified in hypothesis 6:H5: There is a positive relationship between ownership structure and the maqasid performance of IBs.
Finally, Shari’ah governance is one of the main features of IBs, ensuring that their products and operations are Shari’ah compliant, which are mainly presented by SSB features. Farook et al. (2011) proposed that SSBs could be a factor for CSR activities and social disclosures, and this was deduced from the SSBs’ role as promoters of Shari’ah compliance and presenters of Islamic laws and principles. Therefore, it is expected that the better the Shari’ah governance, the higher the maqasid performance of IBs, as stated in hypothesis 7:H6: There is a positive relationship between corporate governance structures and the maqasid performance of IBs.
After identifying the hypotheses, the following section explains the panel data model used to examine the factors impacting the disclosure performance in relation to maqasid al-Shari’ah.H7: Shari’ah governance structures positively affect the maqasid performance of IBs.
Panel Data Econometric Model
Acronym | Definition of variables | Source | Years (available) |
---|---|---|---|
Imaqasid | Maqasid al-Shari’ah index | Eight corollaries | 2008–2016 |
I1 | Faith index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
I2 | Rights and stakeholding index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
I3 | Self-index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
I4 | Intellect index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
I5 | Posterity index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
I6 | Social entity index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
I7 | Wealth index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
I8 | Environment index | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
GDP | Gros Domestic Product (log form) | The World Bank | 1960–2018b |
FD | Financial Development | IMF website | 1980–2017b |
HDI | Human Development Index | UNDP website | 1990–2018b |
PCR | Political and civil repression | Freedom in the World Index | 2005–2018 |
MUSLIMRATIO | A percentage of Muslim ration in the country | CIA World Factbook | 2008–2016b |
COMLAW | A common law system | JuriGlobe database of Ottawa University | 2008–2016 |
CIVLAW | A civil law system | JuriGlobe database of Ottawa University | 2008–2016 |
SHARLAW | An Islamic law system | JuriGlobe database of Ottawa University | 2008–2016 |
INED | Board independence as a percentage of non–executive directors in the board of directors | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
BPSD | Board pro-stakeholders’ directors as a percentage of board members | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
BS | Board size as the number of members in the board of directors | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
CEOD | CEO duality | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
IAH | Investment account holder’s ratio | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
SSBC | SSB composition | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
SSBD | SSB disclosure level | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
SSBCM | SSB control and monitoring abilities | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
GOV | Government owned bank | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
FAM | Family owned bank | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
INST | Institutionally owned bank | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
FORG | Foreign ownership bank | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
SIZE | Islamic Banks’ size of assets | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
LEV | The leverage level which is measured as the ratio of total debt to equity | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
AGE | The date of incorporation of bank | Annual Reports | 2008–2016a |
Generating Data Through Disclosure Analysis
No | Bank | Country | Listed/not listed | Total assets (USD) 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Al-Rajhi | Saudi Arabia | Listed | 90,589 |
2 | KFH | Kuwait | Listed | 53,893 |
3 | DIB | UAE | Listed | 47,643 |
4 | QIB | Qatar | Listed | 38,415 |
5 | ADIB | UAE | Listed | 33,298 |
6 | Alinma Bank | Saudi Arabia | Listed | 27,927 |
7 | Masraf Al Rayan | Qatar | Listed | 25,145 |
8 | Al Baraka | Bahrain | Listed | 23,425 |
9 | Bank Rakyat | Malaysia | Unlisted | 22,117 |
10 | Bank Al Jazira | Saudi Arabia | Listed | 17,685 |
11 | Bank Islami MB | Malaysia | Unlisted | 12,411 |
12 | Ahli United Bank Kuwait | Kuwait | Listed | 12,059 |
13 | Al-Hilal | UAE | Unlisted | 11,824 |
14 | QIIB | Qatar | Listed | 11,689 |
15 | RHB Islamic Bank Berhad | Malaysia | Unlisted | 10,725 |
16 | IBBL | Bangladesh | Listed | 10,138 |
17 | BPM Berhad | Malaysia | Unlisted | 5987 |
18 | Bank Syariah Mandiri | Indonesia | Unlisted | 5867 |
19 | Jordan Islamic Bank | Jordan | Listed | 5773 |
20 | Bank Muamalat | Malaysia | Unlisted | 5314 |
21 | Al Salam Bank | Bahrain | Listed | 4471 |
22 | KFH Bahrain | Bahrain | Unlisted | 4276 |
23 | Meezan Bank | Pakistan | Listed | 4226 |
24 | PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia | Indonesia | Unlisted | 4152 |
25 | Export-Import Bank of Bangladesh | Bangladesh | Listed | 3699 |
26 | Bahrain Islamic Bank | Bahrain | Listed | 2771 |
27 | Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) | Sudan | Unlisted | 2378 |
28 | PT Bank BRI Syariah | Indonesia | Unlisted | 2060 |
29 | Al Rayan Bank Plc | UK | Delisted | 1766 |
30 | BankIslami Pakistan Ltd | Pakistan | Listed | 1736 |
31 | Safwa Islamic Bank | Jordan | Listed | 1295 |
32 | Al Baraka Sudan | Sudan | Listed | 408 |
33 | Al-Shamal Bank | Sudan | Listed | 340 |
Empirical Results of Assessing the Maqasid Performance of Islamic Banks and Its Determinants
The Maqasid Performance of the Sampled IBs
No | Bank | Country | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | Average | % Change 2008–2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Safwa Islamic Bank | Jordan | N/A | N/A | − 0.0631 | 1.8985 | 5.4685 | 6.4589 | 6.7160 | 6.7261 | 6.7370 | 4.8488 | 10,777 |
2 | Jordan Islamic Bank | Jordan | 2.2634 | 2.2333 | 2.1676 | 2.8469 | 2.9789 | 2.3174 | 2.4988 | 2.2193 | 2.3208 | 2.4273 | − 3 |
3 | Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) | Sudan | 1.6362 | 1.8706 | 1.9897 | 2.2131 | 1.9114 | 1.8472 | 1.8484 | 1.8518 | 1.8382 | 1.8896 | − 14 |
4 | PT Bank BRI Syariah | Indonesia | N/A | N/A | N/A | 4.5665 | 0.8211 | 1.2917 | 1.3595 | 1.3873 | 1.4262 | 1.8087 | 69 |
5 | PT Bank Syariah Mandiri | Indonesia | 1.3503 | 1.6666 | N/A | 1.4149 | 1.1830 | 1.2924 | 1.6394 | 1.4279 | 1.5440 | 1.4398 | − 4 |
6 | PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia | Indonesia | N/A | 1.6616 | 1.2023 | 1.2863 | 1.2948 | 1.1401 | 1.0975 | 1.1208 | 1.1505 | 1.2442 | 31 |
7 | Meezan Bank | Pakistan | 0.8519 | 0.9090 | 1.0327 | 1.3298 | 1.2603 | 1.3203 | 1.1687 | 1.5302 | 1.3117 | 1.1905 | − 54 |
8 | Bank Rakyat | Malaysia | 1.1160 | 0.9924 | 1.2951 | 1.3593 | 1.1630 | 1.1700 | 1.1837 | 1.2250 | 1.1846 | 1.1876 | − 6 |
9 | Al-Rajhi | Saudi Arabia | N/A | 1.2579 | 1.1752 | 1.1748 | 1.1565 | 1.0443 | 1.1044 | 1.0763 | 1.1568 | 1.1432 | 8 |
10 | Bank Islami MB | Malaysia | 1.4565 | 0.9163 | 1.1325 | 1.0438 | 1.0945 | 1.1058 | 1.0676 | 1.0614 | 1.1300 | 1.1120 | 22 |
11 | Export-Import Bank of Bangladesh | Bangladesh | 1.1612 | 1.1649 | 1.3587 | 0.9499 | 0.9850 | 0.9240 | 1.0380 | 1.0224 | 0.9037 | 1.0564 | 22 |
12 | IBBL | Bangladesh | 1.0145 | 0.9697 | 1.1567 | 1.0830 | 1.0790 | 1.0410 | 1.0375 | 1.0328 | 1.0429 | 1.0507 | − 6 |
13 | Al Baraka | Bahrain | 0.8540 | 0.7614 | 0.7925 | 0.8207 | 0.9881 | 1.3579 | 1.3207 | 1.3790 | 1.3928 | 1.0741 | − 63 |
14 | Al Baraka Sudan | Sudan | 0.9456 | 0.7619 | 0.8534 | 0.8887 | 0.8537 | 1.2190 | 1.0216 | 1.0902 | 1.2724 | 0.9896 | − 35 |
15 | Masraf Al Rayan | Qatar | N/A | 0.9504 | 1.0713 | 0.9694 | 0.9173 | 0.9604 | 0.9791 | 0.9658 | 1.0090 | 0.9778 | − 6 |
16 | QIB | Qatar | 1.4553 | 1.0099 | 0.9198 | 0.8647 | 0.7998 | 0.8199 | 0.8269 | 0.7962 | 0.8449 | 0.9263 | − 42 |
17 | Alinma Bank | Saudi Arabia | N/A | 0.9198 | 1.1509 | 0.6128 | 0.5563 | 0.6373 | 0.9257 | 1.6697 | 1.1021 | 0.9468 | − 20 |
18 | QIB Bank Pembangunan Malaysia | Qatar | N/A | 0.8617 | 0.8781 | 0.8622 | 0.8215 | 0.8421 | 0.8489 | 0.8682 | 0.8965 | 0.8599 | − 4 |
19 | ADIB | UAE | 0.9015 | 0.7545 | 0.8472 | 0.8750 | 0.8070 | 0.8229 | 0.8356 | 0.8558 | 0.9457 | 0.8494 | − 5 |
20 | DIB | UAE | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0.7645 | 0.8204 | 0.8172 | 0.8142 | 0.8332 | 0.8279 | 0.8129 | − 8 |
21 | Al-Hilal | UAE | N/A | N/A | 0.6796 | 0.7008 | 0.7375 | 0.8449 | 0.9047 | 0.8981 | 0.8990 | 0.8092 | − 32 |
22 | Ahli United Bank Kuwait | Kuwait | N/A | 0.6131 | 0.6827 | 0.7242 | 0.8610 | 0.8926 | 0.8662 | 0.9061 | 0.9142 | 0.8075 | − 49 |
23 | Al Salam Bank | Bahrain | 0.9577 | 0.6982 | 0.5836 | 1.4264 | 0.5405 | 0.5187 | 1.3856 | 0.5551 | 0.5433 | 0.8010 | 43 |
24 | Bank Al Jazira | Saudi Arabia | 0.5768 | 0.8971 | 0.8797 | 0.6464 | 0.7643 | 0.8129 | 0.7911 | 0.8316 | 0.8313 | 0.7812 | − 44 |
25 | Bank Muamalat | Malaysia | 0.5986 | N/A | 0.6311 | 0.6172 | 0.8741 | 0.7352 | 0.7887 | 0.8293 | 0.8749 | 0.7436 | − 46 |
26 | BPM Berhad | Malaysia | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0.7611 | 0.6240 | 0.6772 | 0.7358 | 0.7450 | 0.7002 | 0.7072 | 8 |
27 | KFH | Kuwait | N/A | 0.4790 | 0.5988 | 0.6053 | 0.7141 | 0.7798 | 0.7972 | 0.7913 | 0.8058 | 0.6964 | − 68 |
28 | RHB Islamic Bank Berhad | Malaysia | 0.5776 | 0.6567 | 0.5783 | 0.7343 | 0.7346 | 0.6765 | 0.7478 | 0.7612 | 0.7768 | 0.6937 | − 34 |
29 | BankIslami Pakistan Ltd | Pakistan | N/A | 0.2379 | − 0.0568 | 0.7704 | 0.7515 | 0.7968 | 0.8520 | 0.8767 | 0.9224 | 0.6438 | − 288 |
30 | Al-Shamal Bank | Sudan | 0.5693 | 0.5642 | 0.7709 | 0.6030 | − 0.2739 | 0.5163 | 0.4938 | 0.4942 | 1.3573 | 0.5661 | − 138 |
31 | KFH Bahrain | Bahrain | 0.8841 | 0.5346 | 0.4370 | 0.4878 | 0.4802 | 0.4632 | 0.4698 | 0.5013 | 0.4610 | 0.5243 | 48 |
32 | Bahrain Islamic Bank | Bahrain | 0.8132 | − 0.1742 | − 0.9045 | − 0.3452 | − 1.1175 | 0.7094 | 0.8338 | 0.7522 | − 0.2615 | 0.0339 | 132 |
33 | Al Rayan Bank UK | UK | − 0.7450 | − 1.6393 | − 1.1219 | − 1.2882 | − 1.1821 | − 0.8006 | − 0.6936 | − 0.5630 | − 0.2063 | − 0.9155 | 72 |
Country | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | Average | % Change between 2008 and 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Jordan | 2.26 | 2.23 | 1.05 | 2.37 | 4.22 | 4.39 | 4.60 | 4.47 | 4.52 | 3.34 | 100 |
Indonesia | 1.35 | 1.66 | 1.20 | 2.42 | 1.10 | 1.24 | 1.36 | 1.31 | 1.37 | 1.44 | 1 |
Sudan | 1.05 | 1.07 | 1.20 | 1.23 | 0.83 | 1.21 | 1.12 | 1.14 | 1.50 | 1.15 | 43 |
Bangladesh | 1.09 | 1.07 | 1.26 | 1.02 | 1.03 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 1.02 | 0.97 | 1.05 | − 3 |
Qatar | 1.46 | 0.94 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.91 | 0.96 | − 38 |
Pakistan | 0.85 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 1.05 | 1.01 | 1.06 | 1.01 | 1.20 | 1.11 | 0.92 | 31 |
Saudi Arabia | 0.58 | 1.02 | 1.07 | 0.81 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.94 | 1.19 | 1.03 | 0.92 | 78 |
Malaysia | 0.94 | 0.86 | 0.91 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.90 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 0.90 | 1 |
UAE | 0.90 | 0.75 | 0.76 | 0.78 | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.85 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 1 |
Kuwaita | – | 0.55 | 0.64 | 0.66 | 0.79 | 0.84 | 0.83 | 0.85 | 0.86 | 0.75 | − 56 |
Bahrain | 0.88 | 0.46 | 0.23 | 0.60 | 0.22 | 0.76 | 1.00 | 0.79 | 0.53 | 0.60 | 40 |
UK | − 0.75 | − 1.64 | − 1.12 | − 1.29 | − 1.18 | − 0.80 | − 0.69 | − 0.56 | − 0.20 | − 0.91 | 73 |
Determinants of the Maqasid Performance of IBs: Econometric Analysis
Variables | Mean | Median | Maximum | Minimum | SD | Skewness | Kurtosis |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel A: dependent variables | |||||||
IMAQASID | 1.0284 | 0.8941 | 6.7370 | − 1.6493 | 0.9703 | 3.1132 | 20.0892 |
I1 | 0.3791 | 0.3816 | 0.7666 | 0.0667 | 0.1624 | 0.0682 | 2.2445 |
I2 | 0.4201 | 0.4521 | 0.7435 | 0.1274 | 0.1464 | − 0.1247 | 1.7870 |
I3 | 0.6533 | 0.6324 | 1.0000 | 0.0339 | 0.2902 | − 0.1391 | 1.6326 |
I4 | 0.1711 | 0.1154 | 0.5614 | 0.0000 | 0.1534 | 0.7019 | 2.6386 |
I5 | 0.7157 | 0.3853 | 9.4652 | − 1.1011 | 1.2935 | 4.3322 | 24.2664 |
I6 | 0.4162 | 0.4231 | 0.8462 | 0.0000 | 0.2132 | 0.0264 | 2.3034 |
I7 | 5.2846 | 4.3555 | 49.603 | − 14.0905 | 7.2247 | 3.4466 | 23.0413 |
I8 | 0.1065 | 0.0000 | 0.8000 | 0.0000 | 0.1926 | 2.0204 | 6.1226 |
Panel B: independent variables | |||||||
HDI | 0.7358 | 0.7970 | 0.9200 | 0.4470 | 0.1305 | − 0.9522 | 2.4970 |
GDP | 3.4600 | 1.9900 | 3.0200 | 2.2000 | 5.0100 | 3.5322 | 16.9488 |
FD | 0.4202 | 0.4289 | 0.8888 | 0.0877 | 0.1842 | 0.0025 | 2.6331 |
PCR | 10.0100 | 11.0000 | 14.0000 | 2.0000 | 2.9395 | − 0.5984 | 3.0438 |
CIVLAW | 0.4197 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.4944 | 0.3253 | 1.1058 |
COMLAW | 0.6313 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.4833 | − 0.5244 | 1.2966 |
SHARLAW | 0.9562 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.2050 | − 4.4586 | 20.8791 |
MUSLIMRATIO | 0.7957 | 0.8120 | 1.0000 | 0.0270 | 0.1886 | − 2.1686 | 9.5258 |
GOV | 0.3293 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.4141 | 0.7555 | 1.8363 |
FAM | 0.1614 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.2967 | 1.4869 | 3.6759 |
INST | 0.5218 | 0.5000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.3416 | − 0.0807 | 1.8381 |
FORG | 0.2281 | 0.0000 | 0.7500 | 0.0000 | 0.3040 | 0.7062 | 1.7412 |
INED | 0.3600 | 0.3636 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.2960 | 0.3256 | 2.0693 |
BPSD | 0.1520 | 0.1538 | 0.8000 | 0.0000 | 0.1607 | 1.3854 | 6.0815 |
BS | 9.1368 | 9.0000 | 23.0000 | 0.5000 | 2.9835 | 0.6099 | 5.7906 |
CEOD | 0.9854 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.1201 | − 8.0941 | 66.5148 |
IAH | 5.8891 | 5.4995 | 17.7262 | 0.0289 | 3.6230 | 0.4704 | 2.4924 |
SSBC | 4.6788 | 4.0000 | 14.0000 | 2.0000 | 2.2980 | 2.0235 | 7.3164 |
SSBD | 0.6124 | 0.6667 | 0.8947 | 0.0000 | 0.2302 | − 1.2476 | 3.8551 |
SSBCM | 0.6961 | 0.7500 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.3295 | − 0.8972 | 2.4606 |
Panel C: control variables | |||||||
SIZE | 9783.7 | 4875.616 | 84,165.24 | 7.1300 | 13,865.67 | 2.7262 | 11.9245 |
LEV | 8.4968 | 8.0841 | 18.0744 | 0.2049 | 3.9622 | 0.1943 | 2.3506 |
AGE | 21.5 | 1988 | 2008 | 1954 | 13.3145 | − 0.3880 | 2.5605 |
IMAQASID | I1 | I2 | I3 | I4 | I5 | I6 | I7 | I8 | GDP | HDI | PCR | CIVLAW | COMLAW | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
IMAQASID | 1 | |||||||||||||
I1 | 0.1119 | 1 | ||||||||||||
I2 | 0.2803 | 0.0877 | 1 | |||||||||||
I3 | 0.2562 | 0.1755 | 0.2481 | 1 | ||||||||||
I4 | 0.3300 | 0.0655 | 0.4837 | 0.3822 | 1 | |||||||||
I5 | 0.2517 | − 0.0439 | 0.0455 | 0.0891 | − 0.0983 | 1 | ||||||||
I6 | 0.1975 | − 0.0206 | 0.5053 | 0.5505 | 0.4499 | 0.0826 | 1 | |||||||
I7 | 0.9529 | 0.1121 | 0.2202 | 0.1639 | 0.3130 | 0.0116 | 0.0917 | 1 | ||||||
I8 | 0.1 652 | − 0.0386 | 0.3917 | 0.3221 | 0.3682 | 0.0177 | 0.5059 | 0.1111 | 1 | |||||
GDP | − 0.3252 | 0.0690 | − 0.1341 | − 0.0270 | − 0.2294 | − 0.0336 | − 0.0922 | − 0.3473 | 0.0598 | 1 | ||||
HDI | − 0.1895 | − 0.1432 | 0.1718 | − 0.4695 | 0.0211 | − 0.1352 | − 0.1024 | − 0.1480 | − 0.1962 | 0.2749 | 1 | |||
PCR | 0.1524 | − 0.0113 | − 0.2452 | − 0.2398 | − 0.0267 | 0.0083 | − 0.3009 | 0.2163 | 00.3987 | − 0.5696 | − 0.0698 | 1 | ||
CIVLAW | 0.2046 | 0.1351 | 0.1776 | − 0.2516 | 0.1557 | 0.0750 | 0.1627 | 0.1863 | 0.0902 | − 0.1983 | 0.3291 | − 0.0511 | 1 | |
COMLAW | − 0.2982 | 0.0574 | − 0.2222 | − 0.1131 | − 0.2064 | − 0.1328 | − 0.3076 | − 0.2555 | − 0.1982 | − 0.1549 | − 0.2706 | − 0.0668 | − 0.1780 | 1 |
SHARLAW | 0.3052 | − 0.1324 | 0.2131 | 0.1096 | 0.1171 | 0.1202 | 0.2530 | 0.2867 | 0.0630 | − 0.7465 | − 0.1278 | 0.4567 | 0.1820 | − 0.1635 |
MUSLIMRATIO | 0.3576 | 0.0000 | 0.1527 | 0.2175 | 0.3405 | 0.1588 | 0.2962 | 0.1396 | 0.1697 | − 0.5578 | − 0.1123 | 0.4858 | 0.1712 | − 0.5229 |
GOV | − 0.0157 | − 0.2631 | 0.3510 | − 0.0008 | − 0.0264 | 0.0450 | 0.3850 | − 0.0608 | 0.2276 | 0.0030 | 0.1225 | − 0.2218 | − 0.0962 | − 0.1186 |
FAM | 0.0783 | 0.1978 | − 0.0011 | 0.1428 | − 0.0135 | − 0.0613 | − 0.1940 | 0.1025 | − 0.2045 | − 0.0821 | − 0.1928 | 0.2016 | − 0.1266 | 0.0909 |
INST | − 0.0359 | 0.0271 | 0.2569 | 0.0759 | 0.0620 | 0.0393 | 0.0884 | − 0.0783 | 0.1578 | 0.0953 | − 0.1514 | − 0.3385 | 0.0755 | 0.0213 |
FORG | 0.0989 | 0.3956 | − 0.0521 | 0.1769 | 0.2152 | − 0.0992 | − 0.1275 | 0.1194 | − 0.1054 | 0.1157 | − 0.2911 | − 0.1053 | 0.1284 | 0.0695 |
INED | 0.0430 | − 0.1916 | 0.5025 | 0.0390 | 0.0230 | 0.1309 | 0.1139 | 0.0021 | 0.0140 | − 0.0321 | 0.2211 | − 0.0035 | − 0.0483 | − 0.0338 |
BPSD | 0.2847 | − 0.2623 | 0.3166 | 0.0742 | 0.3607 | − 0.0517 | 0.3355 | 0.2845 | 0.2351 | − 0.2064 | 0.0087 | − 0.0041 | 0.0003 | 0.0566 |
BS | 0.2478 | 0.0006 | 0.0149 | 0.1366 | 0.2992 | − 0.0532 | − 0.0844 | 0.2779 | 0.1418 | − 0.4566 | − 0.3030 | 0.2512 | − 0.1123 | 0.2193 |
CEOD | 0.0387 | 0.0969 | 0.0618 | − 0.0175 | 0.0690 | 0.0140 | 0.0346 | 0.0307 | 0.0675 | 0.0507 | − 0.0679 | 0.0627 | − 0.1431 | 0.1593 |
IAH | − 0.0746 | 0.1090 | 0.3968 | 0.3617 | 0.2069 | 0.0247 | 0.3338 | − 0.1403 | 0.3384 | 0.2544 | − 0.0547 | − 0.6053 | 0.0715 | − 0.0134 |
SSBC | 0.0118 | − 0.1937 | 0.2013 | 0.3072 | 0.2861 | − 0.1133 | 0.1572 | 0.0131 | 0.3805 | − 0.1945 | − 0.1997 | − 0.1166 | − 0.3613 | 0.2261 |
SSBD | 0.0212 | − 0.0019 | 0.2533 | 0.1382 | 0.2893 | − 0.0201 | 0.0935 | 0.0152 | 0.0312 | − 0.2010 | − 0.1822 | − 0.0357 | − 0.0407 | 0.2670 |
SSBCM | 0.0489 | 0.1145 | 0.4478 | 0.2521 | 0.2129 | − 0.0957 | 0.3039 | 0.0479 | 0.2191 | − 0.0749 | 0.1624 | − 0.2461 | 0.0212 | − 0.0906 |
SIZE | − 0.0595 | − 0.0024 | 0.0776 | − 0.1688 | 0.0789 | − 0.1191 | 0.0918 | − 0.0373 | 0.0950 | − 0.0055 | 0.3978 | 0.2222 | 0.0088 | − 0.3084 |
LEV | 0.0100 | 0.3242 | 0.2961 | 0.5617 | 0.1555 | 0.0320 | 0.3168 | − 0.0561 | 0.2535 | 0.1793 | − 0.4116 | − 0.4459 | − 0.2296 | 0.0637 |
AGE | − 0.2253 | − 0.0284 | − 0.885 | − 0.1628 | − 0.2516 | 0.1545 | − 0.2836 | − 0.2632 | 0.0065 | 0.2857 | 0.0451 | − 0.1972 | − 0.0105 | 0.0666 |
MUSLMRATO | GOV | FAM | INST | FORG | INED | BPSD | BS | CEOD | IAH | SSBC | SSBCM | SIZE | LEV | AGE | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
IMAQASID | |||||||||||||||
I1 | |||||||||||||||
I2 | |||||||||||||||
I3 | |||||||||||||||
I4 | |||||||||||||||
I5 | |||||||||||||||
I6 | |||||||||||||||
I7 | |||||||||||||||
I8 | |||||||||||||||
GDP | |||||||||||||||
HDI | |||||||||||||||
PCR | |||||||||||||||
CIVLAW | |||||||||||||||
COMLAW | |||||||||||||||
SHARLAW | |||||||||||||||
MUSLIMRATIO | 1 | ||||||||||||||
GOV | − 0.1693 | 1 | |||||||||||||
FAM | − 0.0614 | − 0.3002 | 1 | ||||||||||||
INST | − 0.2309 | 0.2837 | 0.0960 | 1 | |||||||||||
FORG | − 0.1572 | − 0.4751 | 0.4250 | 0.1831 | 1 | ||||||||||
INED | 0.0569 | 0.2543 | − 0.0000 | − 0.1240 | − 0.3014 | 1 | |||||||||
BPSD | − 0.0100 | 0.2203 | 0.0785 | − 0.2191 | − 0.0820 | 0.2889 | 1 | ||||||||
BS | 0.2435 | − 0.3152 | 0.1839 | − 0.3506 | 0.1431 | − 0.1552 | 0.3102 | 1 | |||||||
CEOD | − 0.0351 | 0.0234 | 0.0664 | − 0.0814 | − 0.2093 | 0.1483 | 0.1154 | 0.0465 | 1 | ||||||
IAH | − 0.1989 | 0.1016 | 0.0676 | 0.4376 | 0.2677 | 0.0663 | 0.0175 | − 0.0928 | − 0.0324 | 1 | |||||
SSBC | 0.0678 | − 0.0539 | − 0.0673 | − 0.1263 | − 0.0966 | 0.0048 | 0.3404 | 0.6221 | 0.0758 | 0.2745 | 1 | ||||
SSBD | − 0.1715 | 0.1095 | 0.0384 | 0.3223 | 0.2517 | − 0.0451 | 0.0947 | 0.0315 | 0.0853 | 0.1607 | 0.1954 | 1 | |||
SSBCM | 0.1695 | 0.0700 | − 0.0770 | 0.0613 | 0.0293 | 0.1520 | − 0.0224 | 0.0955 | − 0.0199 | 0.2865 | 0.2443 | 0.3134 | 1 | ||
SIZE | 0.2167 | 0.1190 | − 0.0659 | − 0.3205 | − 0.2898 | − 0.0106 | 0.1439 | 0.0406 | 0.0086 | − 0.1446 | 0.0323 | − 0.1794 | 0.1372 | 1 | |
LEV | − 0.1132 | 0.0520 | 0.1489 | 0.3966 | 0.3402 | 0.0148 | − 0.1427 | − 0.0866 | − 0.0083 | 0.6869 | 0.1719 | 0.2072 | 0.2470 | − 0.1999 | 1 |
AGE | − 0.0148 | − 0.1299 | − 0.0699 | 0.3681 | − 0.2064 | 0.1434 | − 0.4171 | − 0.3310 | 0.1661 | 0.1048 | − 0.2089 | − 0.1989 | − 0.0751 | − 0.1750 | 0.0995 |
Effects tests | Statistics | df | Prob. |
---|---|---|---|
Imaqasid | |||
Cross-section F | 12.495505 | 32,224 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section Chi square | 280.65104 | 32 | 0.0000 |
Period F | 1.352900 | 7211 | 0.2270 |
Period Chi square | 10.581073 | 7 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section/Period F | 11.359077 | 40,216 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section/Period Chi square | 310.316252 | 40 | 0.0000 |
I1 (faith) | I5 (posterity) | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Cross-section F | 41.94282 | 32,224 | 0.0000 | Cross-section F | 2.102214 | 32,224 | 0.0010 |
Cross-section Chi square | 532.8595 | 32 | 0.0000 | Cross-section Chi square | 71.954453 | 32 | 0.0001 |
Period F | 1.232092 | 7211 | 0.0286 | Period F | 0.472996 | 7211 | 0.8535 |
Period Chi square | 9.654895 | 7 | 0.2090 | Period Chi square | 3.752360 | 7 | 0.8078 |
Cross-section/Period F | 34.655154 | 40,216 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period F | 1.772856 | 40,216 | 0.0053 |
Cross-section/Period Chi square | 549.057199 | 40 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period Chi square | 77.789961 | 40 | 0.0003 |
I2 (rights and state holding) | I6 (social entity) | ||||||
Cross-section F | 19.60897 | 32224 | 0.0000 | Cross-section F | 31.153776 | 32224 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section Chi square | 365.8827 | 32 | 0.0000 | Cross-section Chi square | 464.625795 | 32 | 0.0000 |
Period F | 2.149829 | 7211 | 0.0399 | Period F | 1.281727 | 7211 | 0.2607 |
Period Chi square | 16.603162 | 7 | 0.0201 | Period Chi square | 10.035851 | 7 | 0.1866 |
Cross-section/Period F | 16.761282 | 40,216 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period F | 27.700268 | 40,216 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section/Period Chi square | 386.873690 | 40 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period Chi square | 496.801022 | 40 | 0.0000 |
I3 (self) | I7 (wealth) | ||||||
Cross-section F | 27.42565 | 32,224 | 0.0000 | Cross-section F | 15.050472 | 32,224 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section Chi square | 436.4523 | 32 | 0.0000 | Cross-section Chi square | 314.394135 | 32 | 0.0000 |
Period F | 0.352197 | 7211 | 0.9286 | Period F | 1.333725 | 7211 | 0.2357 |
Period Chi square | 2.799581 | 7 | 0.9029 | Period Chi square | 10.434303 | 7 | 0.1653 |
Cross-section/Period F | 22.76942 | 40,216 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period F | 13.758269 | 40,216 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section/Period Chi square | 452.60369 | 40 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period Chi square | 346.975913 | 40 | 0.0000 |
I4 (intellect) | I8 (ecology) | ||||||
Cross-section F | 16.76641 | 32,224 | 0.0000 | Cross-section F | 15.689253 | 32,224 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section Chi square | 334.9274 | 32 | 0.0000 | Cross-section Chi square | 322.218857 | 32 | 0.0000 |
Period F | 1.544880 | 7211 | 0.1537 | Period F | 1.652824 | 7211 | 0.1223 |
Period Chi square | 12.045613 | 7 | 0.0991 | Period Chi square | 12.865175 | 7 | 0.0755 |
Cross-section/Period F | 15.417663 | 40,216 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period F | 12.683760 | 40,216 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section/Period Chi square | 369.736383 | 40 | 0.0000 | Cross-section/Period Chi square | 331.160602 | 40 | 0.0000 |
Cross-section random | χ2 statistic | χ2 df | Prob. | Conclusion |
---|---|---|---|---|
Imaqasid | 27.12853 | 17 | 0.0562 | H0—not rejected, fixed effect model |
I1 (faith) | 24.85788 | 17 | 0.0979 | H0—not rejected, random effect model |
I2 (rights and stakeholding) | 62.98078 | 17 | 0.0000 | H0—rejected, fixed effect model |
I3 (Self) | 47.58493 | 17 | 0.0001 | H0—rejected, fixed effect model |
I4 (intellect) | 49.91844 | 17 | 0.0000 | H0—rejected, fixed effect model |
I5 (posterity) | 18.40060 | 17 | 0.3640 | H0—not rejected, random effect model |
I6 (social entity) | 37.10761 | 17 | 0.0033 | H0—rejected, fixed effect model |
I7 (wealth) | 26.07010 | 17 | 0.0732 | H0—rejected, fixed effect model |
I8 (ecology) | 132.83777 | 17 | 0.0000 | H0—rejected, fixed effect model |
Imaqasid | Predicted sign | Model 1 | Model 2 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pooled regression | REM | FEM | FEM with robust standard errors | ||||||
Coeff. | t statistic | Coeff. | t statistic | Coeff. | t statistic | Coeff. | t statistic | ||
Intercept | − 0.5046 | − 0.0371 | 1.4459 | 0.0657 | − 18.5327 | − 2.7516 | − 18.5327 | − 1.7247 | |
HDI | – | − 9.0226 | − 5.2605 | − 1.3445 | − 0.7539 | − 2.9549* | − 0.8639 | − 2.9549** | − 0.9308 |
FD (log) | ± | 1.7127 | 4.9048 | − 0.0765 | − 0.2129 | − 0.8180** | − 1.6927 | − 0.8180 | − 1.7058 |
GDP (log) | ± | 0.0079 | 0.0696 | − 0.0279 | − 0.1976 | 0.6398 | 2.2905 | 0.6398 | 1.9405 |
PCR | ± | 0.1444 | 3.0407 | 0.0539 | 1.1499 | − 0.0693*** | − 0.9589 | − 0.0693* | − 2.0233 |
CIVLAW | 0.9034 | 3.9230 | 0.5850 | 1.8265 | |||||
COMLAW | − 1.1333* | − 6.3802 | − 0.6560** | − 1.9329 | |||||
SHARLAW | 0.2735* | 0.6763 | − 0.1245*** | − 0.3446 | |||||
MUSLIMRATIO | ± | − 1.2051* | − 2.0795 | 0.3312 | 0.3435 | 4.8834 | 0.8405 | 4.8834** | 1.1381 |
GOV | ± | − 0.3091*** | − 1.4910 | 0.2982 | 0.9173 | 0.0753 | 0.1470 | 0.0753 | 0.1307 |
FAM | ± | − 0.3671 | − 1.7330 | 0.0692 | 0.2042 | 0.2902 | 0.5275 | 0.2902 | 0.9470 |
INST | ± | 0.1691 | 0.6643 | − 0.3186 | − 0.8141 | − 0.8718*** | − 1.1657 | − 0.8718* | − 2.2328 |
FORG | − 0.0456 | − 0.1496 | 0.0586 | 0.1064 | |||||
INED | ± | − 0.0756 | − 0.3467 | − 0.3932 | − 1.4855 | − 1.2982* | − 3.8913 | − 1.2982* | − 2.5423 |
BPSD | + | 1.7605** | 4.3967 | 1.4095 | 2.8360 | 0.5769 | 0.8524 | 0.5769 | 1.2758 |
BS | ± | 0.0799** | 2.7003 | 0.0115 | 0.3958 | − 0.0166 | − 0.4750 | − 0.0166 | − 0.5583 |
CEOD | + | 0.3491** | 0.8178 | 0.1805 | 0.4861 | 0.2327 | 0.5945 | 0.2327*** | 1.3793 |
IAH | ± | − 0.0436** | − 1.7698 | 0.0135 | 0.5219 | 0.1075 | 3.0097 | 0.1075 | 3.4910 |
SSBC | + | 0.0039 | 0.0899 | 0.0306 | 0.6406 | 0.2103 | 2.6455 | 0.2103*** | 1.6135 |
SSBD | ± | 0.2581 | 0.7889 | − 0.1971 | − 0.4561 | − 0.4447 | − 0.7926 | − 0.4447 | − 0.8185 |
SSBCM | + | 0.0539 | 0.2725 | 0.3201 | 1.4967 | 0.3374 | 1.3321 | 0.3374** | 2.4840 |
SIZE | − 5.92E−0 | − 1.2946 | − 6.32E−0 | − 1.5736 | − 2.96E−0 | − 0.6949 | − 2.96E−0 | − 1.3482 | |
LEV | 0.0388** | 1.6657 | 0.0369* | 1.8890 | 0.0339* | 1.6557 | 0.0339*** | 1.8744 | |
AGE | 0.0039 | 0.5890 | − 8.82E− 0 | − 0.0079 | |||||
R2 | 0.487383 | 0.131822 | 0.767854 | 0.767854 | |||||
Adjusted R2 | 0.440222 | 0.051949 | 0.715803 | 0.715803 | |||||
F-statistic | 10.33451 | 1.650403 | 14.75203 | 14.75203 | |||||
Prob(F-statistic) | 0.000000 | 0.034161 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | |||||
Durbin–Watson stat | 0.575125 | 0.818515 | 1.058972 | 1.058972 | |||||
Hausman test | |||||||||
χ2 statistic | 57.388581 | ||||||||
p value | 0.0000 |
Imaqasid | Predicted sign | Model 3 | Model 4 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pooled regression | REM | FEM | FEM with robust standard errors | ||||||
Coeff. | t statistic | Coeff. | t statistic | Coeff. | t statistic | Coeff. | t statistic | ||
Intercept | 15.9306 | 1.2749 | 4.0042 | 0.1655 | − 18.0346 | − 2.7558 | − 2.3117 | − 1.2232 | |
HDI | ± | − 5.5587 | − 4.1055 | 0.3876 | 0.2226 | − 3.0462* | − 0.9028 | 0.8160** | 1.1357 |
FD (log) | ± | − 0.1831 | − 1.8762 | − 0.0735 | − 0.5246 | 0.5798 | 2.1004 | − 0.0191 | − 0.3358 |
GDP (log) | ± | 1.0261 | 3.8002 | − 0.4081 | − 1.1797 | − 0.8041** | − 1.6644 | − 0.3935 | − 2.7970 |
PCR*INED | ± | 0.0022 | 0.1122 | − 0.0423 | − 1.7098 | − 0.1167 | − 3.8524 | − 0.0093* | − 1.0937 |
PCR | |||||||||
CIVLAW | 0.4058* | 2.3632 | 0.4092 | 1.2450 | |||||
COMLAW | − 1.1038* | − 6.1184 | − 0.5821** | − 1.5442 | |||||
SHARLAW | 0.4636* | 1.1457 | − 0.0542*** | − 0.1501 | |||||
MUSLIMRATIO | ± | − 0.4984* | − 0.9253 | 0.7968 | 0.7755 | 5.2662 | 0.9742 | 2.1711** | 1.3156 |
GOV | ± | − 0.3719*** | − 1.7967 | 0.3199 | 0.9260 | 0.0503 | 0.0986 | − 0.1269 | − 0.3903 |
FAM | ± | − 0.2439 | − 1.1496 | 0.1334 | 0.3675 | 0.2455 | 0.4474 | 0.0434 | 0.3130 |
INST | ± | − 0.2194 | − 0.7176 | 0.0912 | 0.1485 | − 0.6876*** | − 0.9236 | − 0.0916 | − 0.4025 |
FORG | 0.2155 | 0.8393 | − 0.3987 | − 0.9458 | |||||
INED | |||||||||
BPSD | ± | 1.5978** | 4.0320 | 1.2305 | 2.4090 | 0.5783 | 0.8572 | − 0.1201 | − 0.6411 |
BS | ± | 0.0790** | 2.6382 | 0.0038 | 0.1284 | − 0.0066 | − 0.1909 | 0.0198 | 1.8713 |
CEOD | + | 0.6830** | 1.6282 | 0.2324 | 0.6313 | 0.1274 | 0.3364 | 0.0866*** | 1.1678 |
IAH | ± | − 0.0610** | − 2.5059 | 0.0189 | 0.7095 | 0.1056 | 2.9646 | 0.0452 | 5.8771 |
SSBC | ± | − 0.0497 | − 1.2241 | 0.0329 | 0.6684 | 0.2214 | 2.7756 | 0.0891*** | 3.2457 |
SSBD | ± | 0.0676 | 0.2073 | − 0.1915 | − 0.4240 | − 0.4559 | − 0.8169 | − 0.1210 | − 0.6419 |
SSBCM | ± | − 0.0550 | − 0.2804 | 0.2880 | 1.3217 | 0.3386 | 1.3367 | 0.2868** | 4.4267 |
SIZE | − 4.47E−0 | − 0.9728 | − 4.79E−0 | − 1.2281 | − 3.38E−0 | − 0.8085 | − 2.49E−0 | − 0.4610 | |
L-EV | 0.0517** | 2.2145 | 0.0380 | 1.9330 | 0.0330* | 1.6135 | 0.0207*** | 4.0552 | |
AGE | − 0.0029 | − 0.4739 | − 0.0015 | − 0.1225 | |||||
R2 | 0.468026 | 0.115812 | 0.766848 | 0.872235 | |||||
Adjusted R2 | 0.421399 | 0.038313 | 0.715846 | 0.844287 | |||||
F-statistic | 10.03761 | 1.494375 | 15.03566 | 31.20868 | |||||
Prob(F-statistic) | 0.000000 | 0.075653 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | |||||
Durbin–Watson stat | 0.530626 | 0.823455 | 1.049512 | 1.728826 | |||||
Hausman test | |||||||||
χ2 statistic | 0 | ||||||||
p value | 0.0000 |