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Journal of Chinese Political Science
Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science 1/2022

07.08.2021 | Research Article

Supreme Leaders, Provincial Leaders, and Factional Competition in China’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement: Regional- and City-Level Evidence

verfasst von: Jingnan Liu

Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science | Ausgabe 1/2022

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Abstract

Corruption is a great challenge for China. The supreme leaders of the Chinese Communist Party face a trade-off between cracking down on corruption and maintaining the stability and loyalty of the party-state apparatus. This article argues that this dilemma is partially resolved via personal connections between supreme leaders and provincial cadres, which may selectively decrease the intensity of anti-corruption campaigns and stabilize local bureaucracies. Using a combination of province-year data and individual-year, city-level data, this study shows that provincial leaders who were part of supreme leaders’ informal political networks were able to significantly reduce the probability that their local subordinates would be targeted by anti-corruption investigations. Future research should examine in greater detail whether supreme leaders’ factional subordinates tend to be reliable agents or whether subordinates often prioritize their own goals over those of supreme leaders.
Vorheriger Artikel Testing the Relationship between Land Approval and Promotion Incentives of Provincial Top Leaders in China
Nächster Artikel Mapping the Literature on China and Russia in IR and Area Studies: A Bibliometric Analysis (1990–2019)

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Metadaten
Titel
Supreme Leaders, Provincial Leaders, and Factional Competition in China’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement: Regional- and City-Level Evidence
verfasst von
Jingnan Liu
Publikationsdatum
07.08.2021
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Journal of Chinese Political Science / Ausgabe 1/2022
Print ISSN: 1080-6954
Elektronische ISSN: 1874-6357
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09753-4

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