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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. The Intergovernmental Safeguard: Principles of Design

verfasst von : Johanna Schnabel

Erschienen in: Managing Interdependencies in Federal Systems

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

By distinguishing different principles of council design, this chapter outlines the conditions under which intergovernmental councils incentivize governments to coordinate public policy-making in such a way that protects governments’ autonomy so that federal stability is maintained. It argues that intergovernmental councils effectively protect the federal distribution of power if they process federally salient policy matters, are highly institutionalized, make binding resolutions, and if they are not dominated by the federal government. How these aspects of council design are operationalized and measured is also explained in the chapter. However, councils’ effectiveness as federal safeguards is also shaped by mechanisms and institutions outside the council system such as the party system, external pressure, or the federal spending power, which are also discussed.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Dynamic Stability of Federal Systems

Nächstes Kapitel Making Fiscal Policy

See Peters (2015, pp. 20–21) for examples of contradiction and duplication.

“Salience” is a term used in the literature on voting behavior (e.g., Wlezien, 2005) and political agendas (e.g., Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Issue or political salience refers to the importance voters assign to certain policy problems and solutions relative to the importance of other issues (see also Culpepper, 2011). Salience explains why certain policy issues materialize on the public agenda whereas others do not. The way the term is used in this book is slightly different but builds on the idea that the salience of policy problems and their occurrence on the public agenda are related. The fact that an issue is important to voters is considered to impact governments’ willingness to coordinate.

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Councils can prepare draft bills, however, that then constitute their outputs.

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Titel: The Intergovernmental Safeguard: Principles of Design
verfasst von: Johanna Schnabel
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Managing Interdependencies in Federal Systems
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-35460-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-35461-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35461-9_3

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