The Responsibility to Lie and the Obligation to Report

One challenge in any discussion of whistleblowing is defining the term itself. While no definition is perfect, for the purposes of this paper, I will assume the definition articulated by Jubb (1999): “Whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto public record and is made by a person who has or had privileged access to data or information of an organization, about non-trivial illegality or other wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is under the control of that organization, to an external entity having potential to rectify the wrongdoing.”

For discussion of some of the ethical tensions inherent in the act of whistleblowing, see Landblom (2007), Jensen (1987), Larmer (1992), and Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005).

Among the tactics used against Wigand was the production of a 500 page dossier which purported to demonstrate that Wigand was an unstable and unreliable witness. See Hwang and Geyelin (1996).

As regards the allegations made against him by his employers, Brenner notes that the publicist responsible for the most damaging allegations was investigated by the Department of Justice on charges of witness intimidation (Brenner 1996, p. 5).

Brenner (1996, p. 21) much of the subsequent drama surrounding the story centered on the controversy within CBS about whether or not to run the story, given the possibility of lawsuits as well as other considerations. The details, while fascinating in their own right, are peripheral to the basic moral question at stake, namely the conflict between Wigand’s responsibilities as a former employee of B&W and his obligations to the larger public as a whistleblower. It does bear noting however that much of Brenner’s piece centers on the hardball tactics used by Brown & Williamson to silence Wigand, and the role that those tactics played in his ultimate decision. She summarizes the perspective of one of her interviewees, Jack Palladino, as follows: “For Palladino, there is little about Wigand that reminds him of Edmond Safra, the banker—and the client of Stanley Arkin—he worked for who was also the victim of a smear. Safra was motivated by a sense of moral outrage, Palladino tells me, whereas Wigand’s level of tension is a sign of pure fear” (Brenner 1996, p. 31).

For a recent discussion of consequentialist moral theory, see Mendola (2006).

For some recent discussions of the ethics of promising, see Patterson (1992) and Conee (2000).

One could argue that promise-making is a foundational example of an illocutionary act, a performative utterance the declaration of which brings about a particular state of being. Thus, the act of pledging loyalty to his employers brought about a set of obligations in Wigand that would otherwise have not existed. But, existing, such a pledge is by its nature binding. See Austin (1962).

The most extensive treatment of Bonhoeffer’s life, theology, and writing is Bethge (2000).

Thus, in his notes for Ethics, Bonhoeffer writes “It is better when the truthful person lies than when the liar speaks the truth.” This expresses well the paradoxical nature of ethical discernment in morally fraught circumstances. Bonhoeffer argues: “One sin is not like another. They have different weights. There are heavier and lighter sins. Falling away is far more serious than falling down. The most brilliant virtues of the apostates are as dark as night compared with the darkest weakness of the faithful.” Bonhoeffer (2005, p. 77).

This is a point that Bonhoeffer makes in a letter to his co-conspirators entitled “An Account of the Turn of the Year 1942–1943: After Ten Years,” in which he writes: “The man of conscience has no one but himself when resisting the superior might of predicaments that demand a decision. But the dimensions of the conflict wherein he must make his choices are such that, counseled and supported by nothing but his very own conscience, he is torn apart. The innumerable respectable and seductive disguises by which evil approaches him make his conscience fearful and unsure until he finally settles for a salved conscience instead of a good conscience, that is, until he deceives his own conscience in order not to despair. That a bad conscience my be stronger and more wholesome than a deceived one is something that the man whose sole support is his conscience can never comprehend.” (Bonhoeffer 2009, p. 39).

On this general conception in Bonhoeffer’s thought, see Schliesser (2008).