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Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual conference of SIEP, Pavia, September 2012; the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Delhi, January 2013; the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, January 2013; and the IIPF Congress in Taormina, Italy, August 2013. We thank Christoph Schinke and all participants for their helpful comments. We also thank Craig Brett, Jim Davies, Carlo Fiorio, Simone Ghislandi, Riccardo Puglisi, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Viviana Perego and Luca Riva for research assistance. Profeta thanks IDEP and CEPRA at the University of Lugano for their hospitality during the 2012–2013 academic year.
We present an empirical model of wealth transfer taxation in the revenue systems of the G7 countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US—over the period from 1965 to 2009. Our model emphasizes the influences of population aging and of the stock of household wealth in an explanation of the past and likely future of this tax source. Simulations with the model using U.N. demographic projections and projections of household wealth suggest that even in France and Germany where reliance on wealth transfer taxation has been increasing for part of the period studied, wealth transfer taxes can be expected to wither away as population aging deepens over the next two decades. Our results indicate that recent tax designs that rely upon the taxation of wealth transfers to preserve equity in the face of declining taxation of capital incomes may be, in this respect, politically infeasible for the foreseeable future. We conclude by using the case of wealth transfer taxation to raise the general question of the extent to which the consistency of a proposed reform with expected political equilibria ought to play a role in the design of a normative policy blueprint.
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- Wealth transfer taxation: an empirical investigation
Stanley L. Winer
- Springer US
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